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Abstract
THIS THESIS is structured around four empirical chapters examining related issues in cor-
porate governance. The sample of FTSE 350 companies 1995-2005 has unique properties
which are exploited to advance our understanding of the executive pay-setting process;
the turnover of Chief Executives (CEOs); the market’s reaction to shareholder activism
and voting behaviour; and the distribution of pay within the boardroom.
Chapter two assesses whether remuneration committees facilitate optimal contracting or
whether CEOs are able to capture the pay-setting process and inflate their own remunera-
tion. The findings of prior research, which have been mixed, are shown to be sensitive to
the econometric specification employed. A comprehensive assessment of non-executive
directors’ independence is undertaken. Little evidence is found to support a rents capture
model.
Chapter three applies duration analysis within a competing risks framework to model the
tenure and mode of exit of CEOs. The likelihood of forced departure is found to decrease
sharply from the fifth year of a CEO’s tenure. Some evidence is found to suggest that this
is because CEOs who survive beyond year four entrench themselves in their position.
Chapter four considers the impact of shareholder activism. Voting dissent appears incon-
sequential in terms of increasing shareholder returns, reducing CEO pay or increasing the
likelihood of CEO dismissal. However, firing the CEO of a poorly performing company
improves shareholder returns soon after the CEO’s dismissal.
Chapter five examines the structure and distribution of pay amongst board members. As
a test of tournament theory, the impact of a rival’s succession to CEO on the incumbent
directors’ compensation and likelihood of exit is examined. A rival’s succession has a
greater impact on the existing directors’ likelihood of exit than it does on compensation.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
‘Your company is bankrupt, you keep $480m. Is that fair?’
Californian representative Henry Waxman to Lehman Brothers Chief Executive Richard
Fuld1.
1.1 Background and Rationale for Research
The popularity of research in corporate governance and executive remuneration is self
evident. It satisfies many of the criteria that generates media and public interest, not
least a curiosity about the pay packets of some of the country’s highest earners2. It also
provokes those who take umbrage at the very large rewards to voice their discontent3.
Likewise, public interest in corporate governance naturally increases with the occurrence
of high profile corporate failures, especially when such failures are thought to be caused
by something systemic within the existing regulatory framework.
Less self evident is the worth of research in executive remuneration and corporate gov-
ernance from a dispassionate and objective perspective. Satisfying a popular curiosity is
not sufficient grounds to base a research agenda, nor is it the goal of this research. Rather
this research seeks to contribute to the body of microeconomic knowledge in the field of
governance and remuneration. In addition, this research, being empirical throughout, has
direct implications for policy makers and practitioners in the governance and remunera-
tion industries.
1See Guardian 7th October 2008.
2See the coverage given to the publication of The Times’ annual ‘Rich List’.
3Consider the widespread discontent regarding the remuneration of bankers in the context of the present
financial crisis. For example in the quote above.
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It is not fully understood what determines the levels of pay received by top directors.
Nor is it understood why, over the last twenty years, executive pay has risen quicker than
inflation, average employee wages and equity markets. The resolution of these questions
is particularly interesting, given accusations from a wide range of disciplines, that current
levels of pay for top managers are too high and continued rises are unjustified. Often,
such claims have been made on the grounds of fairness and ethics (Perel, 2003). However,
more revelent to an economic research programme, is the accusation that high executive
pay reveals inefficiency in the pay-setting process resulting in pay arrangements that do
not provide appropriate incentives and do not enhance value (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004).
The economics of executive remuneration contracts are normally understood in the con-
text of a principal-agent relationship whereby the manager experiences different incen-
tives to the owner (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As some actions of the manager are hid-
den from the principal (the moral hazard problem), the manager might pursue an agenda
at the owner’s expense without incurring punishment from the owner (Holmstrom, 1979).
Further, the managerial agenda is unlikely to be in the public interest, whereas the opti-
misation of shareholder value is the basis upon which resources are allocated efficiently
within a market economy. The remuneration contract might alleviate these problems by
realigning the incentives of the agent with those of the principal (Jensen and Murphy,
1990). For example, a manager may receive a bonus for good performance or be granted
share options. These incentive instruments are designed to facilitate congruence between
the goals of the manager and their owner. However, if hidden actions extend to the manip-
ulation of the pay-setting process, executives could design a system that provides rewards
regardless of performance or pursuing shareholder interests (Bertrand and Mullainathan,
2001). Within this framework, the yardstick for testing the efficiency of remuneration
arrangements is the extent to which managers are rewarded for success (Murphy, 1999).
Pay-for-performance may also help to solve the problem of ex-ante information asym-
metry (the lemons problem) in the hiring process (Oyer and Schaefer, 2005). Full in-
formation regarding the agent’s suitability for the job is hidden from the principal (e.g.
the manager will try to hide their shortcomings in the job interview) and therefore the
principal risks hiring a bad manager that generates a lower return than the good manager.
This problem might be compounded if the principal offers a contract equal to the expected
return of the two, as this will be insufficient to attract the good manager but sufficient to
secure the services of a bad manager. However, the prospect of pay-for-performance is
more attractive to good managers and hence good managers will self-select into compa-
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nies that offer pay-for-performance.
However, the pay-performance relation might be a misleading indicator of the efficiency
of remuneration arrangements (Frey and Osterloh, 2005; Froud, Leaver, McAndrew, and
Shammai, 2008). First, as pay-for-performance is risky, pay-for-performance is more
costly to satisfy a risk-averse agent (Hall and Murphy, 2002). Second, there are practical
issues as to how to implement pay-for-performance. Agents’ actions will tend towards
the aspect of performance that is being measured, to the detriment of non-rewardable
aspects of performance (Prendergast, 1999). For example, concern has been raised that
practice of uncapped annual bonuses in the financial services sector contributed to the
neglect of sustainable growth over the longer term4. Indeed, principal and agent are likely
to differ in the period over which they would like performance to be assessed (Dikolli,
2001). A residual claimant of a pension fund would like good stock performance over the
period of their working life, whereas the majority of ‘long-term’ equity incentives vest
after only three years. Finally, in attempting to secure the services of a highly valued
manager, who perhaps has unique knowledge of the company’s business operations, the
principal may offer lock-in incentives. The retention of such a manager would likely be
welfare enhancing, as efficient resource allocation requires that managers are positioned
where their skills will have the highest impact. For example, the principal may offer
a long-term contract with specified liquidated damages for early termination. Such a
contract might elicit more risky behaviour from the agent. This might be desirable, if
the principal (being risk-neutral due to their diversified portfolio of shares) wants the
agent to undertake projects that are riskier than naturally selected by a risk averse agent.
However, commitment from the principal to the agent is only credible if it is costly for the
principal to withdraw their commitment. Therefore, the incentives provided by the threat
of dismissal are reduced and, in extreme cases, can generate perverse reward-for-failure
incentives which are the polar opposite of pay-for-performance (Trade and Industry Select
Committee, 2003).
Therefore, rather than simply investigate the pay-performance relation (which has been
examined extensively in the literature (Tosi, Werner, Katz, and Gomez-Mejia, 2000)), it
might be more interesting to examine the pay-setting process directly. In response to ac-
cusations of capture, UK reform efforts have been directed at increasing independence in
the pay-setting process (Combined Code, 2006). Hence, institutional shareholders expect
4Another example is the suspicion that executives may favour share buy-backs over dividend repayments
as a means of returning cash to shareholders if the executives are remunerated under an incentive scheme
that pays out against growth in earnings per share.
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the establishment of a remuneration committee that consists of non-executive directors
who are independent from the executive management. Of course, the extent to which
such directors are truly independent is central to the issue of whether the pay-setting pro-
cess reflects the interests of shareholders or the executives themselves. This is the topic
of chapter 2.
Implicit in the remuneration literature is the assumption that agency problems require
resolution through the creation of appropriate financial incentives. However, it is inter-
esting to consider whether the agency problems that arise from hidden actions have been
overstated. If the process of hiring and firing CEOs is efficient then complex remunera-
tion arrangements are less necessary. Any CEO who does not exert maximum effort in
pursuit of shareholder value would be replaced by the next manager eager to take their
place5. Thus, the threat of dismissal might diminish the need for costly incentive based
remuneration.
However, concerns have been raised that substantial obstacles prevent the efficient re-
moval of CEOs. Firm performance might not adequately represent CEO competence,
diligence and effort. Even after the firm performance has been observed and the actions
of the CEO have been scrutinised (perhaps at a shareholders meeting) it might not be
clear how the actions of the CEO have contributed to firm value. Furthermore, in light
of the most egregious abuses of power, CEO’s have been allowed to ‘resign’ rather than
face the sack6. Similar to the capture of the pay-setting process, if the CEO is able to fill
their board with friendly directors they might be able to resist pressure to step down from
shareholders following poor performance (Weisbach, 1988; Adams and Ferreira, 2007).
Yet this process of entrenchment may take time (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003) and there-
fore a framework is required that allows exploration of the varying likelihood of dismissal
over the duration of the CEOs tenure. Duration analysis is such a framework and chapter
3 applies this method to gain insights into the processes driving CEO tenure and mode of
exit.
An indication of the extent to which firing the CEO is important can be measured by
analysing the stock market’s reaction to such an event. If management is entrenched,
extracting rents from shareholders and resisting pressure to exit, then a successful dis-
missal should be viewed favourably by the market. Despite some voices to the contrary
(Monks and Minow, 2004), extant US research has found little evidence to suggest that
5In fact, even if maximum effort is exerted the executive might get fired if somebody of greater talent is
available.
6See, for instance, Jeffrey Skilling of Enron Corp (Business Week 15 August 2001).
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activism by shareholders improve shareholder returns (Karpoff, 2001). However, institu-
tional reforms in the UK have invested considerable effort in increasing the participation
of shareholders (Hampel, 1998; Myners, 2001, 2004). As a starting point, shareholders
have been encouraged to make considered use of their voting rights at company meetings,
rather than rubber stamp management proposals. The extent to which increased levels of
voting have influenced returns, governance arrangements or remuneration arrangements
is currently unknown and will be explored in chapter 4.
As discussed above, hidden action and hidden information concerns may be one mecha-
nism driving large levels of performance-related CEO remuneration. However, an alterna-
tive justification could be the incentives that CEO remuneration provides to those involved
in a competition for promotion (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). If subordinates are prepared
to sacrifice current pay for the prospect of winning CEO level remuneration, then large
differentials between CEO pay and subordinate pay are to be expected. Investigating tour-
nament theory requires subtle tests to distinguish between alternative hypothesises. For
instance, to maintain tournament incentives, the prize should be increasing in the number
of participants but the ability of the board to recruit from outside the firm complicates
the measurement of the number of players. An alternative is to analyse the compensation
to the losers of the tournament, together with how their likelihood of exit changes when
a rival is promoted to CEO. By exploring these phenomena, a clearer picture should de-
velop as to the extent to which firms use promotion tournaments as a device for motivating
directors.
Several data and measurement issues have arisen in prior studies examining related is-
sues of corporate governance and executive remuneration. While company disclosures on
remuneration are more complete in recent years, the complexity of remuneration arrange-
ments remains a challenge for researchers. In addition to a basic salary, directors can
receive annual bonus payments, deferred bonus entitlements, matching shares on deferred
bonuses, recruitment incentives, stock options, long term equity incentives, transaction
bonuses or pension benefits. There is considerable heterogeneity in application of the dif-
ferent elements amongst companies. For example, the conditions for vesting on option
and long term equity incentives vary and of particular concern is the extent to which they
vest with respect to performance.
This research has used data provided by Manifest Information Services Ltd. The dataset
has several desirable characteristics which allows both the exploration into new areas of
research unavailable to prior researchers as well as more accurate investigation of hy-
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potheses undertaken in prior studies. Indeed, to a certain extent, the research project
has been structured to maximise the potential of the dataset. For this reason, the thesis
comprises four separate empirical investigations, albeit on the related theme of corporate
governance. It also appropriate that some summary statistics are presented within this
introductory chapter to establish the key features and trends associated with executive
remuneration and corporate governance in the UK. A brief description of the sample is
provided in section 1.3 and further issues associated with the sample are described in the
relevant chapters.
Contributions to the literature have been received from several disciplines including labour
economics, finance, strategy, industrial organisation, business ethics and other social sci-
ences. There is a danger that this research could muddle together a mix of these different
strands of the literature without making a significant contribution to any of them. This
thesis uses agency theory as a lens to analyse large public companies in the UK. Agency
theory presupposes that the optimisation of shareholder value is the mark of good gov-
ernance and desirable pay setting arrangements. While this assumption is contestable,
it is not the place of this thesis to debate an agency vs stakeholder paradigm of corpo-
rate governance. Nor does this thesis consider the critique that a market based pursuit
of shareholder value is myopic; overly focused on the short term at the expense of long
term value. Rather, this thesis seeks to determine whether or not governance and remu-
neration arrangements are assisting the mitigation of agency problems or whether agency
problems are unresolved and the institutional arrangements we observe contribute to man-
agerial power, entrenchment and extraction of rents.
This introduction seeks to establish the importance of research in executive remuneration
and corporate governance and will set the context for the remainder of the thesis. The
following sections in this chapter will provide an overview of remuneration and gover-
nance arrangements in the UK. A summary of the research is provided explaining how
the exploration of these topics will contribute to the body of knowledge in field of applied
microeconomics. Academic research in remuneration and governance also has direct im-
plications for the development of best practice. Therefore, this research may also serve
as a useful resource for both policy makers and practitioners in the remuneration and
corporate governance industries.
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1.2 UK Remuneration and Governance
The central trait that most UK and US public companies share is a divorce between owner-
ship and control (Keasey, Thompson, and Wright, 1997; Hart, 1995), with control concen-
trated in the CEO or a small number of executive directors and ownership spread amongst
a large number of diverse shareholders (Berle and Means, 1932). Anglo-American di-
rectors bear a fiduciary duty to the shareholders above other stakeholder groups. This
description of an Anglo-American corporation lends itself well to analysis under agency
theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) which presupposes the overriding objective of the
firm is the maximisation of shareholder value (Tirole, 2001) and that the challenge of cor-
porate governance is how best to ensure this objective is not hindered by the guile and self
interest of management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
While similarities certainly do exists between UK and US vis-à-vis governance arrange-
ments in other territories7 the bundled term ‘Anglo-American’ is somewhat misleading as
subtle differences exist between practice in the US and UK. This thesis solely examines
large UK public companies. It is appropriate therefore to set the context of this research
by briefly outlining the corporate governance and executive remuneration arrangements
specific to the UK. Indeed, UK directors are not paid like US directors (Conyon and Mur-
phy, 2000), UK shareholders act differently and enjoy different rights to US shareholders
(Black and Coffee, 1994; Short and Keasey, 2005) and the UK government takes a differ-
ent approach to the regulation of UK companies than the US does to its firms 8.
The governance and executive remuneration arrangements that feature within public com-
panies in the UK have been framed by a complex mixture of mandatory and voluntary reg-
ulatory initiatives. Companies incorporated within the UK are subject to the Companies
Act (1985) and its subsequent amendments including, for instance, the Directors’ Remu-
neration Report Regulations (2002). Non-compliance with the act is a criminal offence
and the directors of the company, including the non-executive directors, are liable. Com-
panies that are publicly traded on the official list of the London Stock Exchange (LSE)
are also subject to the UK Listing Authority’s9 Listing Rules (2008b), Prospectus Rules
7Governance models in other countries give more recognition to a wider collection of stakeholder
groups. Germany companies, for instance, appoint employee representatives to serve on their boards. See
Keasey, Thompson, and Wright (2005) for a review of the literature on non ‘Anglo-American’ corporate
governance.
8For instance, compare the voluntary UK Combined Code (1999) to the mandatory US Sarbanes-Oxley
(2002) act.
9The current UK Listing Authority is the Financial Services Authority (FSA).
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(2008c)and Disclosure and Transparency Rules (2008a). Appended to the Listing Rules is
the Combined Code (1999, 2003, 2006) with which companies who are UK incorporated
are obliged to comply or explain their non-compliance10.
In addition to this regulatory regime, there has been a series of best practice documents
issued by lobby groups who provided guidance to institutional shareholders and make rec-
ommendations to companies themselves. The two most influential lobby groups are the
Association of British Insurers (ABI) and National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF).
Companies that ignore or deviate from this institutional guidance risk censure from the
business press and disgruntled shareholders. The extent to which, the threat of such cen-
sure acts as a discipline upon managerial behavior is, of course, the subject of much debate
(Karpoff, 2001; Selvaggi and Upton, 2008). This will be a continuing theme throughout
this thesis in particular in chapter 4 where details of how lobby groups endeavour to exer-
cise their influence are reviewed.
1.2.1 Governance
UK public companies are governed by a single board of directors. This unitary board will
typically comprise a team of executive directors responsible for the day to day operation
of the company and a number of non-executive directors who act in a supervisory capac-
ity. The distribution of the composition of boards in our sample is shown in 1.111. The
management team is typically headed by a Chief Executive (CEO) and board meetings
are led by a Chairman. Executive directors, other than the CEO commonly reflect impor-
tant divisional or geographical heads and a Finance Director (FD) will also serve on the
board. A Company Secretary usually attends the board meetings but is not considered a
director unless the role is combined with another executive role as is sometimes the case
in smaller companies. One of the non-executive directors will be nominated as the senior
independent director (SID). The SID is obliged to make herself available to sharehold-
ers who wish to raise issues but whatever reason do not want to channel their concerns
through the Chairman.
10It is possible to incorporate in certain territories outside the UK and still trade on the LSE (see section
1.3).
11The large number of boards with no executive directors is due to the inclusion of investment trust
companies which are later excluded from our analysis.
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Figure 1.1: Distribution of Directors Within Boards
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1.2.2 Ownership
Directors typically own some of their company’s stock although these holdings are nor-
mally small in percentage terms, consistent with the principal-agent framework. Execu-
tive directors are also encouraged to retain shares from the vesting of options and long
term equity incentives. Institutional guidance (ABI (2006)) recommends that executive
directors build a meaningful shareholding and this is typically interpreted by companies
to equal at least the director’s annual salary. However, founding directors still serving on
the board often retain a significant shareholding after the Company’s Initial Public Offer
(IPO).
Figure 1.2 shows the mean and median equity holdings for the companies in our sample.
In our sample median board holdings are less than 1% of the company’s equity (see fig-
ure 1.2). Mean ownership is higher but declined significantly following the end of the
technology bubble in 2000. This reflects the fact that technology stocks are commonly
managed by the company’s founders. It also reflects a move by directors to diversify their
positions alongside a general market downturn.
The Financial Services Authority (FSA) requires under its ‘Disclosure and Transparency
9
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Rules’ that major holders of the company’s stock are identified. Any toehold stake above
3% of the Company’s equity or 3% of the voting rights must be declared in the annual
report and accounts (DTR 5)12. 88% of companies in our sample had at least one disclosed
shareholder and figure 1.3 shows the average size of the toehold for those companies. If
a director’s shareholding (either as individuals or as a concert party) increases to between
30% and 50% of the Company’s equity then they are obligated to make an offer for the
company under Rule 9 of the City Code (2006). Waivers of Rule 9 are possible if approved
by the remaining shareholders and the takeover panel.
The number of toeholds in our sample is difficult to reconcile with the benefits to diver-
sifying as far as possible within a portfolio in order to minimise firm-specific risk. There
is a large literature that discusses the possible merits for outside shareholders owning
a sizeable position in a single company (Admati, Pfleiderer, and Zechner, 1994; Burkart,
Gromb, and Panunzi, 1997). Shleifer and Vishny (1986) present toeholds as a possible so-
lution to the free rider problem in takeovers as articulated by Grossman and Hart (1980).
Of particular relevance to this thesis is the concept of the ‘active investor’ who takes a
large position in a poorly governed company and uses its influence to make changes to
operations and management in the hope of making a return (Becht, Franks, Mayer, and
Rossi, 2008). This literature is discussed further in chapter 4.
1.2.3 Executive Remuneration
The components of a typical FTSE 350 executive director’s remuneration package consist
of salary, bonuses, benefits and long term equity incentives. Descriptive statistics of these
components are given in table 1.1. Within the FTSE 350, the largest 30 companies pay
significantly above the average, with the biggest difference resulting from the grants of
share options and long term incentives (approximately 4 times the average).
One notable omission from table 1.1 is information on pensions. Currently, Manifest
does not record the details of pension schemes in its database, although information can
be found within their Meeting Business reports. Executive directors typically have either
a defined contribution arrangement based on a percentage of salary (or receive additional
salary in lieu of contributions), or belong to the company’s defined benefit scheme. De-
fined benefit schemes typically provide for two-thirds final salary per annum on retire-
12Prior to 20th January 2007, the Companies Act (1985) required notification of holdings when they
exceed 3% of the ordinary issued share capital i.e. it was possible to hold in excess of 3% of the voting
rights and not disclose the holding.
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Table 1.1: Remuneration Arrangements
Remuneration Typical Policy Median Levels (£)
Component FTSE350 FTSE100 FTSE30
Salary Determined by reference to benchmarks such 310,000 433,000 500,000
as size, industry and location.
Annual Bonus Subject to financial and non-financial objectives. 258,750 420,000 617,405
Some or all may be deferred into shares.
Bonus is capped as percentage of salary. 100% 133% 150%
Transaction, sign-on or retention bonuses are rare.
Benefits Expenses occurred in normal course of business. 19,507 26,129 33,000
Exceptional payments include relocation allowances.
Compensation for loss of office limited to 12
months’ salary and benefits.
Share Options Granted annually as a percentage of salary based 379,055 786,240 1,547,776
and LTIPs on face value. Vest after three years subject to
performance conditions.
Nominal prices, policy and composition of Index as at May 2008.
Bonuses are typically uncapped in the investment banking sector.
ment, subject to a certain number years service (normally between 20 and 40).
Executive remuneration is determined by a sub-committee of the board known as the
remuneration committee. The Combined Code (2006) recommends that remuneration
committees comprise solely of independent non-executive directors. The Chairman may
be a member of the committee provided that they do not serve as executive chairman 13.
The remuneration committee is licensed to appoint its own external specialist remuner-
ation advisers who give guidance on the appropriate structure, levels and disclosure of
executive remuneration. Remuneration advisers have been accused of contributing to the
excesses of executive pay, facilitating the capture of rents by powerful and entrenched
managers (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). Remuneration advisers are thought to be particu-
larly vulnerable to capture if they provide additional tax or audit services to the company.
The revenue stream that the supply of such services generates could compromise the im-
partiality of the advice supplied to executives. Since 2003, UK companies subject to the
Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations have been required to disclose the name of
the Remuneration Committee’s advisers and any other services provided by the remu-
neration advisers. Conyon (2008) provides evidence that, in both the US and the UK,
companies that retain specialist remuneration advisers pay their directors more. However,
13The extent to which remuneration committees are truly independent from the executives whose pay
they determine is the subject of chapter 2.
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Table 1.2: FTSE 350 Remuneration Advisers
Adviser FTSE 350 FTSE100 FTSE30
New Bridge Street Consultants 112 32% 31 31% 8 27%
Towers Perrin 55 16% 38 38% 11 37%
Kepler Associates 36 10% 17 17% 9 30%
Deloitte & Touche 38 11% 16 16% 9 30%
Watson Wyatt 28 8% 6 6% 3 10%
Hewitt Associates 14 4% 5 5% 2 7%
Internal Advice 193 55% 73 73% 22 73%
One company may employ more than one remuneration adviser.
Internal Advice identifies cases whether the remuneration committee draws upon the services of em-
ployees of the company.
Hewitt Associates acquired New Bridge Street Consultants in March 2008.
no evidence is found to suggest that this phenomenon is compounded when advisers sup-
ply additional services to the company. Moreover, a stronger pay-performance sensitivity
is reported companies who retain consultants. These results are consistent with Cadman,
Carter, and Hillegeist (2008) who arrive at the same conclusions using a sample of US
firms.
Table 1.2 shows the number of companies to which the five largest remuneration advis-
ers provide services. Internal advice typically includes one of, or a combination of, the
company’s Human Resources department, the CEO, the Chairman or Company Secretary.
1.2.4 Reform since 1992
A defining feature of the period that is studied here is that it spans a decade of progres-
sive corporate governance reform. A very different governance regime existed in 1995
compared to 2005. Table 1.3 sets out the key differences in disclosure, practice, and ex-
pectations facing companies at the start and end of the period. A sizeable literature has
emerged documenting the history of the reform process (see Solomon (2007) for a full re-
view). Provided here, is a brief overview in order establish an appreciation of the differing
governance environment facing companies at various points in our sample.
In response to some high profile corporate scandals in the 1980s (e.g. Maxwell Com-
munications) and economic recession UK in the early nineties, public scrutiny fell upon
the accountability and transparency of board decisions (Solomon, 2007). As a result,
the government established the Cadbury Committee (1992) in an attempt to document a
consensus of best corporate governance practice. Jones and Pollitt (2004) credit the Cad-
bury Report with a range of sensible and practical recommendations which were widely
13
Table 1.3: Governance Environment 1995 and 2005
Standard Practice 1995 Standard Practice 2005
Best Practice Cadbury Report (General); Hampel & Myners (shareholder activism); Higgs & Tyson (Board);
Greenbury Report (Remuneration); Smith (Audit) Turnbull (Internal Control); Combined
Institutional Shareholders Committee; Code (General); Remuneration Report Regulations;
Pre-emption guidelines Voluminous Institutional Guidance (ABI, NAPF, ITC)
Board Separate Chairman and Chief Executive
At least two NEDs on Board At least half independent NEDs (excluding the Chair)
Nomination Committee established Nomination Committee - majority of independent NEDs
No limit on directorships Annual performance evaluation
Maximum of 1 FTSE 100 directorship
Remuneration 3 Year service contracts 12 months service contract
Remuneration Committee established Wholly independent Remuneration Committee
Voluntary disclosure of remuneration Mandatory disclosure of remuneration and advisors
No vote on remuneration report Mandatory but non-binding vote on remuneration report
Parachute clauses Options vest subject to performance and time-pro rated
Audit Audit Committee established Wholly independent Audit Committee
Financial expertise on the Audit Committee
Whistle-blowing procedures
Shareholders Non-voting shares not rare Typically one share, one vote
Institutions cast votes with management Expectation to make informed voting decisions
Proposals passed on a show of hands Electronic proxy poll voting
Poll turnout approximately 50% Poll turnout approximately 60%
Active investment funds rare Some active investment funds
Parachute clauses provide compensation for directors in the event of dismissal following a change of ownership.
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adopted and have been used as the basis of best practice recommendations outside the
UK. The Cadbury Report founded the principle of ‘comply or explain’ on which much
subsequent reform was based. As such, companies are free not to comply provided they
justify their non-compliance to shareholders14. Shareholders then choose to accept the
explanation for non-compliance or to take a range of actions that might include demand-
ing compliance in the form of a shareholder resolution, proposing to dismiss the board or,
ultimately, selling their shares.
The Greenbury Report (1995) focused explicitly on executive remuneration. Amidst pub-
lic discontent at the earnings of ‘fat cats’ and academic research suggesting a lack of trans-
parency in the pay-setting process (Main and Johnston, 1992) and a disconnect between
executive pay and company performance (Conyon and Leech, 1994; Conyon, Gregg, and
Machin, 1995), Greenbury established the remuneration committee as standard practice
and encouraged the use of ‘long-term incentive plans’ (LTIPs). LTIPs are grants of shares
which vest against explicit performance conditions such as inflation-adjusted earnings
per share (EPS) targets or total shareholder return (TSR) ranking against an appropriate
benchmark. Share options were also encouraged, provided that they too contained perfor-
mance conditions.
A series of best practice documents also emerged covering other areas of corporate gover-
nance as noted in table 1.3. The majority of the recommendations from the Higgs review
(2002), which examined the role of chairmen and non-executive directors, were adopted
in the revised version of the Combined Code (2003). Of particular relevance to chap-
ter 2 was the formalisation of the criteria by which non-executive directors were deemed
independent.
Backed by the full weight of company law, the Directors’ Remuneration Report Reg-
ulations (2002) both clarified disclosure rules and gave a non-binding vote on pay to
shareholders. The implications and merits of this act are discussed in chapter 4 as are the
Hampel (1998) and Myners (2001, 2004) proposals which were designed to encourage
shareholder participation in governance.
14Practically, this will take place at the AGM, or in consultation with major shareholders throughout the
year.
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Figure 1.4: Proportion of Chairman with Executive Responsibility
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Role of chairmen and non-executive directors
Chairmen have a unique role in the governance of UK companies. The Combined Code
(2003) does not classify chairmen as non-executive directors but neither are they necessar-
ily executive directors. Rather, chairmen are thought of as being guardians of shareholder
interests and an important contributor to the strategy of organisation, as well as being a fa-
cilitator between the executive and non-executive parties. Economic research undertaken
from an agency perspective has emphasised the importance of the monitoring function
of chairmen and non-executive directors (Jensen, 1993). Indeed, an important aspect of
the investigation undertaken in chapter 2 is the effectiveness of such monitoring. Yet, if
chairmen facilitate discussions between board members over the Company’s strategy, it
might be argued that there is nobody more qualified than the CEO (Daily, Johnson, Ell-
strand, and Dalton, 1998). Of course, the concerns that this might lead to dominance and
managerial rent seeking at the expense of shareholders are well documented (Peel and
O’Donnell, 1995). The decision to combine or separate the roles of Chairman and CEO
is typical of the tension between information and accountability that characterises much
of the debate regarding the composition and effectiveness of boards.
The separation of the roles of Chairman and Chief Executive also has significance in
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Figure 1.5: Board Composition
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the history of the UK reform process. Figure 1.4 shows the decline in the proportion of
chairmen with executive responsibility and the decline in those chairmen also serving as
CEO. This is consistent with the re-emphasis on the monitoring role of chairmen during
the reforming period, the need for accountability in the boardroom and the explicit call to
separate the roles of Chairman and Chief Executive (Higgs, 2003; Combined Code, 2003).
A combined Chairman-Chief Executive role is now a controversial arrangement for large
UK public companies. Sir Stuart Rose’s recent move to try to combine the roles at Marks
& Spencer, (even on a temporary basis) provoked the Company’s major shareholders to
draft a protest resolution at the Company’s 2008 Annual General Meeting (AGM).
The same tension between information and accountability is also an important feature of
the debate surrounding the independence of non-executive directors. During the reform
process, the call for more independent non-executive directors has been reiterated. Figure
1.5 shows an increase in the proportion of non-executive directors and the fall in the
number of insiders during our sample. For simplicity, an insider here is considered to be an
executive director or a non-executive director not considered independent by the company.
Chapter 2 explicitly examines the characteristics of non-executive director independence
and the extent to which independence matters is explored in more depth.
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1.3 FTSE 350 Companies
The sample used throughout this thesis is the FTSE 350 Index, i.e. the largest 350 compa-
nies traded on the LSE by market capitalisation. The sample begins with those companies
who were members of the FTSE 350 and had their financial year end on or after 1st Jan-
uary 1995. The sample follows those companies even if they fall out of the index until
they are wound up or taken private and also includes all other companies who enter the
FTSE 350 until their last financial year in 2005. Institutional expectations of corporate
governance of FTSE 350 companies are more stringent than smaller listed companies. For
instance, the Combined Code (2006) recommends that the boards of FTSE 350 companies
comprise at least 50% non-executive directors whereas companies outside the FTSE 350
are only expected to have at least two non-executive directors.
There are a small number of FTSE 350 companies who are incorporated outside the UK.
These companies are not subject to the same governance regime as UK companies. While
such companies are under institutional pressure to comply with the Combined Code (and
an inspection of these companies’ reports and accounts revealed that these companies
do generally make disclosures consistent with the Combined Code (2006)) it is useful to
identify these in our sample (see table 1.4).
There are also a small number of FTSE 350 companies who are incorporated in the UK
but maintain a dual listing on a foreign exchange. A dual listed company (DLC) is differ-
ent from a ‘cross listing’ where the shares of a company are simply traded on a foreign
exchange (Karolyi, 1998). Indeed, approximately 25% of the FTSE 100 allow their shares
to be traded on the New York Stock Exchange through American Depositary Receipts15.
DLCs are best understood as a merger between two companies in two different territories
who combine their operations and cash flows, but retain separate identities and share-
holder registries (Bedi, Richards, and Tennant, 2003). DLCs may share a single board,
pay a single dividend or give shareholders of the two entities equal voting rights. Careful
attention must be paid to DLCs to ensure that measures of company size and performance
are accurate.
DLCs are potentially interesting as evidence has been presented suggesting that despite
holding identical cash flow rights there can exist substantial differences in the prices of
the two equities (Rosenthal and Young, 1990). Also they contradict market efficiency
15See http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/listed.html. A number of UK companies (Cable & Wireless, ICI,
BG Group) have de-listed from the NYSE as the regulatory burden of maintaining a US listing has increased
post Sarbanes-Oxley (2002).
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Table 1.4: FTSE 350 Non-UK and Dual Listed Companies
Company Country Dual Listing
888 Holdings plc Gibraltar
Alea Group Holdings Ltd Bermuda
Allied Zurich plc UK Switzerland
Aquarius Platinum Ltd Bermuda
BATM Advanced Communications Ltd Israel
BHP Billiton plc UK Australia
Benfield Group Ltd Bermuda
Berkeley Technology Ltd Jersey
Brambles Industries plc UK Australia
Carnival plc UK US
Catlin Group Ltd Bermuda
Colt Telecom Group SA Luxembourg
Dexion Absolute Ltd Guernsey
Emblaze Ltd Israel
Eurotunnel plc UK France*
F&C Commercial Property Trust Ltd Guernsey
Insight Foundation Property Trust Ltd Guernsey
Investec plc UK South Africa
Mapeley Ltd Guernsey
Partygaming plc Gibraltar
Petrofac Ltd Jersey
Randgold Resources Ltd Jersey
Reed Elsevier plc UK Netherlands
Rio Tinto plc UK Australia
Shell Transport & Trading Company plc UK Netherlands
SmithKline Beecham plc UK US
Unilever plc UK Netherlands
* Unlike the other dual listed companies, Eurotunnel plc and Eurotunnel SA shares were not traded
separately but combined through a twinning agreement.
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(Froot and Dabora, 1999); and when a DLC becomes a single entity the company’s market
exposure increases in the country where it lists and decreases from the country where it
has delisted (Bedi, Richards, and Tennant, 2003). However, for the purposes of this thesis
it will suffice to have DLCs identified in our data and hence we can take account of them
in our econometric analysis.
1.4 Summary of Research
The remainder of this thesis is structured as four empirical investigations. A review of the
related literature is contained within each empirical chapter. Chapter 2 tests two major
theories of executive directors’ pay-determination using data on FTSE 350 companies.
The chapter seeks to determine whether remuneration committees facilitate optimal con-
tracting or whether CEOs are able to capture the pay-setting process and inflate their own
remuneration. During the period of our sample, companies reformed the composition of
their boards in line with institutional guidance. This resulted in an increase in the propor-
tion of independent non-executive directors available to serve on the remuneration com-
mittee. Under a rents capture model, independent non-executive directors might be more
resilient to capture by the CEO and thus we would expect less favourable remuneration
packages for the CEO, ceteris paribus.
Prior studies have arrived at different conclusions regarding the importance of indepen-
dence in the pay-setting process. Chapter 2 examines the econometric specifications of
these studies in order to determine the extent to which prior findings are sensitive to the
chosen methodology, before building towards a final preferred estimator. The sample used
in this chapter contains several important features which enable thorough examination of
the issues. These details were often lacking in prior studies. In particular, we have ac-
cess to a more comprehensive assessment of non-executive directors’ independence than
previously available in the literature.
Chapter 3 explores the tenure and mode of exit of Chief Executives from FTSE 350 com-
panies from 1996-2005. Prior studies have applied logit models to predict CEO turnover.
However, this chapter uses duration analysis within a competing risks framework to eval-
uate the threat of dismissal faced by CEOs. This framework explicitly allows for multiple
exit states and thus, unlike a logit model, recognises the different risks from all causes
(retirement, headhunted, dismissal, etc) until exit to one destination occurs, or the CEO is
censored by the end of the sample period. Explanatory variables, such as total shareholder
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return and measures of the CEOs entrenchment are found to impact on the different exit
states in different ways. Some evidence is found to suggest that CEOs are able to entrench
themselves in their position. Evidence is also presented on whether or not the reform of
UK corporate governance that occurred over the duration of the sample has made CEO
turnover more likely.
Chapter 4 investigates the extent to which shareholders play a pro-active role in the gov-
ernance of their companies. Under the Jensen and Meckling (1976) model, governance
devices will be employed up to the point where their marginal benefit equates with the
marginal cost of such measures. However, given typically dispersed shareholders with
low individual incentives to monitor managers it might be assumed that active participa-
tion in the decision making process is unlikely. Yet over the last 15 years, institutions have
been encouraged to play a more active role and companies have been put under pressure to
offer more opportunities for shareholder participation16. The premise of these reforms is
that more engagement with shareholders will reduce deviant behaviour by management,
improve the governance of companies and result in greater returns for shareholders. In
particular, the Hampel (1998) and Myners (2001, 2004) reports have called for greater
levels of shareholder voting. Voting is cheap for shareholders and therefore perhaps the
first form of activism that might be undertaken. The work in chapter 4 represents the first
formal analysis of shareholder votes with panel data. The voting results at shareholder
meetings are analysed in order to determine whether they have any bearing on future
governance arrangements or shareholder returns.
In addition, in order to provide a comparison between voting and undertaking more di-
rect engagements, chapter 4 conducts an event study concerning the market’s reaction to
a forced CEO departure17. Shareholders of an under-performing company might wish to
remove the CEO by placing pressure on the board to take action. The average abnormal
returns around the time of such an event provide an indication of whether this is a worth-
while activity or not. We also repeat the exercise for the CEOs who retired and for those
who were headhunted.
Chapter 5 examines the distribution of pay between executive directors. The distribution
of boardroom pay has the potential to provide insights into tournament theory. In partic-
ular, we seek to understand the impact of a CEO succession event from the perspective
of the existing executive directors. Executive directors who are passed over for promo-
16See Schedule D of the Combined Code (2006).
17Thereby, making further use of the different categories of CEO exit identified in chapter 3.
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tion may suffer a loss in promotion incentives if they are either too old or unsuited to
participate in the next succession competition. A loss in promotion incentives might be
associated with an increase in remuneration if the director was previously sacrificing a
proportion of their marginal product for the prospect of winning the promotion. If there
is no compensation when a defeat occurs, then the director will face a strong incentive
to earn their marginal product elsewhere. This introduces the possibility of an interesting
paradox whereby the differential between the first and second prizes might be reduced,
partially negating the original promotion incentive.
Alternatively, being passed over for promotion may reduce external promotion opportu-
nities, which may moderate these effects. These factors may also have interesting inter-
action effects with the age of the directors, as younger directors may participate in future
promotion competitions. We explore these hypothesises by analysing the impact on ex-
ecutive remuneration and the likelihood of exit when a CEO succession event occurs.
Conclusions, policy implications, suggestions for future research and final thoughts are
brought together in chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2
Chief Executive Pay and Non-executive
Director Independence
‘All of the Company’s directors are independent, and the Audit, Nominating
and Corporate Governance, Finance and Risk, and Compensation and Bene-
fits Committees are composed exclusively of independent directors.’
Lehman Brothers Annual Report 2007.
2.1 Introduction
The debate concerning the nature of the pay-setting process at the highest level in organi-
sations has received renewed interest in recent times. Two principal lines of thought from
the US are being advanced: Optimal contracting theory suggests that executive directors’
remuneration contracts are determined in a way that optimises shareholders’ desire to re-
cruit, retain and motivate executives of the appropriate calibre against the cost of such
contracts. In contrast, some have argued that due to managerial rent seeking, remuner-
ation contracts are sub-optimal and inflated in favour of executive directors. This is an
unresolved agency problem which stems from the fact that powerful managers might be
able to capture the pay-setting process1.
The research programme in the UK has been undertaken in a different context. UK ex-
ecutive directors earn a fraction of their US counterparts (Conyon and Murphy, 2000).
1Typical of this debate is Core, Guay, and Thomas (2004)’s defence of optimal contracting following
Bebchuk and Fried (2004)’s critique of remuneration practices in the US.
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UK executives have not been accused of widespread option backdating (Bebchuk, Grin-
stein, and Peyer, 2006). The archetypical governance scandals in the US (Enron, Tyco
and WorldCom) are relatively fresh in the mind whereas the UK scandals of the 1980s
(Maxwell Communications, Polly Peck) belong to a different era and have been followed
by a reforming agenda throughout the 1990s. These reforms were designed to drive
greater corporate accountability (Cadbury, 1992) improve the pay-performance relation
particularly avoiding reward for failure (Greenbury, 1995) improve transparency (Com-
bined Code, 1999, 2003), increase institutional shareholder participation (Myners, 2001,
2004) and strengthen the role of the non-executive director, particularly independent non-
executive directors (Higgs, 2003). See Solomon (2007) for a review.
However, UK executive remuneration arrangements have not gone uncriticised. The dis-
parity between executive directors’ pay rises year on year against general rises in earnings
has been highlighted by Trade Unions, generating media hostility (Thompson, 2005); aca-
demics have found the pay-performance relation to be vulnerable when the market turns
down (Gregg, Jewell, and Tonks, 2005); a positive impact of mergers to Chief Executive
remuneration has been found even when those mergers did not enhance shareholder value
(Girma, Thompson, and Wright, 2002); and there is evidence of the ‘ratcheting’ of pay
where executives get at least the going rate and that deviations above that rate will in-
fluence subsequent pay (Ezzamel and Watson, 2002). Following the onset of the present
financial crisis, uncapped annual bonuses in the financial service sector have been heavily
criticised. Therefore, a natural line of inquiry is to investigate whether the pay-setting
process has been captured by insiders.
This chapter contributes to the evidence on whether UK CEOs extract rents by capturing
the pay-setting process by using data on FTSE 350 companies 1995-2005. This sample
has a number of important details including the identification of each board member, their
precise service dates and each element of their remuneration package. Prior research has
arrived at different conclusions regarding the importance of director independence in re-
lation to CEO remuneration. Our sample will allow a thorough examination of the issues
associated with econometric specification and will seek to determine which methodologi-
cal choices are important in the estimation of CEO remuneration. In addition, this research
addresses issues associated with the assessment of non-executive director independence.
The chapter will build towards a preferred estimator to provide robust tests of the optimal
contracting and rent extraction hypothesises. The following section briefly reviews the
literature and sets up the propositions to be investigated. The methods, with a particular
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focus on independence assessment, are addressed in section 2.3. A descriptive overview
of the data and the results are provided in sections 2.4 and 2.5 respectively. Section 2.6
concludes.
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2.2 Literature Review
The board should include a balance of executive and non-executive directors (and in par-
ticular independent non-executive directors) such that no individual or small group of
individuals can dominate the board’s decision taking...The board should establish a re-
muneration committee of at least three, or in the case of smaller companies two, members,
who should all be independent non-executive directors.
Combined Code (2003) A.3 Main Principle and Provision B.2.1.
Principle A.3 of the Combined Code (2003) indicates that, left unchecked, executive di-
rectors could potentially redirect company resources to pursue objectives at the expense
of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This accusation has recently been restated
by Bebchuk and Fried (2004) who focus on executive remuneration, which is one of the
more visible areas in which a conflict of interest may occur. Given this conflict, Provision
B.2.1 reflects shareholder expectations that the composition of the remuneration commit-
tee, the sub-committee of the board that is responsible for setting executive directors’ pay,
should be sufficiently independent to withstand capture.
However, the presence of a remuneration committee may not necessarily solve the prob-
lem. Theoretically, we would model the presence of a remuneration committee by a sim-
ple extension of the familiar two-tier principal-agent contract, in which the pay-setting
process is delegated to another supervisor. Under such a three-tier model, the supervisor
faces the decision of whether to act on behalf of the principal or collude with the agent
(Kofman and Lawarree, 1993; Conyon and He, 2004) and the outcome will depend on the
incentives that the supervisor faces.
Optimal contracting theory predicts that shareholders anticipate agents’ incentives to pur-
sue objectives without reference to shareholder interests and therefore take actions ex-ante
to ensure optimal outcomes (Mirrlees, 1976; Holmstrom, 1979; Murphy, 1999; Gugler,
2001). Optimal contracting assumes shareholders retain control over the composition of
the board. Consequently, the observed board structure is the optimal arrangement for the
Company, as being part of the optimal contract negotiated between principals and agents
which also specifies the optimal level of pay (Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999). Note
that since the introduction of the Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations (2002),
the board has been obligated to propose its remuneration report before shareholders at
the company’s annual general meeting. Even prior to this act, shareholders voted on the
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appointment and re-election of the directors, as well as the executive directors’ equity in-
centive schemes. These votes could be interpreted as direct approval from the principals
for the agents’ contracts.
Under a three-tier agency model, shareholders also anticipate that remuneration commit-
tees face a decision to serve managers or shareholders and will therefore take actions to
ensure remuneration committees have sufficient incentives to withstand the attempts by
management to capture the pay-setting process and instead act on behalf of shareholders.
The structure of the remuneration committee is then predicted to be the product of op-
timal contracting and consequently remuneration committees will set pay at a value that
optimises on behalf of shareholders. Therefore, optimal contracting predicts that only the
factors affecting the demand for executive directors of a given quality should be significant
in the determination of pay (Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999). Structural variables
such as the proportion of independent non-executive directors serving on the board and
remuneration committee should be insignificant, providing the estimating equation is cor-
rectly specified. This leads to the testable hypothesis:
Proposition 1: If remuneration contracts are determined optimally, the composition of
the supervisor will have no bearing on the level of remuneration of the CEO.
In the context of the pay setting process, the supervisor may be viewed either as the remu-
neration committee, or the entire board. Under a rents capture type model, the observed
board structure is inefficient due to unresolved agency problems, leading to sub-optimal
outcomes (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Similarly, if the incentives of the remuneration
committee are not sufficient to withstand the rational attempts of executives to capture the
pay-setting process the outcome will be that there are inefficient remuneration contracts
which are inflated in favour of executive directors and, in particular, the CEO. Bebchuk
and Fried (2004) in the context of US companies, pronounce
‘Flawed compensation arrangements have been wide-spread, persistent and
systemic, and they have stemmed from defects in the underlying governance
structure that enable executives to exert considerable influence over their
boards. Given executives’ power, directors could not have expected to engage
in arm’s-length bargaining with executives over their compensation (preface,
ix)’.
The severity of unresolved agency problems may be predicted to vary as the composition
of boards and remuneration committees vary between companies and over time. Although
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Bonet and Conyon (2005) concede the potential for economic benefits (e.g. information
advantages) to arise through the presence of an executive director on a remuneration com-
mittee they regard the potential costs of executive presence as dominant. Intuitively, one
would expect that a remuneration committee comprising exclusively independent non-
executive directors be more resilient to capture than a committee full of insiders. From
accepting such a theoretical perspective, the alternative hypothesis follows:
Proposition 2: Ceteris paribus, fewer independent non-executive directors will lead to
sub-optimal contracts2.
A full empirical review of executive remuneration is not attempted here. Comprehensive
reviews of the literature are provided by Murphy (1999), Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman
(1997), Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck (2004), and Prendergast (1999), while Bruce and
Buck (2005) provide a brief review for the UK. Tosi, Werner, Katz, and Gomez-Mejia
(2000) perform a meta-analysis with 137 papers on CEO pay and conclude that firm size
accounts for more than 40% of the variance in total CEO pay while firm performance
accounts for less than 5% of the variance. However, out of the many works that investigate
executive remuneration, only a handful have given serious thought to the role of the board
and the remuneration committee in pay determination3. These are summarized in table
2.1.
Table 2.1 shows that four of the nine studies suggest some support for the rents capture
model. It is clear, however that there is considerable disagreement within the empirical
literature as to the importance of the composition of the supervisor in pay determination.
Given the lack of consensus, we are particularly mindful of the importance of econometric
rigour in our study. Moreover, it is possible that a publications bias exists, whereby it
is more difficult to publish support for the null hypothesis of no relationship between
independence and executive remuneration.
Table 2.1 also shows the extent to which the studies have adopted different econometric
specifications. It remains possible that the diversity in results can be attributed to the dif-
ferent estimating strategies employed. The studies vary across the following dimensions:
1. The econometric specification of the model;
2. The criteria for independence;
2This chapter believes that inefficient contracts are revealed by unexplained higher pay levels for Chief
Executives.
3Bonet and Conyon (2005) identify over 300 studies since 1990 on executive remuneration but only find
10 with the main focus being the pay-setting committee.
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Table 2.1: Empirical Literature
Study Sample Economic specification Results Comment
Dependent Variable(s) Explanatory Variables(s)
Bonet & 504 Ln (director a) No. insiders a) 0.163** ‘Tentative
Conyon UK plcs emoluments) on rem com (-2.54) and qualified’
(2005) 1999- 2002 Random Effects b) Any insider b) 0.241* support for
Estimator on rem com (-1.88) rents capture.
Conyon 455 IPO Ln (CEO total a) Optimal ai) -0.03 (-0.24) Optimal
& He US Firms remuneration) contracting aii) -0.15* (-1.83) Contracting
(2004) 1998-2001 OLS Regression variables aiii) 0.01** (3.32) model
b) Rents bi) 0.38 (1.51) preferred.
capture bii) 0.05 (0.29)
variables biii) -0.01 (-0.07)
Anderson 110 Ln (sal + On remuneration a) 0.131 (0.47) No insider
& Bizjak US Firms bonus + incentives) committee b) -1.164** (3.38) effect
(2003) 1985-1998 Within a) % Insiders Combined Ch/CEO
Estimator b) Combined Ch/CEO lowers remuneration.
Core 205 Total CEO a) Combined Ch/CEO a) 152,577** (2.86) Power variables
Holthausen US Firms Remuneration b) Board size b) 30,601** (3.51) determine pay
& Larcker 1982-1984 OLS c) Board insiders c) -5,639** (-3.22) Support for
(1999) Regression d) Gray directors d) 7,356** (3.19) rents capture
Newman 161 1. Ln (CEO a) =1 if rem com 1a) 0.135 (1.35) CEO pay shielded .
& Mozes US Firms total pay) ‘insider influenced’ firm from poor performance.
(1999) 1991-1993 2. Change total pay b) Insider influence & 2b) -0.0007 Some support
OLS regression falling market value (-3.561)** for rents capture.
Benito 211 Ln (emoulments) a) Adoption of rem com a) 0.0063 (0.23) No evidence of
& Conyon UK companies Within b) Adoption of Nom com b) 0.0119 (0.35) governance variables
(1999) 1985-1994 Estimator c) Separate Ch&CEO c) 0.0471 (1.52) impacting cash
compensation.
Daily, Johnson 194 Ln (total pay) On rem com. . . a) -0.05 Standard errors
Ellstrand & large US Firms a) % gray directors b) 0.05 not reported.
Dalton 1992-1994 MLE b) % cross directorships 0.05 Power variables
(1998) Regression c) % CEO members statistically insignificant.
Conyon 94 Ln (HPD a) Board outsiders a) -0.499 (-0.74) Outside directors
& Peck large UK plcs salary + bonus) b) Rem Com Outsiders b) 0.692* (2.91) increase not decrease
(1998) 1991-1994 Within c) Adopted Rem Com c) 0.061 (0.77) remuneration.
Estimator d) Combined Chair/CEO d) -0.035 (0.67)
Conyon (1997) 213 Ln (HPD a) Adopted a rem com a) -0.026*(-2.13) Support for
UK plcs emoluments) rents capture
1988-1993 GMM b) Separated b) -0.007 (0.46) Adoption of rem com
Chairman/CEO leads to lower pay.
T-statistics in the parentheses (coefficient divided by standard errors if original paper reports standard errors).
** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%
Rem Com = Remuneration Committee; Nom Com = Nomination Committee; Ch=Chairman
29
3. The dependent variable;
4. The variable of interest (board or remuneration committee); and
5. Composition of the sample (in terms of time and firm type).
We seek to examine the relative importance of these various choices. In this study, we
use a unique dataset from Manifest Information Services Ltd which offers a number of
advantages over and above those used previously. No existing work has attempted to
reconcile the conflicting results. Therefore, at the end of the exercise, we should be able
to state with greater confidence which methodological choices are important and whether
the rents capture model or the model of optimal contracting presents the most accurate
model of executive directors’ pay determination.
2.3 Method
2.3.1 Economic specification
We seek to explain executive remuneration using a model of the following form:
(Remuneration)it = γi + αt + β(Supervisor)it + λ(Controls)it + µit (2.3.1)
where γ is an unidentified firm specific effect for firm i which does not vary over time, αt is
a time trend, supervisor is a vector of variables associated with the board or remuneration
committee (e.g. % insiders), Controls is a vector of controls such as performance and firm
size, and β and λ are the corresponding coefficients. Under proposition 1, β=0.
Firm Fixed Effects
Datasets used in the existing literature are either cross sections or short panels. Panels have
a number advantages over cross-sections: First they typically contain more observations;
second and more importantly, they have potential to model the dynamics of the pay-setting
process; and third are able to control for firm fixed effects. Firm fixed effects could include
a risk premium associated with a particularly company. (In cross-section, these fixed
effects are often ignored which is akin to omitting dummy variables for each company
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in the sample Conyon, Peck, and Sadler (2000). Therefore, researchers, in particular,
Murphy (1985) have questioned the validity of prior cross sectional pay regressions).
To obtain consistent estimates of β in the presence of the unobserved time-invariant het-
erogeneity correlated with a regressor, first difference or ‘fixed effect’ (within estimator)
estimation techniques may be employed.
For an equation of the form:
yit = αi + X
′
itβ + µit (2.3.2)
Where αi is the fixed effect,
yit − yi(t−1) = (Xit −Xi(t−1))
′β + (µit − µit−1) (2.3.3)
first differencing eliminates the fixed effect.
The ‘within’ estimator measures the association between individual-specific deviations
of regressors from their time-averaged values and individual-specific deviations of the
dependent variable from its time-averaged value (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). By ex-
ploiting the individual variation over time, the fixed effect is eliminated.
yit − yi = (χit − χi)
′β + (µit − µi) (2.3.4)
Both the within estimator and the first differences estimator rely on variation over time
to eliminate the fixed effect. Therefore, a limitation of both estimators is their inability
to identify time-invariant regressors. For instance, regressors such as firm sector are not
identified since if χit = χi then χi = χi so χit − χi = 0. Similarly χit − χi(t−1) = 0 .
The first difference and within estimate will produce identical estimates if T = 2. When
T > 2, the choice between first differencing and the within estimator depends on as-
sumptions made of µit (Wooldridge, 2002). If the µit are serially uncorrelated the within
estimator is more efficient, while the first difference estimator is more efficient when
µit follows a random walk. If the within estimator and first differences estimator differ
in ways that cannot be attributed to sampling error, then one should be suspicious that
the regressors aren’t strictly exogenous, possibly due to measurement error, time-varying
omitted variables or simultaneity.
Alternatively, it is sometimes proposed that the individual effects are random variables
distributed independently of χit (Mundlak, 1978). If such a restriction holds, then a ran-
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dom effects model can be employed (Bonet and Conyon, 2005). In a random effects
model some omitted variables may vary between individuals (but be constant over time)
or vary over time (but be constant between individuals). Unlike fixed effects models, ran-
dom effects allows the identification of the marginal effects of time-invariant independent
variables. Unfortunately, the strong assumption of the random effects model that the ex-
pectation of αi given χit is constant is unlikely to hold in practice (Nickell, 1981). A
Hausman test can be used to discern between random and fixed effects models.
Individual Director Fixed Effects
In addition to firm fixed effects, it is possible that there are unobserved fixed effects associ-
ated with the individual directors in the sample. Individual fixed effects could include the
director’s human capital, status or their access to valuable networks. Therefore, equation
2.3.1 can be re-written as:
(Remuneration)ijt = γi + δj +αt +β(Supervisor)ijt +λ(Controls)ijt +µijt (2.3.5)
where δj is a time-invariant unobserved effect specific to director j. The majority of prior
panel studies have not identified the individuals and so have not controlled for δj . The only
previous study that controls for individual effects is Bonet and Conyon (2005) who use
a random effects estimator. However, Manifest’s data offers a significant advantage over
Bonet & Conyon’s data in that, Manifest has identified the individual from the inception
of its database and one is able to track individual movement between firms. It is therefore
possible to control for both firm and individual fixed effects.
Lagged Dependent Variable
Empirical evidence suggests that directors’ pay does not adjust immediately (Main, Bruce,
and Buck, 1996; Conyon, 1997; Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand, and Dalton, 1998; Conyon,
Peck, and Sadler, 2000). To control for this dynamic feature of CEO pay determination
we might wish to include lagged pay as a further explanatory variable. However, with a
lagged dependent variable on the right hand side of the pay equation, the use of the within
estimator will result in inconsistent estimates as the lagged dependent variable will be
correlated with the error term (Nickell, 1981; Wooldridge, 2002; Cameron and Trivedi,
2005). The Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) provides a framework for estimat-
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ing equations with such endogenous variables. Instrumental variables that are related to
the explanatory variable but not the error can be used to isolate the variation that is not
correlated with the error. Such instruments are easy to obtain in a panel context because
deeper lags of the dependent variable (beyond t-1) can be used. Arellano and Bond (1991)
provide a first-difference estimator that uses lags of the lagged dependent variable as an
instrument for prior period pay. Arellano-Bond requires no second-order serial correlation
in the first differenced errors and T must be greater or equal to 3.
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) have enhanced the Arellano-
Bond estimator to provide additional instruments. Lagged levels might be weak instru-
ments for first differences, particularly for variables close to a random walk (Roodman,
2006). Arellano and Bover (1995) show that, if the original equation in levels is added
to the system, additional moment conditions can be used to increase efficiency. For in-
stance, prior period pay can be instrumented with lags of its own first difference. The
resulting estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) is known as ‘system GMM’
(as opposed to the original ‘differenced GMM’). The two-step version of the estimator
is used, together with Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors. This is desirable as
improvements in efficiency can be made with the two-step estimator (Arellano and Bond,
1991). Monte Carlo studies have shown that the estimated asymptotic standard errors in
finite samples are biased downwards and consequently Arellano and Bond do not recom-
mend inference on the coefficients when the two-step estimator is used (Roodman, 2006).
However, Windmeijer (2005) has developed a correction so that inference using these
corrected standard errors is appropriate.
Performance Measure
An important specification issue is the performance measure. Researchers generally
choose between an accounting (e.g. Earnings Per Share (EPS)) or market based (e.g.
Total Shareholder Return (TSR)) performance measure but neither is theoretically domi-
nant. A market based measure might be preferred because it more accurately reflects the
objective function of shareholders and is not subject to accounting conventions or other
vagaries of accounting measures (Conyon, Peck, and Sadler, 2000). Alternatively, an
accounting measure is not as vulnerable to market fluctuations.
In addition, it is theoretically unclear whether it is the level of performance or performance
growth which is more appropriate in a remuneration equation. Both formulations have
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appeared in the literature (Conyon, Peck, and Sadler, 2000).
Moreover, the literature has included both pre-dated performance measures (Gregg, Machin,
and Szymanski, 1993) and contemporaneous performance measures (Newman and Mozes,
1999). Pre-dated performance measures have the advantage of being less ambiguous with
respect to the direction of causality but are less powerful in explaining current remunera-
tion levels, particularly given that company accounts report on an annual basis in arrears.
They also tend to reduce the sample size considerably as panels are generally unbalanced.
There is also an issue of the actual timing of when executives are rewarded. In general,
salaries are reviewed towards the start of the financial year while bonus payments are paid
at the end of the financial year or subsequent to the year end. Options and shares awards
are granted within 42 days of the announcement of results. Therefore, care is needed
when made making inferences about the coefficient of the performance variable.
Functional Form
The functional form of the estimating equation is also potentially significant. All the stud-
ies in table 2.1, other than Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), express the dependent
variable and performance variable in logarithms. When the log form is used, the perfor-
mance co-efficient will represent pay-performance elasticity; otherwise the performance
co-efficient will represent pay-performance sensitivity (Murphy, 1999). The literature
generally regards the choice of functional forms of secondary importance and is normally
motivated by the economic interpretation sought by the author. However, Daily, Johnson,
Ellstrand, and Dalton (1998) cite Tabachnik and Fidell (1996) who suggest that skewed
pay distributions can weaken statistical relationships and lead to heteroscedasticity. Mur-
phy (1999) also notes that models in logarithms generally provide a better fit.
2.3.2 Independence
Mis-specification might also result from omitted independent variables or measurement
error. Of particular concern is that past work has relied on blunt distinctions of indepen-
dence such as an insider/outsider classification. For example, a remuneration commit-
tee might have been deemed wholly independent notwithstanding the fact that members
shared cross directorships with the CEO, enjoyed certain business relationships with the
company or served on the board for over nine years. With the application of the Manifest
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data to the problem, one should be able to provide the fairest test possible of the rent’s
capture model.
Table 2.2 shows that there is considerable variation in the literature as to the classification
of an insider. In the UK, directors are classified as ‘independent’ or ‘not independent’ fol-
lowing the guidance of Combined Code (2003). In the US literature three categories for
directors appear: ‘insider’; ‘affiliated/grey’; and ‘outsider’. Insiders are those employed
by the firm, retired from the firm or immediate family members. Affiliated directors are
those with a material business relationship with the firm. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker
(1999) and Newman and Mozes (1999) also consider directors affiliated by a cross direc-
torship not to be outsiders. For comparative purposes, affiliated directors in US studies
are considered not independent/insiders in the table below.
The Combined Code (2003) gives a non-exhaustive list of potential factors that might
compromise the independence of a non-executive director’s character and judgement.
Such factors include: familial or material business associations with members of the man-
agement and length of service. The Code expects the board to state the independence of
each director and to explain situations where they consider a director independent in light
of such factors. There is an obvious incentive for boards to declare their directors inde-
pendent even when such a claim might be considered dubious. Further, as boards enjoy
superior information over shareholders, one suspects that boards are capable of establish-
ing and maintaining an illusion of independence. Studies that only take the Company’s
statement on independence as the measurement of board or remuneration committee in-
dependence are therefore likely to be limited. In addition to recording the Company’s as-
sessment of non-executive director independence, Manifest conducts its own assessment.
Manifest’s independence assessment is based around the guidance of the Combined Code
(2003) but includes an element of flexibility. While a board might claim that they are
in a better position to assess the character and judgement of each director, one suspects
that the conflict of interest they face outweighs the superior information they possess over
Manifest.
Table 2.3 provides a comparison of the Company’s and Manifest’s independence assess-
ments. An ‘insider’ is an executive director or a non-executive deemed not to be inde-
pendent. Over the whole sample period, more than 50% of companies assert that all their
non-executive directors are independent whereas Manifest regards only 25% of compa-
nies as having entirely independent directors. This divergence is due to the more rigourous
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Table 2.2: Independence Characteristics
Study Considered an Insider in Study?
% Insiders % Insiders Executive Former Material Family Major Cross Tenure
on Board on Rem Com Director Employee Business Tie Shareholder Directorship
Relationship
Bonet 49.40% 4.40% Yes No No No No No No
& Conyon
(2005)
Conyon 32.70% 5.64% Yes Yes No No No No No
& He
(2004)
Anderson Not 40.7% (85-93) Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
& Bizjak Reported 24.1% (94-98)
(2003)
Core Holthausen 42.90% Not Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
& Larcker Investigated
(1999)
Newman Not 16.90% Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No
& Mozes Reported
(1999)
Daily, Johnson Not Not Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Ellstrand & Dalton Reported Reported
(1998)
Conyon 52.70% 11.00% Yes Yes No No No No No
& Peck
(1998)
Company Own 48.10% 6.70% Varies Varies Varies Varies Varies Varies Varies
Assessments
Manifest’s 60.80% 27.20% Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Assessments
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Table 2.3: Independence by Company vs Independence by Manifest: 1995-2005
Variable N Mean St Dev Median
Board size 5258 8.33 2.9 8
Number of non-executive directors 5258 4.7 2.1 4
Insiders (Company) 5258 48.10% 19.80% 50%
Insiders (Manifest) 5258 60.80% 19.40% 62.50%
application of the provisions of the Combined Code4.
Table 2.2 shows that Manifest’s assessment of independence is the most demanding as-
sessment. This reflects the fact that Manifest’s independence assessment is based on UK
institutional guidance and the Combined Code which provides a more stringent assess-
ment of independence than previously used in the literature. Therefore if prior research
has failed to support the rent’s capture model of pay determination from a lack of variation
between companies, Manifest’s assessment of independence provides a more rigourous
test.
2.3.3 Dependent Variable
In terms of the dependent variable there are two main issues. The first concerns the unit of
analysis, and whether it is possible to identify individuals and, therefore, director changes.
The second issue concerns what elements of remuneration are included.
The UK studies in table 2.1 that were unable to identify individuals were forced to mea-
sure only the remuneration of highest paid director (HPD). The HPD does not identify
an individual, nor even the same position, as the HPD may or may not be the CEO. The
result is that these studies can not control for individual fixed effects (see section 2.3.1).
An examination of HPDs’ emoluments will systematically underestimate the true level
of pay as the emoluments disclosed are amounts received during the financial period. If
the CEO (who is likely to be the HPD on a pro-rata basis) only serves part of the year,
then he will not be recorded as the HPD. Rather, the next highest paid director who has
served the whole year (perhaps the Finance Director) will be taken instead. If the en-
tire board changes during the financial year then a very low figure for the HPD will be
recorded. Therefore, director movement will artificially depress the dependent variable
and the marginal estimates of the regressors will be inconsistent if director appointments
and resignations are correlated with the regressors. Only if individuals are identified can
4Prior to the establishment of the Combined Code, Manifest’s independence assessment was based on
institutional guidance and best practice which was not materially different guidelines in the Code.
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Table 2.4: Full Remuneration Data - One Company
Individual Year Position Salary Salary Golden Golden
(Pro-rata) (Disclosed) Handshake Goodbye
Bob 1997 CEO 200 74
Bob 1998 CEO 250 250
Bob 1999 CEO 350 25 600
Henry 1997 FD 150 150
Henry 1998 FD 200 80 500
Henry 1999 FD
Hamid 1997 CEO 300 275 500
Hamid 1998 CEO
Hamid 1999 CEO
Kate 1997 FD
Kate 1998 FD 250 180 50
Kate 1999 FD 280 280
one control for director changes.
In measuring remuneration, prior studies in the UK have been constrained by the dis-
closure regime prevailing over the period of analysis (Bruce and Buck, 2005). Since
the Companies Act (1967), information has been publicly available on the emoluments
of the HPD in the company. Emoluments comprise salary plus bonus and a cash valu-
ation of perquisites. The measurement of the value of long term equity incentives has
only recently become easily available since adoption of the Greenbury disclosure recom-
mendations (1995). The majority of prior studies in the UK have therefore limited their
investigation to the emoluments of the HPD.
The situation is further complicated by the practice of paying directors recruitment incen-
tives and providing compensation for loss of office. These one-off payments are likely to
increase the remuneration of the director in the years of his appointment and resignation,
the very years in which it is unlikely that the director served a full 12 months.
For illustrative purposes, table 2.4 considers a simple company with two executive posi-
tions (CEO and FD), no equity based incentives or pension. Bob joins half way through
year 1, hence his disclosed amount is less than his pro-rata salary. In year two, Henry is
replaced by Kate and so both these directors serve less than 12 months in this financial
year. Henry receives a golden parachute and Kate a golden hello. In year three Bob is
replaced by Hamid.
A typical HPD study would reduce the data in table 2.4 to the data shown in table 2.5.
Only in year three does the HPD correspond to the CEO of the Company and at no point
38
Table 2.5: Highest Paid Director Data - One Company
Position Year Salary Emoluments
HPD 1997 150 150
HPD 1998 80 580
HPD 1999 275 725
does the HPD director pick up the highest salary on a pro-rata basis. In contrast, Manifest
identifies an individual, his position and records the appointment and resignation dates
and hence the richness of the data in table one is retained.
The emoluments of the HPD remained the standard disclosure on directors’ pay until the
early 1990s when shareholder institutions began to put pressure on public companies to
improve the quality of their disclosure with respect to remuneration, consistent with the
overall movement towards greater corporate accountability (Bruce and Buck, 2005). The
Greenbury Report (1995) formally recommended that companies disclose the remuner-
ation of each director and Conyon (1997) demonstrates that the adoption of these rec-
ommendations was quick and widespread. By 1995, it had become accepted practice to
disclose the emoluments of each director together with detail on executive share options
(ESOs) and long term incentive plans (LTIPs) in the annual report and accounts. The first
year of Manifest’s data collection occurred in 1995 and therefore from its inception Man-
ifest was able to take advantage of the Greenbury Recommendations and collect data for
all directors, and each aspect of pay5.
Lewellen and Huntsman (1970) were first to suggest that the examination of the whole
board is the most appropriate basis for analysis. However, due to limits on the availability
of data most studies have followed Lewellen and Huntsman (1970)’s example and adopted
the pay of the CEO as a suitable surrogate for pay of the whole board. Main, Bruce, and
Buck (1996) justify their extension from CEO pay to whole board pay in the context of
company law and agency theory. In law, directors have equal duties and responsibility
and therefore the whole board are ‘agents’ serving shareholders. The term ‘CEO’ de-
scribes a specific administrative role but it should be noted that the term ‘CEO’ is not
applied universally across companies. For example, the ‘Managing Director’ of one firm
may perform the role of the CEO, but in another firm there may be a CEO and separate
Managing Director. For this reason, Manifest records both the job title described by the
company and has a dummy variable stating whether or not the individual is the Chief
5Studies using data prior to 1995, required an exceptional amount of effort to collect data beyond the
emoluments of the HPD. Indeed, Main, Bruce, and Buck (1996) mention, as an aside, the frustrations they
experienced in acquiring information on share option grants.
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Executive.
The pay-performance literature discusses the shortcomings of early research which failed
to include a measure the value of equity based payments (Jensen and Murphy, 1990;
Main, Bruce, and Buck, 1996). While options are a much less important component of
remuneration in the UK compared with the US (Conyon and Murphy, 2000) and are more
mechanically tied to the salary levels (Girma, Thompson, and Wright, 2004) they remain
a very real and important pecuniary element in a director’s remuneration package. By
including equity based incentives in the calculation of total remuneration, one will reveal
the impact, if any, of captured boards on the most inclusive measure of pay. Studies
that only investigate short term elements are, nevertheless, interesting as there may be
reasons to suggest that certain aspects of the remuneration package may be more easily
manipulated by a captured remuneration committee than others.
2.3.4 Composition of the Supervisor Variable
The studies cited in table 2.1, focus attention on either the remuneration committee or
the board as the third party in the pay-setting process. The Greenbury Report (1995)
recommended that boards established a sub committee of the board6, comprising solely of
non-executive directors to determine executive remuneration. The Combined Code (2003)
has reinforced this recommendation suggesting that remuneration committees comprise
exclusively independent non-executive directors. The whole board remains the ultimate
authority for the functioning of the company and continues to bear the main responsibility
for the pay arrangements of the executive directors. However, it is the members of the
remuneration committee who undertake the actual task of setting pay, albeit being free
to consult other board members providing no director gives specific advice in relation to
their own remuneration. Therefore, it is natural for UK studies post Greenbury to focus
attention on the composition of the remuneration committee and its ability to withstand
capture.
However, it remains theoretically conceivable that the best proxy for a company’s re-
silience to capture might be the composition of the board, not the remuneration committee.
For instance, a captured board may satisfy investor expectations to fill the remuneration
committee with token outside directors to legitimize biased pay arrangements. Therefore,
6Although Conyon and He (2004) have another variable to indicate the presence of a significant share-
holder on the remuneration committee.
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to provide the best test between optimal contracting and rents capture both the composi-
tion of the board and remuneration committee will be examined. One final practical issue
is whether to model the composition of the board/committee in terms of percentage inde-
pendence, the number of independent directors or as a dummy variable between having
purely independent committee or a dominated committee. It remains possible that the
results might be sensitive to this choice. For instance, one executive on the remuneration
committee might enjoy superior information over his part time colleagues on the commit-
tee to the extent that he is able to capture the pay setting process. Whether or not another
insider joins the committee, might, or might not be relevant.
2.3.5 Sample Composition
After attempting to consolidate the empirical results across the dimensions identified
above, divergences may remain due to real differences in the populations from which
the samples have been drawn. The samples vary in terms of the time period under obser-
vation, the sample sizes, and types of firms under consideration.
The longest time horizon in table 2.1 is Anderson and Bizjak (2003) which spans 13 years
whereas five of the studies include only three years of data. The number of firms in the
studies ranges from 94 to 504. In addition, it is reasonable to expect to differences in
findings between studies that draw upon firms in the early 1980s (Core, Holthausen, and
Larcker, 1999) to those who draw upon more recent firms (Bonet and Conyon, 2005).
Firm Type
It is possible that significant differences occur in the behaviour of different types of com-
panies. It is reasonable to expect samples that cover different geographical locations,
companies with different sizes, markets, ownership structures, corporate cultures and gov-
ernance environments to return different results. However all studies in table 2.1, with the
exception of Conyon and He (2004), look at large US or UK public companies whose
behaviour one would expect to be reasonably similar. Conyon and He (2004) examine
US companies that went public between 1998 and 2001. They identify that remuneration
committees with venture capitalists and other large shareholders give CEO’s lower pay
and greater equity incentives but find no support for managerial capture of the board.
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2.4 Data
2.4.1 Sample
The dataset used in this study comprises all companies that entered the FTSE 350 Index
with any financial year end between 31st December 1995 and 31st December 2005. To
avoid survivorship bias, companies that drop out of the index prior to 2006 are included in
our coverage until the company is wound up or taken private. The period chosen is signif-
icant. As well as providing the most recent investigation in the literature, the data covers
a full economic cycle, with market growth until 2001, subsequent decline and recovery.
Moreover, the period under analysis is particularly interesting given the steady flow of
corporate governance reforms designed to improve the transparency and accountability
of boards and produce more efficient remuneration contracts. Investment trusts that con-
tained no executive directors were excluded from the sample, although self-managed in-
vestment trusts were retained7. Manifest’s data was supplemented in the return index and
other control variables from Thomson Datastream. Some information was missing data
with respect to Datastream’s dead stock list. In addition, some corporate entities were
recorded differently particularly if mergers or other corporate actions occurred8. This
also lead to the loss of some entities in Manifests sample and a manual inspection of com-
pany names was undertaken to ensure Manifest and Datastream’s company id variables
matched companies correctly.
After losing 99 companies on merging Manifests and Datastream’s data9, an unbalanced
panel of 523 companies was left producing 4123 firm-years of remuneration data. 290
of the 523 companies had information for all financial years 1996-2005. To determine
a unique time-period for the purposes of constructing the panel, the year of the end of
the reporting period was used. However, if a company changed its reporting year-end
it is possible to have two reporting period ends in one calendar year. In these cases, an
adjustment was made based on the reporting month to ensure the year variable uniquely
identified different time periods.
7Other than those boards without executive directors such as investment trusts.
8For instance when Glaxo Wellcome and SmithKline Beecham merged in 2000, Manifest assigned a
new company id to the new entity GlaxoSmithKline, whereas Datastream placed SmithKline Beecham into
its Dead list and renamed Glaxo Wellcome as GlaxoSmithKline (i.e. no new company id).
9The vast majority of the missing data was with respect to Datastream’s dead stocks.
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2.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.6, summaries the key variables under analysis. All monetary values are adjusted
for inflation and expressed in May 2006 prices. Note that since the panel is unbalanced,
the growth figures do not compare exactly the same set of companies in 1996 and 2005.
Salary was annualised where an individual did not serve a full 12 months (e.g. due to
appointment or resignation during the year). Emoluments are the total cash amounts
received by the director (i.e. salary, bonus, benefits, vested deferred bonuses, vested LTIPs
or exercised options). Total remuneration is the expected value of remuneration related to
the year under review and includes an estimate of the fair value of equity based incentives
at grant date.
The accurate measurement of the value of executive equity incentives is an important is-
sue. Studies such as Main, Bruce, and Buck (1996) have applied a sophisticated option
evaluation methodology such as Black and Scholes (1973) or a binominal method Cox,
Ross, and Rubinstein (1979). These models generate a theoretical price for an option
grant based on: the company’s share price at grant date, share price volatility, and divi-
dend yield; the exercise period and price; and the risk free rate. Under new international
accounting regulations (IFRS-2 Share Based Payments) these methods are used in the
pricing of options in company financial statements.
However, both the Black-Scholes and binominal approaches are limited. They assume the
underlying asset returns follow the normal distribution (i.e. the underlying asset prices
are distributed lognormally) which may or may not be reasonable and historical measures
of price volatility must used to estimate future volatility. Yet even more problematic
is the absence of individual risk parameters in these standard valuation methodologies.
Murphy (1999) shows how option valuations are sensitive to even small variations in the
executive’s aversion to risk. Further, Hall and Murphy (2000) describe how the standard
methods evaluate the cost of the option to the firm, the value of which may be significantly
different from the value to which an undiversified executive would place on his non-
tradable option. A potential solution is given in Hall and Murphy (2002) where a certainty
equivalence approach is developed to derive for what price an executive would swap their
incentives. However, this method requires assumptions about each executive’s preference
for risk and their non firm-related wealth. We do not have access to such information.
In addition, none of the standard models consider the impact of performance conditions.
Performance conditions reduce the probability of vesting and therefore the present ex-
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Table 2.6: Descriptive Statistics
Key Variables 1996-2005 1996 2005 % Growth
(Pooled) 1996-2005
N (firm years) 4123 350 342
Total board Mean 2,850,902 1,981,284 3,892,381 96.46
board St Dev 2,970,435 1,732,762 3,581,674
remuneration (£) Median 1,972,352 1395651 2733443 95.85
Executive Mean 575,689 359,167 907,778 152.75
director total St Dev 586,496 257,042 760,074
remuneration (£) Median 420,406 303,868 675,768 122.39
Executive Mean 274,219 223,504 346,148 54.87
director St Dev 134,895 111,946 148,591
salary (£) Median 246127 204802 318572 55.55
Mean 8.80 8.86 9.12 2.93
Board Size St Dev 2.80 2.96 2.56
Median 8 9 9 0
Mean 4.70 4.33 5.52 27.48
No NEDs St Dev 2.06 2.16 2.01
Median 4 4 5 25
% Insiders Mean .522 .571 .454 -20.49
on board St Dev .145 .148 .124
(Company) Median 0.5 0.509 0.444 -12.77
% Insiders Mean .634 .675 .540 -20
on board St Dev .159 .155 .144
(Manifest) Median 0.629 0.667 0.5 -25.04
% Insiders on Mean .064 .103 .029 -71.84
remuneration St Dev .165 .230 .121
committee (Company) Median 0 0 0
% Insiders on Mean .267 .319 .165 -48.28
remuneration St Dev .284 .296 .233
committee (Manifest) Median 0.25 0.273 0 -100
No NEDs where 660 432 2
independence
is not known
1. Data ordered on firm-years. Please refer to table 2.7 for details of CEO remuneration.
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pected value of the incentive but to what extent is unclear. Performance conditions vary
dramatically such that ideally, the vesting conditions on each grant would be considered
separately. Bruce, Udueni, Buck, and Main (2003) demonstrate how producing a truly
objective estimate of the impact of performance conditions on present expected value is
an almost impossible task, particularly when vesting depends on the performance of com-
pany peers. To complicate matters further, Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer (2006) provide
evidence for the opportunistic timing of option grants and Bebchuk and Fried (2004) iden-
tify the potential for opportunistic timing on exercise. Opportunistic timing would bias
the value of any equity incentive calculated using the aforementioned pricing methods. In
light of such uncertainty, Conyon and Murphy (2000)’s arbitrary discount of 20% when
a performance condition is present, does not seem unreasonable. Our approach follows
standard practice in the remuneration consultancy industry (MM & K Ltd, 2007) and cal-
culates equity incentives as one third of their face value10. This is justified on the grounds
that the cost of labour involved in employing a more sophisticated option methodology
would be substantial to the point where it would outweigh any gain in accuracy.
Figure 2.1 shows the growth in salary, salary plus bonus and total remuneration respec-
tively at median levels for executive directors (Figure 2.2 for CEOs) in the FTSE 350. The
acceleration of UK Executive Directors’ remuneration over this period is clearly seen, un-
like in the US where the increase in pay is almost entirely explained by the explosion
of stock options grants (Murphy, 1999), the mean growth in UK directors’ remuneration
is attributable to a 55% real increase in salary and a 150% increase in real total remu-
neration. It should be noted that median total remuneration in real terms did not decline
following the market downturn post 2000, indeed its growth appears largely unaffected.
These trends are consistent with those found in recent studies (Gregg, Jewell, and Tonks,
2005).
Figure 2.3 illustrates the changes in board composition over the period. While there is lit-
tle movement in total board size, boards have comprised a significantly greater proportion
of non-executive directors after 1999. This reflects the increasing pressure for companies
to meet shareholder expectations of governance structure which are guided by the provi-
sions contained within the Combined Code. Specifically, boards were recommended to
comprise at least one-third non-executive directors and on revision of the Code in 2003 at
least half non-executive directors (excluding the Chairman).
Figure 2.4 shows that the UK companies replaced insiders on the Board with independent
10The final results were not sensitive to reasonable changes in this value. See appendix for further details.
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Figure 2.1: FTSE 350 Executive Remuneration 1996-2005
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Figure 2.2: FTSE 350 CEO Remuneration 1996-2005
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Figure 2.3: Board Composition 1995-2005
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non-executive directors between 1995-2005. This reflects the voluntary adoption of the
recommendations of Combined Code and increase adherence to institutional and investor
guidelines. The trend is the same for both Manifest’s assessments and the companies’ own
assessments. Considering the persistent above inflation increases in executive remunera-
tion that occurred over the same period, we might expect that an increase independence
will have, at best, a limited impact at reducing remuneration. Of course it remains pos-
sible that remuneration levels might been even higher had the increase in independence
not occurred. Therefore, we will attempt to control for as many factors as possible in our
analysis in order to isolate the effect of independence upon remuneration.
The quality of disclosure by companies on the independence of its directors is not even
over the period. The percentage of individuals for which independence is unknown was
11.7% in 1996. This steadily reduced over the period to less than 5% by 2000 and less than
1% by 2003. The improving quality of disclosure over the period is itself an indication of
the adoption of best practice and the Combined Code.
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 illustrate the difference between Manifest’s and companies’ own as-
sessments of independence in terms of the number of insiders serving on the remuneration
committees. Manifest’s assessment is stricter, with approximately 50% of companies hav-
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Figure 2.4: Fall in the Proportion of Board Insiders 1995-2005
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ing at least one insider serving on the remuneration committee, while less than 20% of
companies admit to having an insider on the committee. The graphs also show that the
majority of remuneration committees have no insiders.
Figure 2.5: Number of Insiders on Remuneration Committee (Manifest)
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Section 2.3 argued that datasets that were unable to identify the individual would system-
atically underestimated CEO remuneration. Table 2.7 shows the extent of this problem
by comparing CEO remuneration to the measure of HPD remuneration. Using HPD pay
as opposed to CEO pay captures 89% of the individuals and 92% of salary. However, the
problem is not so severe when a total remuneration figure is taken. This study will report
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Figure 2.6: Number of Insiders on Remuneration Committee (Company)
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Table 2.7: Impact of Identifying the CEO on Remuneration
HPD CEO HPD as % of CEO
N (Position years) 3979 4463 89.16%
Mean 354,837 383,179 92.60%
Salary St. Dev (204,181) (217,818)
Median 317,869 338,365 93.94%
Mean 824,596 852,624 96.71%
Total Remuneration St.Dev (113,582,6) (1,143,999)
Median 557,689 581,649 95.88%
Data ordered by Position.
results using a measure that accounts for the identification of the individual.
Having the individual identified allows one to track the movement of directors within
the sample. 8434 individuals shared 13,979 director positions in the dataset. Of these
13,979 positions, 7,755 commenced at some point during the 10 year period. 76% of
CEO appointments were filled by individuals with a directorship at another FTSE 350
company, with the majority being existing board members from the appointing firm. 41%
of all executive appointments were filled by individuals with a directorship, again with
the majority of these being existing board members.
The UK literature has found unanimously that company size is an important determinant
of executive pay. The studies in table 2.1 measure company size as market capitalisa-
tion (Bonet and Conyon, 2005; Conyon and He, 2004) sales (Core, Holthausen, and Lar-
cker, 1999), total assets (Anderson and Bizjak, 2003) and number of employees (Conyon,
1997). Table 2.9 summarises these variables.
Figure 2.7 shows the mean movement in company size of the FTSE 350 over the sample
period. The divergence of turnover and market capitalisation11 in the late 1990s reflects
11The closing price on ordinary shares multiplied by the number of ordinary shares in issue as at the
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Table 2.8: Director Appointments
CEO Appointments Executive appointments (inc CEO) NED appointments
Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage
External 72 0.1099 333 0.1024 706 0.1567
Internal 427 0.6519 984 0.3026 458 0.1017
Within Dataset 499 0.7618 1317 0.4051 1146 0.2544
Total 655 3251 4504
External: Where a vacant position was filled by a director from another company in the sample
Internal: Where a position was filled by an existing board member.
Total: The total number of appointments; i.e. the sum of 3 and those directors appointed that are not
found elsewhere in the sample.
Table 2.9: Size Variables
Size Variables 1996-2005 1996 2005 % Growth
(Pooled) 1996-2005
Market Cap (£ m) Mean 3,300 2,170 3,906 80
St Dev 10,400 4,230 1,190
Median 670 625 917 46.72
Sales (£) Mean 2,690 2,570 3,380 31.52
St Dev 8,280 6,810 1,020
Median 592 568 805 41.73
Total Assets (£000) Mean 13,100 8,075 18,200 125.38
St Dev 54,000 29,000 78,100
Median 1026 859 1251 45.63
Total Employees Mean 21,460 22,413 22,122 -1.3
St Dev 40,333 41,727 43,769
Median 6360 7338 6810 -7.2
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Figure 2.7: FTSE 350 1996-2005
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the ‘.com boom’ and the prevalence of high tech stocks in the FTSE 350 during this
period. The subsequent collapse in value of these stocks relative to other sectors is also
reflected in the convergence of turnover and market capitalisation post 2001.
Performance is measured in terms of either accounting performance or market perfor-
mance. The performance measure used most frequently in the UK literature is the market
return index from Datastream and the change in the log of variable corresponds to Total
Shareholder Return (TSR)12. Earnings per share (EPS) is the underlying figure as reported
in the financial statements. Return on assets is another measure of profitability and is de-
fined as net income divided by total assets. Return on equity is defined as net income
divided by shareholder equity and is recorded as a percentage.
In order to replicate the specifications of prior studies following variables were also col-
lected. The market to book ratio is obtained from Datastream and is considered as a
measure of the future growth opportunities in the firm. It is calculated as net tangible
assets divided by the market value. The number of other CEOs represents the number
company’s financial year end.
12Following Murphy (1985) and Conyon and Peck (1998), TSR equals the year change in log of annual
return index supplied by Datastream (Conyon, Peck, and Sadler, 2000). TSR represents the growth in share
value including paid dividends. Growth 1996-2005 aggregates TSR between 1996-2005.
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Table 2.10: Performance Variables
Performance Variables 1996-2005 1996 2005
(Pooled)
Market Mean 11,493 9,762 15,965
Return St Dev 27,803 19,760 37,932
Median 1073 2203 1139
Total Mean .055 .192 .156
Shareholder St Dev 0.49 0.354 0.278
Return Median 0.102 0.195 0.171
Earnings Mean 260.1 43.3 34.2
Per Share St Dev 12,473 99 57.7
Median 17.43 16.57 18.8
Return on Mean .105 .113 .153
Assets St Dev 3.16 2.09 3.38
Median 0.143 0.152 0.154
Return on Mean 18.4 24.2 20.7
Equity St Dev 215.2 55.6 97.4
Median 15.4 18.2 14
Table 2.11: Control Variables
Control Variables 1996-2005 1996 2005
(Pooled)
Market Mean 2.46 2.42 1.91
to St Dev (44.9) (40.6) (25.0)
Book Median 2.21 2.51 2.40
No. Mean .132 .179 .079
Other St Dev (.393) (.474) (.278)
CEOs Median 0 0 0
Equity Mean .419 - .242
Holdings of St Dev (3.25) - (2.64)
the CEO Median 0 - 0
St Dev Mean .103 .067 .065
of Monthly St Dev (.074) (.042) (.037)
Returns Median .085 .058 .057
Blockholder Mean .102 - .075
Dummy St Dev (.304) - (.264)
Median 0 - 0
Combined Mean .026 .024 .021
Chairman St Dev (.160) (.144)
CEO Dummy Median 0 .152 0
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of non-executive directors serving on the remuneration committees who are also CEOs
elsewhere within Manifest’s sample. Authors have suggested that this variable could pos-
itively influence CEO pay via a tacit collusion arrangement (Conyon and He, 2004). The
percentage of equity holdings of the CEO could potentially have either a positive or neg-
ative effect on total remuneration. A large equity holding could off-set the need for large
performance-related incentive packages, or perhaps pay of any kind as the CEO’s wealth
would vary dramatically with the fortunes of the Company regardless of remuneration.
However, a large equity holding is might also facilitate CEO power and hence a positive
relationship between equity holdings and executive remuneration is conceivable. In this
matter, our findings are consistent with Anderson and Bizjak (2003) who find a negative
relationship between CEO equity holdings and CEO pay.
The standard deviation of monthly returns is included as a measure of risk. Riskier busi-
nesses might need to pay more to attract the same quality CEO as individuals are normally
assumed to be risk averse. Length of service is included to capture experience.
Finally, a number of dummy variables are created. A blockholder dummy, is included
to identify firms where there is a outside shareholder owning more than 5% of the Com-
pany. Controversial pay arrangements might be brought under greater scrutiny in firms
where there is one party that has a significant interest in the company. A combined Chair-
man/CEO dummy is included to identify those firm-years where the role of Chairman and
CEO was exercised by the same individual. Resignation and appointment dummies are
included to identify those individuals who served less than a full 12 months. For reasons
explained in section 3.3 even after annualising the pay of those individuals who served
less than a full 12 months we might expect inflated pay in these periods due to receipt of
recruitment incentives and compensation payments.
Time and Sector Dummy variables
Time specfic effects are controlled with a full set of yearly time dummies. Manifest base
their sector definitions on the FTSE classifications which are split into 33 groups. Sector
dummies are unable to be identified in fixed effects methodologies as all time-invariant
effects specific to firms are eliminated.
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2.5 Results
The results are presented as follows. Firstly, the estimating strategy of the original studies
are applied to manifest’s data. Then in each subsequent stage, one aspect of the method
is altered along the dimensions discussed above, in order to show to which choices the
results are sensitive. This will then inform the selection of a preferred estimator.
2.5.1 Replication of Existing Studies on Manifest Data
Table 2.12 summarises the results of replicating six of the studies outlined in table 2.1
using the Manifest data relating to remuneration committee structure13. Full output is pro-
vided in the appendix. As far as possible, all significant control variables were included as
in the original regressions and the original estimation techniques were followed. There-
fore any differences between the original results and Manifest’s results should only reflect
genuine differences in the sample data.
Table 2.12 shows that the replication of the original studies’ methods produced broadly
similar results when applied to Manifest’s data. The only instance where an original result
was overturned was with respect to Conyon and He (2004). This is not surprising as there
are important differences between our sample and Conyon & He’s sample. Conyon & He
use young IPO firms from the US whilst Manifest’s data covers the FTSE 350 Index14.
Studies in the literature that have applied different econometric techniques and measuring
the variables in different ways have come to different conclusions regarding the signifi-
cance of independence in the pay setting committee. Applying the strategies to the same
dataset does not the reconcile the different conclusions. Rather table 2.12 suggests that
methodological choices are important in the acceptance or rejection of proposition 1.
2.5.2 Econometric Specification
As detailed in section 2.2, there are a number of issues to consider regarding econometric
specification. These include the importance of controlling for firm fixed effects, iden-
tifying the individual in the sample and controlling for past realisations of pay in the
13Conyon (1997) and Benito and Conyon (1999) were not replicated as their variable was the adoption
of a remuneration committee which is almost universal within Manifest’s sample.
14See appendix for further details.
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Table 2.12: Replication of Prior Studies
Study Variable Original Finding Manifest Data Qualitatively
Different?
Bonet No. insiders on rem com .163** (2.55) .041** (2.15) No
& Conyon Rem com insider dummy .241* (1.88) .047** (2.04) No
Conyon & He % insiders on rem com .380 (1.51) .626*** (3.52) Yes
Anderson & Bizjak % outsiders on rem com .131 (0.47) -.102 (-0.90) No
Core Holthausen % EDs on board -5,639*** (-3.22) -15,246*** (-8.76) No
& Larcker No. affiliated NEDs on board 7,356** (3.19) 56,008** (1.99) No
No. cross directorships 4,358 (0.99) 90,855 (0.69) No
Newman & Mozes 1st year insider rem com dummy .061 (0.57) .022 (0.17) No
2nd year insider rem com dummy .135 (1.35) -0.34 (-0.06) No
Conyon & Peck % outsiders on board -.319 (-0.42) .009 (0.11) No
% outsiders on rem com .692*** (2.90) -.127 (-1.55) No
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determination of current pay15. After controlling for these factors, there is still scope for
divergence in the results owing to the construct of the dependent variable, independence
criteria and whether it is the composition of the board or remuneration committee that is
being investigated.
Firm Fixed Effects
Murphy (1985) argues for pay regressions to control for firm fixed effects. Certain com-
panies might offer particular remuneration contracts for reasons that are either unknown
or unobservable. Correlations between these hidden effects and the composition of the
pay-setting committee will bias the results in studies that use a cross section. However,
if these firm specific effects are time-invariant, they can be eliminated with panel data
by employing a fixed effects methodology. The table below replicates the method of the
authors that use an OLS estimator but applies the within estimator to Manifest’s data.
Eliminating firm fixed effects leads all three specifications to fail to reject the model of
optimal contracting. This suggests that there could be unobserved firm-specific charac-
teristics that influence pay levels which are also correlated with remuneration committee
independence. Therefore, the OLS estimates reported in table 2.13 might be overstating
the relationship between remuneration committee independence and executive pay as the
relationship appears to be sensitive to the elimination of these unobserved firm-fixed ef-
fects. However, several more econometric improvements are required before we arrive at
a conclusion.
Individual Fixed Effects
In addition to firm fixed effects, it is likely that certain individuals achieve specific pay
increments or are paid in particular ways for reasons that are specific to that individual
but are unobservable. Such factors could include individual risk preferences or certain
human-capital related attributes. By repeatedly observing the individual over a period of
time our estimates can control for these individual fixed effects.
Table 2.14 compares estimates controlling for firm and individual fixed effects. Column
‘Firm FE’ eliminates the firm fixed effect and column ‘Individual FE’ eliminates the in-
15The performance variable is not of explicit interest in this investigation. We assume an underlying
relationship between log of current market return and the log of remuneration throughout (i.e. a levels
specification). In addition, from here on, all inferences will be made using standard errors robust to het-
eroscedasticity.
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Table 2.13: Eliminating Firm Fixed Effects
Study Variable OLS FE Comment
Conyon % insiders .626*** (3.52) .245 (1.46) Within estimator overturns
& He on rem com result. Now consistent
with original study
Core % EDs on board -15,246** (-8.76) -4003 (-1.58) Within estimator
Holthausen No. affiliated NEDs on board 56,008** (1.99) 29,704 (0.58) overturns result.
& Larcker No. cross directorships 90,855 (0.69) 188,934 (0.84)
Newman 1st year insider rem com dummy .022 (0.17) Change in coefficients
& Mozes 2nd year insider rem com dummy -0.34 (-0.06) but short of significance
All years rem com dummy .105 (1.59) at the 10% level.
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dividual fixed effect. Column ‘Firm*Individual FE’ in table 2.14 shows the results when
a new variable is created uniquely identifying the firm and individual for each year end,
and the data ordered around this new variable. Applying the within estimator with the
data ordered around this variable eliminates the firm fixed effect and individual effect
simultaneously (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Full output is provided in the appendix.
Table 2.14 finds no evidence that the independence on the remuneration committee has
a statistically significant impact on director pay levels. This result is not sensitive to
grouping around individuals or firms or the variable that identifies individual and firm.
Prior Period Pay
Section 2.3 suggests that there was significant evidence that prior period pay is an im-
portant determinant of pay in the UK. As the individual was unidentified in prior studies,
‘prior period’ would have referred to the HPD prior period pay, which may or may not be
the same individual. Therefore with Manifest’s data, grouping the data on the variable that
uniquely identifies firm and individual one might expect the importance of prior period
pay to be reinforced.
Table 2.15 compares the results of the regressions using the Arellano-Bond ‘differenced’
estimator grouped around firms against those of table 2.14. The third column represents
the Arellano-Bond estimator with the data grouped around the variable that identifies firm
and individual. Full output is provided in the appendix.
As discussed in section 2.3, there are reasons to suspect that the Arellano-Bond ‘differ-
enced’ estimator might not provide good instruments of lagged levels for prior pay. There-
fore table 2.16 compares the results using the ‘system’ Arellano-Bond estimator, referred
to here as Arellano-Bond 2. Where appropriate, the two-step estimator is used, together
with the Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors. This is desirable as improvements
in efficiency can be made with the two-step estimator (Roodman, 2006). Monte Carlo
studies have shown that the estimated asymptotic standard errors in finite samples are bi-
ased downwards (Windmeijer, 2005) and consequently Arellano and Bond (1991) do not
recommend inference on the coefficients when the two-step estimator is used (StataCorp,
2005). However, Windmeijer (2005) has developed an appropriate correction so that in-
ference using these corrected standard errors is possible. Again, full output is provided in
the appendix.
Prior period pay is significant in all regressions using Arellano-Bond 2. Only one of the
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Table 2.14: Eliminating Firm and Individual Fixed Effects
Study Variable Firm FE Individual FE Firm*Individual FE
Bonet No. insiders on rem com -0.23 (-0.89) 0.10 (0.45) 0.24 (1.09)
& Conyon Rem com insider dummy -.011 (-0.48) .000 (0.00) .016 (0.63)
Conyon & He % insiders on rem com .245 (1.46) .201 (1.09) .210 (1.07)
Anderson & Bizjak % outsiders on rem com -.102 (-0.90) .111 (1.01) .091 (0.78)
Core % EDs on board -4003 (-1.58) -229,646 (-1.05) -184,251 (-0.84)
Holthausen No. affiliated NEDs on board 29,704 (0.58) -4,726 (-0.09) -14,302 (-0.28)
& Larcker No. cross directorships 188,934 (0.84) 242,269 (0.96) 224,781 (0.91)
Newman & Mozes Insider rem com dummy .105 (1.59) .061 (0.80) .063 (0.78)
Conyon % insiders on board .009 (0.11) .009 (1.02) .006 (.069)
& Peck % outsiders on rem com -.127 (-1.55) .012 (1.16) .012 (1.25)
Within estimator
Robust t-stats in parentheses
Dependent variable identifies the individual
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Table 2.15: Controlling for Prior Period Pay with Differenced GMM
Study Variable FE Firma AB Firm*Individual AB
Bonet No. insiders on rem com -0.23 (-0.89) .024 (0.50) .004 (0.09)
& Conyon Rem com insider dummy -.011 (-0.48) .026 (0.52) .013 (0.26)
pay t-1 .479** (7.11) .479** (7.33)
pay t-2 .039** (2.30) .040** (2.30)
Conyon % insiders on rem com .245 (1.46) .082 (0.33) .054 (0.20)
& He pay t-1 .306** (3.33) .237** (2.05)
pay t-2 .095** (2.14) 0.46 (1.18)
Anderson % outsiders on rem com -.102 (-0.90) -.007 (-0.04) .108 (0.57)
& Bizjak pay t-1 .311 (3.50) .299** (2.49)
pay t-2 .091 (2.17) 0.69* (1.79)
Core a) % EDs on board -4003 (-1.58) 1536 (0.59) 6539 (0.33)
Holthausen No. affiliated neds on board 29,704 (0.58) 12710 (0.18) -56595 (-1.07)
& Larcker No. cross directorships 188,934 (0.84) 667,560** (3.22) 267631* (1.71)
pay t-1 -.096 (-0.15) -.257 (1.52)
pay t-2 -.016 (-0.19) -.152 (-0.89)
Newman Insider rem com insider dummy .105 (1.59) .059 (0.54) .024 (0.19)
& Mozes pay t-1 .237** (2.50) .294** (2.39)
pay t-2 0.60 (1.43) .053 (1.30)
Conyon % insider on board .009 (0.11) -.044 (-0.30) -.064 (-0.50)
& Peck % outsiders on rem com -.127 (-1.55) -.158 (-0.71) -.106 (-0.38)
pay t-1 .179** (2.89) .010 (0.96)
pay t-2 .034 (1.02) -.032 (-0.92)
aExcept for Bonet and Conyon (2005) where the data is grouped around individuals.
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Table 2.16: Controlling for Prior Period Pay with System GMM
Study Variable Firm*Individual AB AB 2
Bonet No. insiders on rem com .004 (0.09) .002 (0.12)
& Conyon Rem com insider dummy .013 (0.26) .003 (0.12)
pay t-1 .479** (7.33) .391** (7.59)
pay t-2 .040** (2.30) -.054** (-2.59)
Conyon % insiders on rem com .054 (0.20) .251 (1.32)
& He pay t-1 .237** (2.05) .289** (2.67)
pay t-2 0.46 (1.18) .042 (0.65)
Anderson % outsiders on rem com .108 (0.57) -.255** (-2.08)
& Bizjak pay t-1 .299** (2.49) .469** (6.33)
pay t-2 0.69* (1.79) .122** (2.22)
Core % EDs on board 6539 (0.33) -762357** (-4.34)
Holthausen No. affiliated neds on board -56595 (-1.07) 10746 (0.22)
& Larcker No. cross directorships 267631* (1.71) 309,173 (1.11)
pay t-1 -.257 (1.52) .301** (3.19)
pay t-2 -.152 (-0.89) .174 (1.62)
Newman Rem com insider dummy .024 (0.19) -.045 (-0.51)
& Mozes pay t-1 .294** (2.39) .486** (5.50)
pay t-2 .053 (1.30) .101* (1.86)
Conyon % insider on board -.064 (-0.50) .101 (0.83)
& Peck % outsiders on Rem Com -.106 (-0.38) -.092 (-0.73)
pay t-1 .010 (0.96) .349** (2.98)
pay t-2 -.032 (-0.92) -.021 (-0.31)
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models finds evidence that the proportion of outsiders on the remuneration committee is
significant in the determination of CEO pay.
2.5.3 Independence
The regressions above have used the various constructs of independence employed in the
original studies. We suggested in section 2.3 that Manifest’s data might allow a more
detailed examination of director independence. Some independence characteristics might
be more important than others. In addition, concerns have been raised regarding the reli-
ability of the company’s own independence assessments. Manifest’s data will allow us to
explore these issues.
Table 2.17 compares the original authors’ constructs of independence against the compa-
nies’ own assessments and Manifest’s. Each equation uses the most sophisticated estima-
tor available (system GMM, including prior period pay, with the individual identified and
data grouped around the variable that uniquely identifies firm and individual). Full output
is provided in the appendix.
Table 2.17: Manifest vs Company Independence Assessments
Study Variable Original Company Manifest
Bonet No. insiders on rem com .002 (0.12) .030** (2.11) .008 (1.58)
& Conyon Rem com insider dummy .003 (0.12) .030* (1.75) .011 (1.16)
pay t-1 .391** (7.59) .388** (7.52) .388** (7.51)
Conyon % insiders on rem com .251 (1.32) .343** (2.63) .026 (0.48)
& He pay t-1 .289** (2.67) .314** (2.65) .319** (2.66)
Anderson % outsiders on rem com -.258** (2.16) -.258** (2.16) -.064 (-0.75)
& Bizjak pay t-1 .477** (5.23) .477** (5.23) .476** (4.84)
Newman Rem com insider dummy -.045 (-0.51) .068 (1.38) .019 (0.76)
& Mozes pay t-1 .486** (5.50) .464** (5.69) .471** (5.80)
Conyon % insider on board .101 (0.83) .101 (0.83) .076 (0.83)
& Peck % outsiders on Rem Com -.092 (-0.73) -.092 (-0.73) -.037 (.079)
pay t-1 .349** (2.98) .349** (2.98) .332** (2.98)
Anderson & Bizjak and Conyon & Peck’s assessments are akin to the Company’s own assessment. Core
et al is not repeated as they break down insiders into different categories like Manifest. Therefore, there
is no available measure for company independence and the original is similar to Manifest’s assessment.
Table 2.17 provides some evidence for the rejection of proposition 1 in favour of a rents
capture model when the company’s own assessment is applied. However, contrary to ex-
pectations, the effect of taking Manifest’s impartial assessment ahead of the less strict
company assessments is to find no support for a rents capture type model. It appears that
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the directors most susceptible to capture are the same directors that the company has al-
ready identified. The extra independence failures that Manifest identifies do not increase
executive remuneration. This does not imply that the Company’s own assessment of in-
dependence dominates Manifest’s. However, in terms of the pay setting process, it is the
violations of independence that are too flagrant for a company to ignore that have the
greatest statistical impact on pay. Manifest’s data still has the advantage of being able
to identify the detailed reasons for independence failure. For instance, perhaps the most
contentious suggestion of the Combined Code is that an independence issue can arise just
because a director has served on the board for nine or more years. Companies frequently
disagree with Manifest that tenure is an independence issue and the Association of Invest-
ment Trust Companies’ Code of Corporate Governance (2003) does not recognise tenure
as an independence issue. Therefore, with Manifest’s data it is possible to experiment
with the construct of independence.
Table 2.18: Independence Failures for Length of Service Alone
Is tenure the Failed by Failed by Difference % Disagreement
only issue? Manifest company
YES 2,761 from 2,778 190 from 2,778 2,571 from 2,778 0.9254
NO 4,603 from 21,959 1,646 from 21,959 2,957 from 21,959 0.1347
Table 2.18 compares the company assessments of independence against Manifest’s assess-
ment when length of service is the only independence issue. Manifest fail for indepen-
dence in all but 17 cases whereas the Company only failed in 6.8% of the time. Therefore,
if one suspects tenure as a genuine independence issue, one is able to re-calibrate Mani-
fest’s assessment to exclude those who have failed independence for tenure alone.
Table 2.19 show that the results move closer towards finding an effect of board indepen-
dence on pay, but remain short of significance even after considering those who’s only
issue is length of service as independent. Hence, some characteristics of independence
could be more important than others. Therefore it is worth examining further the reasons
behind independence failure.
Given that some of the reasons for failure have only small number of failures it is sen-
sible to group some of the categories above. In addition, it is desirable to disentangle
outside major shareholders from shareholders with a management association. Contrary
to directors related to management, outside major shareholders should be more resilient
to capture. Therefore, an increase in these directors would be associated with lower not
higher levels of pay under the rents capture model. The four categories in table 2.21 are
substituted in for the independence variables used the studies. Only the model akin to
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Table 2.19: Manifest vs Manifest less length of service only failures
Study Variable Manifest Less Tenure
Bonet No. insiders on rem com .008 (1.58) .014* (1.83)
& Conyon Rem com insider dummy .011 (1.16) .006 (0.58)
pay t-1 .388** (7.51) .390** (7.52)
Conyon % insiders on rem com .026 (0.48) .126 (1.25)
& He pay t-1 .319** (2.66) .256** (2.07)
Anderson % outsiders on rem com -.064 (-0.75) -.065 (-0.89)
& Bizjak pay t-1 .476** (4.84) .360** (3.96)
Newman Rem com insider dummy .019 (0.76) .012 (0.39)
& Mozes pay t-1 .471** (5.80) .455** (5.17)
Conyon % insider on board .076 (0.83) .116 (1.15)
& Peck % outsiders on Rem Com -.037 (.079) -.022 (-0.24)
pay t-1 .332** (2.98) .401** (3.22)
Bonet and Conyon (2005) finds evidence for the rejection of proposition 1. This model
suggests that remuneration committees with more non-executive directors who have a
material business relationship with the Company, ceteris paribus, increase levels of pay
for executive directors. None of the studies link an executive presence (or closely related
executive presence) to greater levels of executive (or CEO) remuneration. In addition, the
presence of an outside shareholder, or a non-executive director who has failed indepen-
dence for tenure only, appear to have no significant effect on remuneration.
2.5.4 Other Methodological Issues
There are three remaining dimensions which have been implicitly covered in the analysis
above but deserve further attention: first, the difference between analysing CEO remuner-
ation or the remuneration of all executive directors; second, the construct and functional
form of the dependent variable (i.e. which parts of the remuneration package are mea-
sured and how); and finally, there may be a difference between analysing the composition
of the board and the composition of the remuneration committee.
Bonet and Conyon (2005)’s study, together with the results of table 2.19 and table 2.22
find greater evidence for the capture of all executive directors’ pay than just the CEO
alone. An interpretation for these results could be that it is CEO pay is the focus of scrutiny
by shareholders and hence the setting of CEO pay is harder to capture than pay setting
process for other directors. However, this is not consistent with the traditional predictions
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Table 2.20: Reasons for Independence Failures
1996-2005 1996 2005
Total NEDs (director years) 31011 2263 3018
Failed by Company 2376 87 313
Failed by Manifest 9316 584 855
i) Executive Director (within last five years) 968 38 107
ii). Family connection to an executive director or Company 229 20 19
iii). Material Business Relationship (within last three years) 1190 109 90
iv) Cross Directorship (ned of firm x is ed of firm y where ed of firm x is a ned of firm y) 71 3 6
v) Professional/Consultancy Services (within last three years) 422 24 54
vi) Received bonuses or other significant remuneration in excess of normal fees for service as non-executive director 661 23 126
vii) Significant Shareholder (holding in excess of 3% issued share capital) 1273 84 146
viii) Tenure (=> nine years) 5104 336 563
ix) Tenure only 3732 243 401
No NEDs where independence is not known 660 432 2
Directors were assessed by Manifest’s analysts (of which the author was one) on an annual basis. Some of the directors were assessed retrospectively by the author
in order to complete missing records. In each year, a director may fail for any number of reasons.
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Table 2.21: Grouping of Independence Failures
1996-2005 1996 2005
1. Failed for association to management (either i; ii; or iv) 1229 59 129
2. Failed for connection to company’s business (either iii; v; or vi) 2197 154 261
3. Independent shareholder (failed for vii; and independent on i, ii or iv) 1071 69 125
4. Tenure only 3732 243 401
Table 2.22: System GMM with Independence Failure Groups
Study Variable AB2
Bonet Association to management -.013 (0.52)
& Conyon Association to business .038** (3.47)
Outside Shareholder .012 (0.49)
Tenure only .002 (0.27)
Conyon Association to management .023 (0.90)
& He Association to business .089 (0.62)
Outside Shareholder -.146 (-0.77)
Tenure only -0.18 (-0.27)
Anderson Association to management .069 (0.33)
& Bizjak Association to business -.001 (0.00)
Outside Shareholder .085 (0.59)
Tenure only -.082 (-1.09)
Core Association to management 26541 (0.37)
Holthausen Association to business 32095 (0.63)
& Larcker Outside Shareholder 26403 (0.46)
Tenure only 14205 (0.47)
Newman Association to management .062 (0.91)
& Mozes Association to business -.044 (-1.32)
Outside Shareholder .092 (1.55)
Tenure only -.014 (-0.58)
Conyon Association to management -.317 (-1.18)
& Peck Association to business 0.25 (0.26)
Outside Shareholder .000 (0.00)
Tenure only .012 (0.18)
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Table 2.23: Different Elements of the Remuneration Package
Study Rem Measure Variable AB2
Bonet Ln Director Salary No. insiders on rem com -.005 (-0.35)
& Conyon Ln Director Emoluments .021 (1.29)
Ln Director Total Rem .018 (1.23)
Conyon Ln CEO Salary % insiders on rem com .045 (0.35)
& He Ln CEO Emoluments .256 (1.42)
Ln CEO Total Rem .255* (1.81)
Anderson Ln CEO Salary % outsiders on rem com -.278** (2.01)
& Bizjak Ln CEO Emoluments -.194 (1.38)
Ln CEO Total Rem -.258** (2.16)
Newman Ln CEO Salary =1 if insider on Rem Com .086** (2.26)
& Mozes Ln CEO Emoluments .068 (1.43)
Ln CEO Total Rem .068 (1.38)
Conyon Ln CEO Salary % insider on board .149 (1.54)
& Peck Ln CEO Emoluments .068 (0.39)
Ln CEO Total Rem .005 (0.04)
Ln CEO Salary % outsiders on Rem Com -.151 (1.45)
Ln CEO Emoluments .032 (0.22)
Ln CEO Total Rem -.002 (0.02)
of rents capture models which argue that it is the CEO who is best positioned to capture
pay. An alternative econometric interpretation is simply that examining the pay of all the
executive directors in the company, rather than just the CEO, allows more observations
from a fixed set of companies. Given how subtle the relationship between independence
and pay could be, one might expect more observations to increase the likelihood of finding
some evidence for the rejection of optimal contracting.
It is possible that it is easier to capture some aspects of the remuneration package than
others. For instance the most recent concerns voiced by shareholder institutions are related
to the suspected ratcheting of salary, more than the design of long term incentives (MM
& K Ltd, 2007). With this in mind, Table 2.23 repeats the regression models using salary,
emoluments, and total remuneration in logs as the dependent variable. Full output is
provided in the appendix, including the non-log model.
Evidence is found for the capture of salary in one instance and capture of total remuner-
ation in two instances. However, no evidence is found for the capture of emoluments,
which include the gains from exercise of long-term incentive awards (which can be sev-
eral multiples of salary). This might be expected as the amount and terms of the long-term
incentive are set up to ten years prior to exercise i.e. the remuneration committee can have
little, if any, influence on exercise of awards post grant date. As the composition of the re-
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muneration committee at exercise date could bear little relation to the composition of the
committee at grant date (if such a committee even existed), failure to find a relationship
between the committee and exercise levels is not surprising.
2.5.5 Preferred Estimator
The results in the previous sections have shown that how important independence appears
to be in the pay-setting process is dependent upon the chosen econometric strategy. We
now construct a preferred estimating equation.
The methodological choices investigated above can be broadly described by two cate-
gories. There are those which are dominant in terms of econometric theory as they pro-
duce more accurate estimates. Other choices are subjective but yet remain important in
an arriving at a conclusion regarding the role of independence in the pay setting process.
The dominant aspects include the use of panel data, the identification of individuals, an
accurate measurement of pay, controlling for individual and firm effects, controlling for
prior period pay and a detailed assessment of non-executive director independence. Any
estimator that claims to be preferred should include these aspects as a minimum. The
main subjective decision appears to be how the variable measuring independence is con-
structed. A sensible strategy is to apply the preferred estimator with an independence
measure that we expect to give the most robust test of the rents capture hypothesis and
another measure that provides the most robust test of the optimal contracting model. The
results relating to Chief Executives are shown in table 2.2416.
When the independence variable is broken down, table 2.24 reports no evidence for rents
capture by CEO’s. When the boarder measure of independence is used (using companies’
own assessments) replacing a wholly independent remuneration committee entirely with
insiders is associated with a 16% increase in remuneration for the CEO. However, the
estimated coefficient is only statistically significant at the 10% level.
Our control variables largely behave as expected. Past realisations of pay explain a large
proportion of current pay. Age is positively correlated with remuneration, but the square
of age is negative suggesting that remuneration does not increase with age beyond a par-
ticular age17. Chief Executives close to retirement are unlikely to receive grants of equity
16The analysis is repeated for all executive in the appendix. Also in the appendix, we experiment with
valuations for the equity based incentives in the calculation of total remuneration.
17The turning point in the predicted values with respect to age is 52. Perhaps this is slightly earlier than
might be expected but reflects some very large declines in remuneration for the very old CEOs.
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Table 2.24: Preferred Estimator: Chief Executives
CEO Robust Test Robust Test
Ln Total Rem Rents Capture Optimal Contracting
Dependent Variable
t− 1 0.393*** (4.29) 0.388*** (4.05)
t− 2 0.071* (1.81) 0.067* (1.68)
Remuneration Committee Variables
No. Associated to Management -0.025 (-0.46)
No. Business Relationship -0.006 (-0.23)
No. Major Shareholders 0.035 (0.88)
No. Long Tenure -0.002 (-0.13)
% Insiders (Company) 0.155* (1.80)
Committee Size 0.008 (0.67) 0.007 (0.59)
Age 0.056* (1.71) 0.058* (1.77)
Age2 -0.001* (-1.86) -0.001* (-1.92)
Ceo Holdings -0.001 (-0.51) -0.001 (-0.52)
Board Size 0.020*** (3.24) 0.020*** (3.14)
Sales 0.113*** (4.31) 0.117*** (4.22)
TSR 0.091** (2.35) 0.088** (2.28)
EPS -0.001 (-0.08) -0.001 (-0.02)
Dummy Variables
Resigned in Year 0.000 (0.00) 0.002 (0.04)
Appointed in Year -0.070 (-0.94) -0.066 (-0.90)
Combined Chairman & CEO 0.036 (0.66) 0.038 (0.68)
Female 0.130 (1.42) 0.135 (1.47)
Blockholder -0.026 (-0.94) -0.031 (-1.13)
Constant 3.112*** (3.37) 3.114*** (3.29)
1998 0.195 (1.17) 0.172 (0.93)
1999 0.269 (1.56) 0.250 (1.35)
2000 0.360** (2.17) 0.343* (1.91)
2001 0.342* (1.87) 0.329* (1.66)
2002 0.433** (2.34) 0.423** (2.10)
2003 0.480** (2.57) 0.470** (2.33)
2004 0.516** (2.58) 0.509** (2.35)
2005 0.530** (2.38) 0.523** (2.19)
N 2141 2141
Groups 681 681
Instruments 73 73
F-stat(27, 680) 55.65 57.67
Hansen J χ2 57.18 57.31
Prob > χ2 (0.257) (0.253)
No Second Order 0.220 0.260
autocorrelation in first differences (0.828) (0.795)
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incentives. Consistent with other UK studies, larger companies as measured by board size
and logged sales are associated with greater levels of CEO pay. Performance as measured
by total shareholder return (TSR) is also positively associated with pay, albeit the account-
ing measure, earnings per share (EPS), is not. Performing the role of Chairman as well as
being the CEO is not associated with higher levels of remuneration for the CEO.
As the calculation of remuneration was annualised for directors serving less than 12
months of a year, it is not surprising that dummy variables identifying CEOs in the first
or last year of their tenure are statistically insignificantly different from zero. Our female
dummy is also insignificant. This is not surprising as there were only 14 female Chief
Executives in our sample. However, it is perhaps, slightly surprising that the coefficient
is positive, given the general perception that women suffer from wage discrimination and
that this discrimination is thought to be particularly prevalent at the highest level. One
explanation might be that, given 98% of our sample is male, only exceptionally talented
women are able to break through the glass ceiling and reach the position of CEO. We
might expect these women to be paid more than the average CEO, or at least paid enough
to counter the wage discrimination effect.
The blockholder dummy equals one when an outside major shareholder holds more than
5% of the company’s equity. The coefficient on the blockholder dummy is negative but
statistically insignificant. The relationship between shareholder monitoring and executive
pay is explored in more detail in chapters 4 and 5. The year dummies describe the well
documented unexplained growth in CEO pay over the duration of the sample.
To produce unbiased estimates, the variables used to instrument prior period pay must be
uncorrelated with the error (exogenous). This is tested by the Hansen J statistic. Bias
might also be caused by second order autocorrelation in the first differences. Both these
diagnostic tests are satisfied.
2.6 Conclusion
Prior empirical research has produced mixed findings and hence this study sought to be as
rigourous as possible regarding its econometric strategy. The use of panel data, the identi-
fication of individuals, an accurate measurement of pay, controlling for individual and firm
effects, controlling for past realisations of the dependent variable and a rich assessment
of non-executive director independence were all important for a thorough exploration of
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the issues surrounding the relationship between remuneration committee independence
and CEO pay. The results, taken together, do not favour the rents capture model. Only
in the most favourable specification was a relationship between the independence of the
pay-setting committee and CEO remuneration levels found. This relationship was only
significant at the 10% level, with the control variables contributing far more to the de-
termination of pay levels. Furthermore, in the majority of specifications there was no
evidence to reject the null model of optimal contracting.
Yet the findings of our study are not sufficient to state that CEO remuneration contracts
are being determined optimally. Our findings are consistent with optimal contracting but
other interpretations are possible. For example, one interpretation could be that no matter
how independent you make your board the CEO will still capture the pay-setting process
and inflate their own remuneration beyond the optimal level for shareholders. Indeed,
the very fact that CEO pay continued to rise above general earnings year on year during
the same period when the presence of insiders on remuneration committees was reducing
steadily, is suggestive of this phenomenon.
While significant, the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on the performance variable
(TSR) is relatively small in our preferred specification. This, together with the continued
acceleration of CEO pay during a market decline (post 2001) is disappointing if the pay-
performance relationship is a good estimate of how well contracts are being designed
to solve agency problems. Moreover, the persistence of prior levels of pay to current
arrangements may also be a concern for shareholders. If shareholders are seeking an
optimal contract with the CEO in each time period, then theoretical reasons why past
period pay should be positively correlated with current pay are not entirely clear.
Future work might wish to concentrate on more sophisticated choices of the dependent
variable as a measure of the efficiency of remuneration contracts. Although the measure
of long term equity incentives used in this study was robust to different specifications it
was technically simplistic. We were unable to measure CEO wealth in this study (other
than equity holdings) which might influences the extent to which changes in remuner-
ation actually matter to the CEO. Nor did our study include any data on CEO pension
arrangements. We were unable to model the complexity and diversity of equity incentive
schemes, particularly with respect to performance conditions. Performance conditions
are an issue in which executives have been suspected of directly capturing the pay-setting
process18. Therefore, further research into the severity of performance conditions and the
18For instance by ‘earnings smoothing’ by which CEOs may choose not to maximise earnings in early
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relationship with non-executive director independence is certainly an interesting area for
future research. One possibility, is the application of a monte carlo probability simulation
in pricing incentives at grant date. Such a model is able to consider the impact of perfor-
mance conditions on the valuation of incentive grants. The price produced by the monte
carlo model, could be compared with a black-scholes model to reveal the impact of per-
formance conditions on incentive pricing. The differential could then be regressed against
director independence to assess whether tougher performance conditions are correlated
with director independence.
Future work might also be focus on the extent to which remuneration arrangements have
changed over the last 15 years. As indicated in this chapter, there have been many sig-
nificant developments in best practice. New disclosure rules and an increased emphasis
on the role of the non-executive director have been designed to make boards less vul-
nerable to capture than in previous years. At the same time, service contracts have been
reduced, providing fewer severance provisions and equity vesting conditions have become
more demanding in order to strengthen the link between performance and reward. It is
also possible that increased disclosure has enabled a ratcheting of pay, a phenomenon to
which captured boards might be more vulnerable. Thus, there are many avenues for future
related work to explore and given that the increased disclosure has placed the necessary
data in the public domain, further interesting insights into the pay-setting process should
be achievable.
periods to make performance growth targets easier to achieve in later periods.
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Appendix
2.A Replication of Studies
Section 2.5.1 attempts to reproduce the results from studies in the existing literature that
tested whether the independence of the supervisor in the pay-setting process was signif-
icant in the determination of pay. The studies were replicated as far as possible in terms
of the econometric specification of the estimating equation. This included the regression
model (including the standard errors employed), the control variables used, the defini-
tion of independence, the unit of analysis and supervisor variable and also the ordering
of panel data where applicable. One should note that the apparently unsophisticated ap-
proaches of some of the studies can be justified in light of the fact that their main focus
lay elsewhere than discerning between the optimal contracting and rents capture models.
Unfortunately, some data items for the control variables used in the original studies were
unable to be collected and others were incomplete for the whole sample and merged into
Manifest’s database. However, in all cases, care was taken to ensure that at least the
main significant variables of the original studies were included such that the attempt of
replication was a fair one.
Two of the studies in table 2.1, Benito and Conyon (1999) and Conyon (1997) investigate
the difference between those companies who have adopted a remuneration committee and
those that have not. A replication of these studies is not possible as almost all companies
in Manifest’s database adopted a remuneration committee prior to 1996. Daily, Johnson,
Ellstrand, and Dalton (1998) was not replicated as specific software (LISREL 8.03) was
required to replicate their regression technique19.
Applying Conyon & He’s (2004) method to Manifest’s data overturns one of the original
results. The coefficient on the proportion of insiders on the remuneration committee is
19Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand, and Dalton (1998) apply maximum likelihood to estimate structural equation
models.
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Table 2.25: Bonet and Conyon (2005) p148, table 7.4
Original Data Manifest Data
No. of insiders on rem com 0.163** (0.064) .041** (0.019)
Any insider on rem com 0.241* (0.128) .047** (.023)
CEO 0.527** (0.056) 0.526** (0.057) .516** (.016) .516** (.016)
Board Size 0.007 (0.010) 0.004 (0.010) .024** (.002) .024** (.002)
Rem Com Size -0.030 (0.022) -0.023 (0.021) .010* (.005) .010* (.005)
Ln market cap 0.234** (0.025) 0.232** (0.025) .179** (.005) .179** (.005)
No. of groups 623 4731
Observations 1536 20399
Executive director compensation defined as ‘salary, bonus and other type of compensation but excluding
the value of exercised stock options’.
Random effects estimator with asymptotic standard errors.
Year and industry dummies included.
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%.
Table 2.26: Conyon and He (2004) p29; table 2
Original Data Manifest Data
Insiders on Rem Com 0.38 (1.51) .626** (3.52)
Sig shareholders -0.15 (-1.83) -.112** (-2.58)
CEO directors 0.05 (0.29) .203 (1.23)
CEO age -0.00 (-0.16) .005** (2.32)
CEO Tenure -0.01 (-1.54) -.004* (-1.93)
CEO Founder? -0.41 (-4.63)
Rem Com? -0.17 (-1.20)
Combined Ch/CEO? 0.01 (0.10) .056 (1.27)
Board size 0.08** (3.88) .017** (3.05)
Insiders on the board -0.46 (-1.76) -.806** (-7.96)
Firm age 0.00 (0.43)
Firm size 0.15** (6.98) .316** (26.47)
Firm growth potential -0.15** (-3.22) -.0001 (-0.36)
Firm volatility 0.11* (2.20) .337 (1.32)
Firm performance 0.04* (2.11) .002* (1.97)
Observations 1563 2188
Adjusted R-squared 0.2637 0.6269
CEO compensation defined as ‘salary, bonus, benefits and the expected value of equity based grants’.
OLS estimator with robust t-stats.
Year and industry dummies included.
N is less than in the replication of Bonet & Conyon (2005) as Conyon & He (2004) only investigate
CEO, not the pay of each executive director.
It was not possible to identify CEO Founders or firm age in the in the data. However, unlike Conyon
& He’s sample of venture capitalists there are a very small number of Company founders in the FTSE
350 who serve as CEO’s. Also, the remuneration committee dummy is not included as all companies in
Manifest’s sample had established a compensation committee.
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Table 2.27: Anderson and Bizjak (2003) p1333; table 2
Original Data Manifest Data
Fraction of outsiders on rem com 0.131 (0.47) -.102 (-0.90)
CEO on remuneration committee -0.562 (1.55) .121 (1.36)
CEO Turnover -0.079 (0.51) -.086** (-2.21)
CEO equity holdings -6.289** (-2.93) -.602** (-1.99)
CEO tenure 0.002 (0.19) .001 (0.33)
CEO Founder 0.497** (2.20)
Ln total assets 0.486** (7.83) .1247** (4.31)
Risk 3.918 (1.14) -.116 (-0.43)
Investment opportunity set -0.036 (1.44) .001 (0.79)
Return on assets 7.675 (1.65) -.004 (-1.11)
Market return(t-1) 0.233 (0.51) .034 (1.34)
Firm Groups 110 304
N 1003 2187
R squared 58.16 44.15
F-stat 17.07 69.38
CEO compensation defined as ’salary, bonus, benefits and the expected value of equity based grants’.
Firm Fixed effects estimator estimator with robust standard errors.
positive and significant. Unlike Conyon & He’s (2004) results, this is suggestive of a
rents capture type model. However, the coefficient should be interpreted carefully as
the regression also controls for the percentage of insiders on the board. In addition, like
Conyon & He (2004) support is also found for agency theory as the presence of significant
shareholders on the remuneration committee also appears to be important. Moreover, it is
not unreasonable to suspect some market differences between a sample of US IPO firms
and the FTSE 350 Index.
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Table 2.28: Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) p386; table 2
Original Data Manifest Data
Sales in millions US$ and GBP respectively (t-1) 12.598** (6.07) 52.7** (14.94)
Investment Opportunities (market to book ratio) 101,391** (2.43) -283 (-0.77)
Return on Assets(t-1) (% earnings/assets) 4,108 (0.98) 5671.939 (0.92)
Stock Return (t-1) 1,454** (2.34) 54,680** (5.43)
S.d of ROA -41,857** (-3.75) -682,010* (-1.69)
S.d of RET -967 (-0.83)
Combined Chair/CEO 152,577** (2.86) 126,852* (1.74)
Board size 30,601** (3.51) 49,907** (5.39)
Inside directors -5,639** (-3.22) -15,246** (-8.76)
Directors appointed by CEO 4,137** (4.14)
Gray outside directors 7,356** (3.19) 56,008** (1.99)
Interlocked outside directors 4,358 (0.99) 90,855 (0.69)
Outside directors over age 69 4,136** (2.42)
Busy outside directors 2,016 (1.80)
CEO % ownership -8,027 (-2.21) 214,092 (0.42)
Non-CEO insider owns 5% -142,389** (-2.18) -130,865 (-1.32)
Percentage stock ownership -21,183 (-0.81)
Outside blockholder owns 5% -86,100** (-1.98) -139,597* (-1.87)
Adjusted r-squared 37.2% 38.48%
F stat 9.85 26.06
Core et al (1999) is the only study not to take logs of the dependent variable.
CEO compensation defined as ’salary, bonus, benefits and the expected value of equity based grants’.
OLS estimator with t-statistic in parentheses (not adjusted)
Table 2.29: Newman and Mozes (1999) p47, table 3
Original Data Manifest Data
1991 1992 1997 2005
Major Shareholder Dummy -.002 (-0.58) -.005 (1.73) .091 (0.55) -.037 (-0.33)
Ln Sales .372** (6.56) .286** (4.92) .209** (10.21) .291** (15.32)
CEO Tenure .005 (0.56) .020** (2.16) -.003 (-0.57) .006 (1.07)
Stock Returns .003** (2.12) .006** (3.88) .235 (0.85) .264 (0.98)
Return on Equity .005** (2.79) .001 (0.33) .003 (0.45) .003 (1.11)
Insider .135 (1.35) .061 (0.57) .022 (0.17) -.034 (-0.06)
Observations 161 161 258 321
F-Stat 9.79 7.96 22.35 49.11
Adjusted R-squared 25.3% 23.5% 29.35% 42.91
Newman & Mozes regress on two years of cross sectional data.
CEO compensation defined as ’salary, bonus, benefits and the expected value of equity based grants’.
OLS estimator with t-statistic in parentheses (not adjusted)
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Table 2.30: Conyon and Peck (1998) p153, table 3
Original Data Manifest Data
Fraction outsiders on board -0.319 (0.43) .009 (0.11)
Fraction outsiders on rem com 0.692** (2.91) -.126 (-1.55)
Shareholder Return .122** (1.26) .152** (9.13)
Total Employment -.031 (0.34) .041** (2.41)
Combined Chair/CEO .017 (0.31) .080* (1.88)
Nominating committee -.084 (1.61)
Blockholder dummy (=1 if >.049) .001 (0.25) -.036 (-1.47)
Inside directors -.017 (-0.58) .003 (0.37)
Outside directors -.016 (-0.55) 0.28** (3.42)
Observations 342 2491
Groups (firms) 93 307
HPD Emoluments includes salary, bonus and benefits but not the expected value of equity based grants.
Year dummies included.
OLS estimator with robust t-statistic in parentheses.
2.B Econometric Specification
The following section aims to identify the importance of econometric specification in
arriving at a conclusion as to the evidence for capture of non-executive directors in the
context of executive pay determination. Three issues are explored. Firstly, the importance
of time invariant heterogeneity between groups in the panel is examined. Secondly, the is-
sue of what constitutes a group in the panel is explored and finally one attempts to control
for past realisations of the dependent variable on the right hand side of the equation.
2.B.1 Fixed Effects
The following section compares the results of the studies that used an OLS estimator
against the within estimator, which, unlike the OLS estimator, controls for fixed effects.
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Table 2.31: Fixed effects: Conyon and He (2004)
OLS Estimator Within Estimator
Inside Directors .626** (3.52) .245 (1.46)
Significant shareholders -.112** (-2.58) -.027 (-0.67)
CEO directors .203 (1.23) -.043 (-0.29)
CEO age .005** (2.32) .001 (0.26)
CEO Tenure -.004* (-1.93) .001 (0.13)
Combined Ch/CEO? .056 (1.27) .006 (0.13)
Board size .017** (3.05) .018** (2.96)
Insiders on the board -.806** (-7.96) -.385** (-3.36)
Firm size .316** (26.47) .262** (17.59)
Firm growth opportunity -.0001 (-0.36) -.0001 (-0.31)
Firm volatility .337 (1.32) -.028 (-0.12)
Firm performance .002** (1.97) .001 (1.48)
Observations 2188 2188
Groups 307
Adjusted R-squared 0.6269 0.5583
CEO compensation defined as ‘salary, bonus, benefits and the expected value of equity based grants’.
Robust t-stats.
Year and sector dummies included. Sector dummies eliminated as fixed effects
After applying the within estimator one is unable to reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on the
insider variable is significantly different from zero. Thus, the application of the within estimator is
important in this instance.
Table 2.32: Fixed effects: Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999)
OLS Estimator Within Estimator
Sales in millions US$ and GPB respectively (t-1) 52.7** (14.94) 48.8** (3.94)
Investment Opportunities (market to book ratio) -283 (-0.77) -203 (0.48)
Return on Assets(t-1) (% earnings/assets) 5,672 (0.92) 3,429 (1.38)
Stock Return (t-1) 54,680** (5.43) 144,234** (2.55)
S.d of ROA -682,010* (-1.69) 527,198 (-1.60)
Combined Chair/CEO 126,852* (1.74) -4,064 (-0.06)
board size 49,907** (5.39) 15,088 (0.98)
Inside directors -15,246** (-8.76) -4003 (-1.58)
Gray outside directors 56,008** (1.99) 29,704 (0.58)
Interlocked outside directors 90,855 (0.69) 188,934 (0.84)
CEO % ownership 214,092 (0.42) -374,604 (-1.30)
Non-CEO insider owns 5% -130,865 (-1.32) 110,453 (1.34)
Outside blockholder owns 5% -139,597* (-1.87) -130,054** (-2.40)
Adjusted r-squared 38.48% 23.74
F 26.06 18.11
Remuneration includes salary, bonus, benefits and the expected value of equity based grants.
Robust t-statistic in parentheses
The application of the within estimator overturns the inference on the board composition variables.
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Table 2.33: Fixed effects: Newman and Mozes (1999)
OLS Estimator Within Estimator
1997 2005 1996-2005
Major Shareholder Dummy .091 (0.55) -.037 (-0.33) -.062** (-2.18)
Ln Sales .209** (10.21) .291** (15.32) .181** (6.24)
CEO Tenure -.003 (-0.57) .006 (1.07) -.0003 (-0.01)
Stock Returns .235 (0.85) .264 (0.98) .083 (1.38)
Return on Equity .003 (0.45) .003 (1.11) .000 (1.57)
Insider .022 (0.17) -.034 (-0.06) .105 (1.59)
Observations 258 321 2311
Groups 303
F-Stat 22.35 49.11 101.72
Adjusted R-squared 29.35% 42.91% 46.89%
CEO compensation defined as ’salary, bonus, benefits and the expected value of equity based grants’.
T-statistic in parentheses (not adjusted)
Table 2.34: Individual Identified: Bonet and Conyon (2005)
Firms Individuals Firm and Individual
No. of insiders on Rem Com -.023 .010 .024
(-0.89) (0.45) (1.09)
Any insider on Rem Com -.011 .000 0.16
(-0.48) (0.00) (0.63)
CEO .263** .264** .279** .279**
(14.85) (14.84) (15.93) (15.92)
Board Size -.014 -.014** .006** .007** .007** .007**
(-3.96) (-3.95) (2.41) (2.39) (2.45) (2.43)
Size of Rem Com .016** .016** -.004 -.004 -.005 -.005
(2.76) (2.74) (-0.80) (-0.72) (-1.12) (-1.05)
Ln (market cap) .147** .146** .096** .097** .089** .089**
(14.83) (14.77) ( 13.36) (13.36) (11.77) (11.77)
Groups 523 4,731 5,094
Observations 4109 20,399 20,718
Year dummies included.
2.B.2 Individual Identified
The following output compares the results of grouping by position (i.e. individual and
firm are uniquely identified), against grouping by firm and individual. All regressions use
Manifest’s data with the individual identified (i.e. allowing for salary adjustments in the
years of appointment and resignation). Grouping the data different certain variables forces
one to drop some time-invariant variables. For instance, with Bonet & Conyon, grouping
around individuals, allows the identification of the marginal effect of the CEO dummy
as the same individual can vary between being CEO and not being CEO throughout the
sample. However, grouping around position forces one to drop the CEO dummy as this
characteristic will be time invariant for each group throughout the sample.
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Table 2.35: Individual Identified: Conyon and He (2004)
Firms Individuals Firm and Individual
Inside Directors .245 (1.46) .201 (1.09) .210 (1.07)
Significant shareholders -.027 (-0.67) -.020 (-0.50) -.027 (-0.67)
CEO directors -.043 (-0.29)
CEO age .001 (0.26) .027 (0.32) .011 (.104)
Combined Ch/CEO? .006 (0.13) -.081 (-0.73) -.110 (-0.92)
board size .018** (2.96) .018** (2.42) .015** (2.02)
Insiders on the board -.385** (-3.36) -.202 (-1.46) -.202 (-1.49)
Firm size .262** (17.59) .191** (7.64) .202** (7.87)
Firm growth opportunity -.0001 (-0.31) -.0001 (-1.08) .0001 (-1.03)
Firm volatility -.028 (-0.12) -.204 (-0.82) -.247 (-0.99)
Firm performance .001 (1.48)
Observations 2188 2,654 2,686
Groups 307 611 625
Adjusted R-squared .5583 .4390 .5009
Year dummies included.
Table 2.36: Individual Identified: Anderson and Bizjak (2003)
Firms Individuals Firm and Individual
Fraction outside directors on Rem Com -.102 (-0.90) .111 (1.01) .091 (0.78)
CEO on Rem Com .121 (1.36) -.226* (-1.67) -.237* (-1.69)
CEO Turnover -.086** (-2.21) -.122** (-2.89) -.077* (-1.92)
CEO equity holdings -.602** (-1.99) -.003 (-1.31) -.003 (-1.39)
CEO tenure .001 (0.33)
Ln (total assets) .1247** (4.31) .072** (2.35) .068** (2.02)
Risk -.116 (-0.43) -.218 (-0.91) -.246 (-1.10)
Investment opportunity set .001 (0.79) .000 (0.01) .000 (0.04)
Return on assets -.004 (-1.11) -.003 (-0.70) -.002 (-0.53)
Market return .034 (1.34) .108** (4.34) .157** (5.61)
Groups 304 609 623
N 2187 2618 2650
R squared 44.15 .3111 .2675
F-statistic 69.38 40.04 40.54
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Table 2.37: Individual Identified: Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999)
Firms Individuals Firm and Individual
Sales in millions (t-1) 48.8** (3.94) 57.1** (5.30) 57.7** (5.37)
Market to book ratio -203 (0.48) -1,906 (-1.03) -1,921 (-1.05)
Return on Assets(t-1) 3,429 (1.38) 23,663 (1.01) 24,038 (1.04)
Stock Return (t-1) 144,234** (2.55) 92,676** (2.64) 148,936 (4.54)
S.d of ROA -527,198 (-1.60) -51,595 (-0.20) -127,607 (-0.50)
Combined Chair/CEO -4,064 (-0.06)
Board size 15,088 (0.98) 34,857* (1.89) 30,684* (1.70)
Inside directors -4003 (-1.58) -229,646 (-1.05) -184,251 (-0.84)
Gray outside directors 29,704 (0.58) -4,726 (-0.09) -14,302 (-0.28)
Interlocked outside directors 188,934 (0.84) 242,269 (0.96) 224,781 (0.91)
CEO % ownership -374,604 (-1.30)
Non-CEO insider owns 5% 110,453 (1.34)
Outside blockholder owns 5% -130,054** (-2.40)
Adjusted r-squared 23.74 23.21 21.06
F 18.11 14.32 15.19
Table 2.38: Individual Identified: Newman and Mozes (1999)
Firms Individuals Firm and Individual
Major Shareholder Dummy -.062** (-2.18)
Ln Sales .181** (6.24) .141** (4.07) .145** (4.05)
CEO Tenure -.0003 (-0.01)
Stock Returns .083 (1.38) .148** (2.57) .169** (2.86)
Return on Equity .000 (1.57) .000 (1.08) .000 (1.13)
Insider .105 (1.59) .061 (0.80) .063 (0.78)
Observations 2311 2470 2503
Groups 303 596 609
F 101.72 49.42 42.19
Table 2.39: Individual Identified: Conyon and Peck (1998)
Firms Individuals Firm and Individual
Proportion of outsiders on board .009 (0.11) .084 (0.81) .067 (0.69)
Proportion of outsiders on rem com -.126 (-1.55) .035 (0.31) -.003 (-0.03)
Shareholder Return .152** (9.13) .099** (5.20) .121** (5.41)
Total Employment .041** (2.41) .085** (3.25) .079** (2.90)
Combined Chair/CEO .080* (1.88)
Off-board holding (=1 if >.049) -.036 (-1.47) -.027 (-1.13) -0.18 (-0.76)
Inside directors .003 (0.37) .009 (1.02) .006 (0.69)
Outside directors 0.28** (3.42) .012 (1.16) .012 (1.25)
Observations 2491 2630 2662
Groups 307 612 627
Year dummies included.
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Table 2.40: Prior Period Pay: Bonet and Conyon (2005)
xtabond xtabond xtabond2
individuals individuals*firms individuals*firms
Y(t-1) .479** .479** .496** .497** .391** .391**
(7.11) (7.11) (7.32) (7.33) (7.59) (7.59)
Y(t-2) .039** .039** .039** .040** -.054** -.054**
(2.30) (2.30) (2.29) (2.30) (-2.59) (-2.59)
No. of insiders on Rem Com .024 .004 .002
(0.51) (0.09) (0.12)
Any insider on Rem Com .026 .013 .003
(0.52) (0.26) (0.12)
CEO .177 .177** .138** .139** .325** .325**
(5.29) (5.29) (4.66) (4.66) (10.51) (10.51)
Board Size .002 .002 .002 .003 .012** .012**
(0.49) (0.49) (0.59) (0.59) (3.52) (3.52)
Size of Rem Com -.002 -.002 -.002 -.003 .001 .001
(-0.21) (-0.21) (-0.39) (-0.42) (0.30) (0.30)
Ln (market cap) .061 .061 .067 .067 .143 .143
(4.60) (4.60) (4.82) (4.80) (9.83) (9.73)
Groups 2519 2557 3417
Observations 8154 8003 11646
Year dummies included.
2.B.3 Prior Period Pay
The following output shows the results of including prior period pay on the right hand
side of the equation. The first column applies the Arellano-Bond ‘differenced’ estimator
grouped around firms and second column grouped around the variable that uniquely iden-
tifies firm and individual. The third column applies the extended Arellano-Bond estimator
designed to compute a levels equation and hence uses a system GMM framework. The
two-step version of the estimator with Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors was
used.
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Table 2.41: Prior Period Pay: Conyon and He (2004)
xtabond xtabond xtabond2
firm individuals*firms individuals*firms
Y(t-1) .306** (3.33) .237** (2.05) .289** (2.67)
Y(t-2) .095** (2.14) .046 (1.18) .042 (0.65)
Inside Directors .082 (0.33) .054 (0.20) .251 (1.32)
Significant shareholders -.014 (-0.22) .023 (0.41) -.022 (-0.50)
CEO directors -.268 (-0.82) -.217 (-0.40) -.331 (-0.96)
CEO age -.012 (-1.24) .025 (0.11) -.002 (-0.69)
CEO Tenure -.268 (-0.82)
Combined Ch/CEO? -.112 (-0.59) .041 (0.20) .023 (0.34)
Board size .016 (1.30) .013 (1.16) .015* (1.77)
Insiders on the board .098 (0.49) .219 (1.07) -.391** (-2.33)
Firm size .091** (2.08) .112** (2.15) .191** (3.80)
Firm growth opportunity -.00002 (-0.14) -.0001 (-0.79) .00001 (0.18)
Firm volatility .498 (1.28) -.118 (-0.35) -.265 (-0.86)
Firm performance .003 (1.51)
Observations 1440 1094 1557
Groups 285 334 436
Year dummies included.
Table 2.42: Prior Period Pay: Anderson and Bizjak (2003)
xtabond xtabond xtabond2
firm individuals*firms individuals*firms
Y(t-1) .311** (3.50) .299** (2.49) .469** (6.33)
Y(t-2) .091** (2.17) .069* (1.79) .122** (2.22)
Fraction outside directors on Rem Com -.007 (-0.04) .108 (0.57) -.255** (-2.08)
CEO on remuneration committee -.049 (-0.21) -.265 (-1.31)
CEO Turnover -.094 (-1.49) -.119 (-1.39) -.114 (-1.52)
CEO equity holdings -.002 (-0.73) -.002 (-0.95)
CEO tenure .004 (0.62)
Ln (total assets) -.021 (-0.37) -1.43** (-2.02) .095** (3.28)
Risk .522 (1.32) -.107 (-0.30) -.420* (-1.84)
Investment opportunity set -.0002 (-0.32) -.0001 (-0.66) .00001 (0.10)
Return on assets .002 (0.18) .010 (0.58) -.001 (-0.14)
Market return(t-1) -.032 (-0.64) .091 (1.69) .014* (1.91)
Firm Groups 284 331 435
N 1432 1079 1542
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Table 2.43: Prior Period Pay: Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999)
xtabond xtabond xtabond2
firm individuals*firms individuals*firms
Y(t-1) -.096 (0.15) -.257 (-1.52) .301** (3.19)
Y(t-2) -.016 (0.19) -.152 (-0.89) .174 (1.62)
Sales in millions (t-1) 23.8 (1.06) 69.6 (2.75) 23.8** (2.78)
Market to book ratio -235 (-0.43) -4820 (-1.04) -3821 (-0.93)
Return on Assets(t-1) 6435 (1.62) 78883 (1.00) 60526 (0.92)
Stock Return (t-1) 132,611 (1.26) 78854 (1.14) 37014** (2.48)
S.d of ROA 599,357 (1.10) 399591 (1.08) -269602 (-0.96)
Combined Chair/CEO -24291 (-0.31)
Board size 12413 (0.59) 6539 (0.33) 46387** (3.37)
Inside directors 1536 (0.59) 102322 (0.36) -762357** (-4.34)
Gray outside directors 12710 (0.18) -56595 (-1.07) 10746 (0.22)
Interlocked outside directors 667,560 (3.22) 267631* (1.71) 309,173 (1.11)
CEO % ownership -75314 (-0.30)
Non-CEO insider owns 5% 13863 (0.22)
Outside blockholder owns 5% -77993 (-1.36)
N 1450 1100 1568
Groups 287 336 441
Table 2.44: Prior Period Pay: Newman and Mozes (1999)
xtabond xtabond xtabond2
firm individuals*firms individuals*firms
Y(t-1) .237** (2.50) .294** (2.39) .486** (5.50)
Y(t-2) .060 (1.43) .053 (1.30) .101* (1.86)
Major Shareholder Dummy -.046 (-1.28)
Ln Sales .040 (0.72) -.037 (-0.53) .104** (2.87)
CEO Tenure .004 (0.81)
TSR .055 (0.51) .189 (2.92) .233** (3.40)
Return on Equity .00001 (0.85) -.0000 (-0.99) -.0000 (-1.36)
Insider .059 (0.54) .024 (0.19) -.045 (-0.51)
Observations 1359 1025 1479
Groups 276 319 424
Table 2.45: Prior Period Pay: Conyon and Peck (1998)
xtabond xtabond xtabond2
firm individuals*firms individuals*firms
Y(t-1) .179 (2.89) .010 (0.96) .349** (2.98)
Y(t-2) .034 (1.02) -.032 (-0.92) -.021 (-0.31)
Proportion of insiders on board -.044 (-0.30) -.064 (-0.50) .101 (0.83)
Proportion of outsiders on Rem Com -.158 (-0.71) -.106 (-0.38) -.092 (-0.73)
Shareholder Return .164 (4.13) .010** (2.58) .027** (3.11)
Total Employment -.018 (-0.33) .121** (2.25) .071** (3.66)
Combined Chair/CEO .146 (1.39)
Off-board holding (=1 if >.049) -.009 (-0.34) .024 (0.95) -.017 (-0.51)
Inside directors .033** (2.32) .007 (0.49) .0006 (0.08)
Outside directors .018 (1.15) .006 (0.49) .068** (3.63)
Observations 1431 1074 1861
Groups 285 329 500
Year dummies included.
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Table 2.46: Independence: Bonet and Conyon (2005)
Original Company Manifest Manifest
Independence Independence Independence less tenure
Y(t-1) .391** .391** .388** .388** .389** .388** .386** .390**
(7.59) (7.59) (7.52) (7.51) (7.48) (7.51) (7.46) (7.52)
Y(t-2) -.054** -.054** -.052** -.052** -.052** -.052** -.054** -.054**
(-2.59) (-2.59) (-2.55) (-2.55) (-2.56) (-2.55) (-2.61) (-2.58)
No. of insiders on Rem Com .002 .030** .008 .014*
(0.12) (2.11) (1.58) (1.83)
Any insider on Rem Com .003 .030* .011 .006
(0.12) (1.75) (1.16) (0.58)
CEO .325** .325** .328** .327** .327** .327** .329** .327**
(10.51) (10.51) (10.50) (10.48) (10.47) (10.45) (10.48) (10.44)
Board Size .012** .012** .011** .012** .011** .011** .011** .012**
(3.52) (3.52) (3.61) (3.60) (3.55) (3.58) (3.58) (3.62)
Size of Rem Com .001 .001 .000 .000 .001 .000 -.000 .000
(0.30) (0.30) (0.06) (0.08) (0.15) (0.08) (-0.06) (0.19)
Ln (market cap) .143** .143** .145** .145** .144** .144** .146** .144**
(9.83) (9.73) (9.86) (9.77) (9.75) (9.68) (9.82) (9.69)
Groups 3417 3417 3417 3417
Observations 11646 11646 11646 11646
Year dummies included.
2.C Independence
The following output shows the results of altering the measure of independence. The first
column shows the results with the original independence measure used by the authors,
the second with Company’s own independence assessments and the third with Manifest’s
assessments. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) is not included as it breaks down
its independent assessment into separate categories. With Anderson and Bizjak (2003),
the Company’s own assessment is akin to the original assessment used by the authors.
Each column uses system GMM (xtabond2) grouped around the variable that uniquely
identifies firm and individual.
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Table 2.47: Independence: Conyon and He (2004)
Original Company Manifest Manifest
Independence Independence Independence less tenure
Y(t-1) .289** (2.67) .314** (2.65) .319** (2.66) .256** (2.07)
Y(t-2) .042 (0.65) .065 (1.05) .070 (1.16) .033 (0.50)
Inside Directors .251 (1.32) .343** (2.63) .026 (0.48) .126 (1.25)
Significant shareholders -.022 (-0.50) -.027 (-0.64) -.018 (-0.39) -.025 (-0.53)
CEO directors -.331 (-0.96) -.209 (-0.68) -.212 (0.67) -.185 (-0.52)
CEO age -.002 (-0.69) .039 (0.64) -.002 (-0.77) -.001 (-0.42)
Combined Ch/CEO? .023 (0.34) .039 (0.64) .037 (0.58) .047 (0.68)
Board size .015* (1.77) .012 (1.47) .012 (1.45) .015* (1.69)
% Eds on the board -.391** (-2.33) -.336** (-2.03) -.330** (-1.96) -.408** (-2.32)
Firm size .191** (3.80) .185** (3.41) .176** (3.29) .204** (3.62)
Firm growth opportunity .00001 (0.18) -.00001 (0.17) -.0000 (-0.26) .0000 (-0.09)
Firm volatility -.265 (-0.86) -.196 (-0.60) -.230 (-0.71) -.282 (-0.87)
Observations 1557 1568 1568 1563
Groups 436 437 437 436
Year dummies included.
Table 2.48: Independence: Anderson and Bizjak (2003)
Original Company Manifest Manifest
Independence Independence Independence less tenure
Y(t-1) .477** (5.23) .477** (5.23) .476** (4.84) .360** (3.96)
Y(t-2) .113* (1.94) .113* (1.94) .111* (1.84) .062 (1.07)
Fraction outside directors on Rem Com -.258** (-2.16) -.258** (-2.16) -.064 (-0.75) -.065 (-0.89)
CEO on Rem Com -.219 (-1.22) -.219 (-1.22) -.174 (-0.92) -.239 (-1.29)
CEO Turnover -.059 (-0.72) -.059 (-0.72) -.064 (-0.75) -.099 (-1.20)
CEO equity holdings -.001 (-0.70) -.001 (-0.70) -.001 (-0.72) -.002 (-0.87)
Ln (total assets) .096** (2.75) .096** (2.75) .096** (2.56) .136** (3.76)
Risk -.377 (-1.57) -.377 (-1.57) -.387 (-1.57) -.308 (-1.21)
Investment opportunity set -.000 (-0.33) -.000 (-0.33) -.000 (-0.38) -.000 (-0.35)
Return on assets .003 (0.28) .003 (0.28) .004 (0.33) .003 (0.27)
Market return .015** (1.95) .015** (1.95) .014* (1.74) .021** (2.34)
Firm Groups 436 436 436 435
N 1553 1553 1553 1548
Table 2.49: Independence: Newman and Mozes (1999)
Original Company Manifest Manifest
Independence Independence Independence less tenure
Y(t-1) .486** (5.50) .464** (5.69) .471** (5.80) .455** (5.17)
Y(t-2) .101* (1.86) .090* (1.91) .092** (2.04) .074* (1.67)
Ln Sales .104** (2.87) .115** (3.56) .110** (3.56) .118** (3.71)
TSR .233** (3.40) .211** (3.17) .214** (3.19) .240** (3.59)
Return on Equity -.0000 (-1.36) -.0000 (-1.10) -.0000 (-0.95) -.0000 (-0.93)
Insider -.045 (-0.51) .068 (1.38) .019 (0.76) .012 (0.39)
Observations 1479 1490 1490 1486
Groups 424 425 425 425
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Table 2.50: Independence: Conyon and Peck (1998)
Original Company Manifest Manifest
Independence Independence Independence less tenure
Y(t-1) .349** (2.98) .349** (2.98) .332** (2.98) .401** (3.22)
Y(t-2) -.021 (-0.31) -.021 (-0.31) -.021 (-0.31) -.002 (-0.04)
Proportion insiders on board .101 (0.83) .101 (0.83) .076 (0.83) .116 (1.15)
Proportion outsiders on Rem Com -.092 (-0.73) -.092 (-0.73) -.037 (.079) -.022 (-0.24)
Shareholder Return .027** (3.11) .027** (3.11) .028** (3.20) .025** (2.75)
Total Employment .071** (3.66) .071** (3.66) .073** (3.92) .062** (3.00)
Off-board holding (=1 if >.049) -.017 (-0.51) -.017 (-0.51) -.015 (-0.46) -.031 (-0.97)
Inside directors .0006 (0.08) .0006 (0.08) .002 (0.82) .002 (0.19)
Outside directors .068** (3.63) .068** (3.63) .070** (3.87) .062** (3.31)
Observations 1861 1861 1869 1869
Groups (firms) 500 500 502 503
Year dummies included.
Table 2.51: Independence Characteristics: Bonet and Conyon (2005)
Manifest
Categories
Y(t-1) .379** (7.33)
Y(t-2) -.058** (2.76)
Association to management (number on rem com) -.013 (0.52)
Association to Company business (number on rem com) .038** (3.47)
Outside major shareholder (number on rem com) .012 (0.49)
Tenure only (number on rem com) .002 (0.27)
CEO .330** (10.61)
Board Size .012** (3.59)
Size of remuneration committee -.001 (-0.16)
Ln (market capitalisation) .146** (9.80)
Groups 3417
Observations 11,646
Year dummies included.
2.C.1 Independence Characteristics
The following tables show the output when separate characteristics are substituted for the
independence variable.
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Table 2.52: Independence Characteristics: Conyon and He (2004)
Manifest
Categories
Y(t-1) .363** (3.29)
Y(t-2) .099* (1.69)
Association to management (% on rem com) .023 (0.90)
Association to company business (% on rem com) .089 (0.62)
Outside shareholders (% on rem com) -.146 (-0.77)
Tenure only (% on rem com) -0.18 (-0.27)
CEO age -.003 (-0.97)
Combined Ch/CEO? .011 (0.16)
Board size .013 (1.47)
% Eds on the board -.312* (-1.94)
Firm size .153** (3.07)
Firm growth opportunity -.000 (-0.44)
Firm volatility -.291 (-0.93)
Observations 1560
Groups 434
Year dummies included.
Table 2.53: Independence Characteristics: Anderson and Bizjak (2003)
Manifest
Categories
Y(t-1) .429** (4.95)
Y(t-2) .088** (2.15)
Association to management (% on rem com) .069 (0.33)
Association to company business (% on rem com) -.001 (0.00)
Outside shareholders (% on rem com) .085 (0.59)
Tenure only (% on rem com) -.082 (-1.09)
CEO on remuneration committee -.139 (-0.79)
CEO Turnover -.135** (-3.72)
CEO equity holdings -.001 (0.35)
Ln (total assets) .114** (3.79)
Risk -.377 (-1.56)
Investment opportunity set -.000 (-0.16)
Return on assets .001 (0.10)
Market return .015** (2.01)
Firm Groups 428
N 1530
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Table 2.54: Independence Characteristics: Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999)
Y(t-1) .356** (4.22)
Y(t-2) .214** (2.26)
Association to management (no. on board com) 26541 (0.37)
Association to company business (no. on board com) 32095 (0.63)
Outside shareholders (no. on board com) 26403 (0.46)
Tenure only (no. on board com) 14205 (0.47)
Sales in £millions (t-1) 20.1** (2.76)
Investment Opportunities (market to book ratio) -3457 (-0.93)
Return on Assets 54823 (0.92)
Stock Return 32379 (2.38)
S.d of ROA -233042 (-0.79)
Board size 43200** (3.27)
N 1570
Groups 439
Table 2.55: Independence Characteristics: Newman and Mozes (1999)
Manifest
Categories
Y(t-1) .558** (7.07)
Y(t-2) .113** (2.79)
Association to management (=1 if one or more on rem com) .062 (0.91)
Association to company business (=1 if one or more on rem com) -.044 (-1.32)
Outside shareholders (=1 if one or more on rem com) .092 (1.55)
Tenure only (=1 if one or more on rem com) -.014 (-0.58)
Ln Sales .085** (2.83)
TSR .044 (0.74)
Return on Equity -.00002 (-1.63)
Observations 1479
Groups 423
Table 2.56: Independence Characteristics: Conyon and Peck (1998)
Manifest
Categories
Y(t-1) .369** (2.76)
Y(t-2) -.008 (-0.11)
Association to management (% on rem com) -.317 (-1.18)
Association to company business (% on rem com) .025 (0.26)
Outside shareholders (% on rem com) .000 (0.00)
Tenure only (% on rem com) .012 (0.18)
Shareholder Return .026** (2.48)
Total Employment .057** (3.02)
Largest off-board equity holding (=1 if >.049) -.042 (-1.27)
Inside directors .004 (0.43)
Outside directors .066** (3.18)
Observations 1850
Groups (firms) 498
Year dummies included.
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Table 2.57: Dependent Variable: Bonet and Conyon (2005)
Sal Emol Rem Ln Sal Ln Emol Ln Rem
Y(t-1) .701 .231** .413** .317** .252** .383*
(5.39) (4.13) (5.56) (3.98) (7.00) (9.07)
Y(t-2) .040 .069** .117* -.027 .053** .015
(0.73) (2.07) (1.74) (-1.63) (2.23) (0.61)
No. of insiders on Rem Com -3035 -29690 -25054** -.005 .021 .018
(-1.20) (-1.61) (-2.18) (-0.35) (1.29) (1.23)
CEO 51207** 315223** 211323** .322** .345** .323**
(4.25) (8.81) (5.55) (8.76) (11.90) (10.75)
Board Size 2454** 14505** 11967** .003 -.000 .007**
(2.85) (2.86) (3.12) (1.13) (0.03) (2.16)
Size of Rem Com 4185** 4838 10656 .017** .002 .002
(2.88) (0.43) (1.00) (4.16) (0.29) (0.37)
Market cap 1.66** 12.5** 11.4** .133** .189** .155**
(3.67) (5.75) (4.54) (7.97) (12.69) (9.97)
Groups 3,409 3,088 3,447 3,409 3,088 3,447
Observations 11,632 10,566 11,767 11,632 10,566 11,767
Year dummies included.
2.D Dependent Variable
The following tables examine the differences in estimates between salary, emoluments
and total remuneration. Both the levels and log-levels are calculated. For comparability,
all independence variables are based on the companies’ own assessments.
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Table 2.58: Dependent Variable: Conyon and He (2004)
Sal Emol Rem Ln Sal Ln Emol Ln Rem
Y(t-1) .299 -.092 .286** .202 .115 .304**
(1.43) (-1.13) (2.84) (1.49) (1.02) (2.95)
Y(t-2) .003 .034 .175 .032 .089 .051
(0.07) (0.66) (1.56) (0.83) (1.24) (0.78)
Inside Directors 20733 -68279 29853 .045 .256 .255*
(0.55) (0.19) (0.14) (0.35) (1.42) (1.81)
Significant shareholders -42457** -102263 -57238 -.049* .000 -.021
(-2.99) (0.82) (-0.99) (-1.94) (0.00) (-0.47)
CEO directors 4449 -842038* -398214 -.085 -.756* .002
(0.05) (-1.96) (-1.52) (-0.29) (-1.78) (-0.67)
CEO age 2204* -4370 -4790 .003 -.002 -.273
(1.80) (0.41) (-0.94) (1.10) (0.61) (-0.79)
Combined Ch/CEO? 24993 196553 70746 .076 .060 .035
(1.08) (0.94) (0.90) (1.52) (0.76) (0.56)
Board size 16180** 63208** 51376** .012** .007 .012
(3.32) (1.97) (3.66) (2.04) (0.80) (1.46)
% Eds on the board -202,452** -1601102** -765163** -.266** -.332 -.338**
(-2.87) (-2.86) (-4.05) (-2.80) (-1.90) (-2.01)
Market Cap 3.62** 20.7** 16.1* .151** .238** .192**
(3.09) (2.95) (1.87) (4.59) (4.64) (3.81)
Firm growth opportunity 10.1 -361 -440 .000 .000 .000
(1.48) (0.38) (-0.70) (-0.09) (1.23) (0.04)
Firm volatility -155453 -350309 -688369** -.116 -.511 -.215
(-2.34) (-0.39) (-2.52) (-0.56) (-1.64) (-0.70)
Observations 1549 1527 1564 1549 1527 1564
Groups 431 431 435 431 431 435
Year dummies included.
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Table 2.59: Dependent Variable: Anderson and Bizjak (2003)
Sal Emol Rem Ln Sal Ln Emol Ln Rem
Y(t-1) .402 -.052 .377 .116 .142 .477**
(1.63) (-0.69) (4.07) (1.06) (1.17) (5.23)
Y(t-2) .054 .063 .227 .013 .052 .113*
(0.86) (1.04) (2.18) (0.41) (0.60) (1.94)
Fraction outside directors on Rem Com -31875 90232 6060 -.278** -.194 -.258**
(-0.70) (0.27) (0.03) (-2.01) (-1.38) (-2.16)
CEO on remuneration committee -69542 -261033 -186093 -.227 -.029 -.219
(-1.60) (-1.12) (-1.76) (-1.51) (-0.16) (-1.22)
CEO Turnover -25638 -327896 -248727 -.015 -.284** -.059
(-1.52) (-2.92) (-3.18) (-0.38) (-2.93) (-0.72)
CEO equity holdings -2071** -13513 -5333** -.000 -.002 -.001
(-2.06) (-3.19) (-2.30) (-0.19) (0.90) (-0.70)
Ln (total assets) .001035** .004485 .00306** .160** .175** .096**
(2.50) (4.65) (2.19) (8.62) (3.70) (2.75)
Risk -235877** -728088 -789037** .056 -.537 -.377
(-2.55) (-0.79) (-3.29) (0.24) (-1.61) (-1.57)
Investment opportunity set 109** -1693 -3458 .000 .001 -.000
(2.38) (-0.25) (-0.91) (0.91) (0.62) (-0.33)
Return on assets -1908** 23803 54615 ) -.003 -.009 .003
(-2.33) (0.22) (0.89 (-0.95) (-0.55) (0.28)
Market return .380* 1.908 1.26 .028** .027** .015**
(1.81) (1.18) (1.25) (3.46) (2.07) (1.95)
Firm Groups 430 431 435 430 431 436
N 1528 1508 1543 1528 1508 1553
Table 2.60: Dependent Variable: Newman and Mozes (1999)
Sal Emol Rem Ln Sal Ln Emol Ln Rem
Y(t-1) .243 .220** .421** .171 .241** .464**
(1.32) (2.46) (4.66) (1.13) (3.63) (5.69)
Y(t-2) -.025 .133 .196** -.051 .111** .090*
(0.44) (1.39) (3.13) (-1.34) (2.17) (1.91)
Ln Sales 74540** 191774** 140762** .189** .162** .115**
(4.44) (6.78) (3.62) (5.97) (5.46) (3.56)
TSR -3865 215,780 -50123 .013 .272** .211**
(-0.44) (1.16) (-0.75) (0.42) (2.75) (3.17)
Return on Equity -11.3** -27.4 -20.5 -.000036 -.0000 -.0000
(-2.26) (-1.10) (-0.67) (-4.73) (-1.60) (-1.10)
Insider 20951 63740 89259 .086** .068 .068
(1.39) (0.55) (1.10) (2.26) (1.43) (1.38)
Observations 1465 1444 1480 1465 1444 1490
Groups 419 417 424 419 417 425
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Table 2.61: Dependent Variable: Conyon and Peck (1998)
Sal Emol Rem Ln Sal Ln Emol Ln Rem
Y(t-1) .171 -.071 .326** .155 .156 .382**
(1.31) (-.088) (3.65) (1.12) (1.59) (3.08)
Y(t-2) -.077 .059 .204** .000 .030 .057
(-1.11) (1.01) (1.93) (0.58) (0.38) (0.94)
Proportion insiders on board 73667* -347028 -151596 .149 .068 -.005
(1.78) (-0.77) (-0.63) (1.54) (0.39) (0.04)
Proportion outsiders on Rem Com -101691** 249128 93240 -.151 .032 - .002
(-2.46) (0.50) (0.34) (-1.45) (0.22) (0.02)
Shareholder Return -.438 5.24* 2.16 .005 .009 .022*
(-1.15) (1.66) (1.18) (0.51) (0.56) (1.69)
Total Employment 92835** 168298** 105727** .119** .096** .059**
(5.52) (3.25) (2.20) (4.96) (4.19) (2.49)
Off-board holding (=1 if >.049) 15475* -94356 -42699 -.028 -.014 -.039
(-1.86) (-1.42) (-0.91) (-1.19) (-0.29) (-1.15)
Inside directors 5592 77,961 -8759 .002 -.009 .003
(-1.60) (-2.35) (-0.66) (0.20) (0.78) (0.33)
Outside directors 17934** 149,862** 91452** .052** .089** .068**
(3.73) (3.09) (3.87) (4.87) (4.30) (2.73)
Observations 1536 1507 1551 1536 1507 1551
Groups 434 432 439 434 432 439
Year dummies included.
2.E Final Estimator
Table 2.62 repeats the construction of the preferred estimator but for all executive direc-
tors, including the chief executive. There is no evidence that remuneration committee
independence, however measured, determines executive pay. Our control variables im-
pact executive pay in much the same way they impact Chief Executive pay. There is a
sign change on the female dummy variable, suggesting that while female CEOs receive
more remuneration, female executive directors receive less, although both statistics are
statistically insignificant. Again, while being careful not to place too much weight on
data with so few female observations, the sign change could be consistent with the idea
that female CEOs pay reflects the special ability of these women to break through the glass
ceiling, while with female executive directors, the wage discrimination effect is dominant.
The regressions pass the test for no serial correlation in the first differenced residuals,
which otherwise would imply inconsistent estimates. However, the Hansen J statistic, ro-
bust to heteroscedasticity, rejects the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions
are valid. The variables used to instruments prior period pay, as a group, appear not to be
exogenous. This introduces the possibility that the estimated coefficients are biased and
raises doubt as to the appropriateness of the deeper lags of the dependent variable that
were used as instruments for the first lag of the dependent variable in this model. Adjust-
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Table 2.62: Preferred Estimator: Executive Directors
Director Robust Test Robust Test
Ln Total Rem Rents Capture Optimal Contracting
Dependent Variable
t− 1 0.499*** (10.25) 0.496*** (10.30)
t− 2 0.067** (2.66) 0.066** (2.61)
Remuneration Committee Variables
No. Associated to Management -0.014 -0.59
No. Business Relationship 0.015 1.49
No. Major Shareholders 0.030 1.20
No. Long Tenure -0.003 -0.40
% Insiders (Company) -0.021 (-0.59)
Committee Size 0.005 (0.96) 0.006 (1.09)
Age 0.029*** (3.11) 0.028*** (3.00)
Age2 -0.001*** (-3.53) -0.001*** (-3.44)
Ceo Holdings -0.002 (-1.10) -0.002 (-1.09)
Board Size 0.010*** (3.50) 0.011*** (3.67)
Sales 0.086*** (6.50) 0.086*** (6.67)
TSR 0.104*** (6.56) 0.104*** (6.56)
EPS 0.000 (-0.95) 0.000 (-0.96)
Dummy Variables
Resigned in Year -0.012 (-0.76) -0.012 (-0.72)
Appointed in Year 0.038 (1.20) 0.037 (1.18)
CEO 0.234*** (7.27) 0.236*** (7.37)
Female -0.056 (-1.53) -0.054 (-1.49)
Blockholder -0.029* (-1.97) -0.027* (-1.85)
Constant 2.856*** (5.21) 2.958*** (5.33)
1998 0.197** (2.24) 0.187** (2.15)
1999 0.241*** (2.70) 0.231** (2.62)
2000 0.286*** (3.17) 0.275*** (3.10)
2001 0.335*** (3.52) 0.322*** (3.47)
2002 0.390*** (4.14) 0.374*** (4.09)
2003 0.402*** (4.28) 0.386*** (4.23)
2004 0.419*** (4.09) 0.406*** (4.10)
2005 0.433*** (3.90) 0.423*** (3.96)
N 11099 11099
Groups 3304 3304
Instruments 79 79
F-stat(27, 3303) 306.55 342.45
Hansen J χ2 108.01 107.64
Prob > χ2 (0.000) (0.000)
No second order 1.210 1.270
autocorrelation in first differences (0.226) (0.203)
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ing the instrument set with different lags of the dependent variable, reduced the Hansen
J statistic but not to the point where the null could no longer be rejected. Therefore, the
results reported above should be taken in light of this.
2.E.1 Robustness Checks
In section 2.4.2, the difficulties of arriving at an accurate estimate of the fair value of
executive equity incentives were discussed. It was concluded that the most appropriate
strategy, was to use one-third of the face value of the equity incentive as an approximation
of the worth of the incentive to the executive. It is possible that this is either too high or
too low, depending on factors such as the executive’s preference for risk and the extent to
which the vesting conditions are achievable. To test whether our estimates are sensitive to
the value we put on equity incentives we re-estimated our preferred model with different
values for equity incentives. Tables 2.63 and 2.64 use 20% and 50% of the face value of
equity incentives respectively in the calculation of total CEO remuneration.
The estimated coefficients on the remuneration committee independence variables are ro-
bust to the alternative estimates of the worth of equity incentives. Independence remains
mostly inconsequential in the determination of CEO pay, apart from the broad insider
measure which remains significant at the 10% level. With the 50% estimate, the posi-
tive cofficient on the female dummy becomes significant at the 10% level and the year
dummies become even more significant. Otherwise, the control variables are qualitatively
uneffected by the different equity incentive estimates.
2.F Independence Assessments
The divergence between Manifest’s assessments of independence and companies’ own
assessments arises from the application of Provision A.3.1 of the Combined Code (2003).
Under the Code, companies have the freedom to pass their directors for independence
notwithstanding violating any of the points below, provided justification is disclosed. It
is then for shareholders to decide whether that explanation is adequate. In Manifest’s
opinion, very often it is not. Therefore, in normal circumstances, Manifest’s policy is
to flag an independence issue (‘fail for independence’) on a director if they contradict
any of the points in the provision below, unless there are exceptional reasons not to do
so. In addition, Manifest will fail directors if there are any other independence issues to
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Table 2.63: CEOs: Equity Incentives 20% of Face Value
Director Robust Test Robust Test
Ln Total Rem Rents Capture Optimal Contracting
Dependent Variable
t− 1 0.428*** (3.92) 0.412*** (3.77)
t− 2 0.052 (1.35) 0.045 (1.12)
Remuneration Committee Variables
No. Associated to Management -0.027 (-0.48)
No. Business Relationship -0.009 (-0.32)
No. Major Shareholders 0.028 (0.72)
No. Long Tenure 0.002 (0.10)
% Insiders (Company) 0.135* (1.64)
Committee Size 0.008 (0.78) 0.008 (0.73)
Age 0.049* (1.60) 0.053* (1.79)
Age2 -0.001* (-1.73) -0.001* (-1.91)
Ceo Holdings 0.000 (-0.11) 0.000 (-0.19)
Board Size 0.017*** (2.97) 0.017*** (2.90)
Sales 0.105*** (3.71) 0.112*** (3.85)
TSR 0.070** (2.09) 0.067** (2.00)
EPS 0.000 (-0.27) 0.000 (-0.16)
Dummy Variables
Resigned in Year 0.031 (0.71) 0.033 (0.80)
Appointed in Year -0.080 (-1.32) -0.074 (-1.26)
Combined Chairman & CEO 0.031 (0.61) 0.034 (0.66)
Female 0.090 (1.18) 0.099 (1.30)
Blockholder -0.019 (-0.73) -0.023 (-0.90)
Constant 3.240*** (2.99) 3.294*** (2.97)
1998 0.140 (0.74) 0.115 (0.54)
1999 0.216 (1.12) 0.197 (0.92)
2000 0.285 (1.47) 0.270 (1.26)
2001 0.275 (1.34) 0.265 (1.19)
2002 0.353* (1.65) 0.349 (1.51)
2003 0.402* (1.85) 0.401* (1.73)
2004 0.443* (1.91) 0.444* (1.80)
2005 0.468* (1.86) 0.470* (1.78)
N 2141 2141
Groups 681 681
Instruments 79 76
F-stat(27, 680) 60.03 62.73
Hansen J χ2 58.71 59.27
Prob > χ2 (0.214) (0.200)
No second order 0.38 0.43
autocorrelation in first differences (0.703) (0.669)
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Table 2.64: CEOs: Equity Incentives 50% of Face Value
Director Robust Test Robust Test
Ln Total Rem Rents Capture Optimal Contracting
Dependent Variable
t− 1 0.385*** (4.71) 0.386*** (4.47)
t− 2 0.081** (1.99) 0.080** (1.95)
Remuneration Committee Variables
No. Associated to Management -0.022 (-0.40)
No. Business Relationship -0.004 (-0.14)
No. Major Shareholders 0.036 (0.88)
No. Long Tenure -0.007 (-0.35)
% Insiders (Company) 0.158* (1.78)
Committee Size 0.007 (0.51) 0.005 (0.38)
Age 0.059* (1.77) 0.059* (1.75)
Age2 -0.001** (-1.96) -0.001* (-1.93)
Ceo Holdings -0.002 (-0.87) -0.002 (-0.85)
Board Size 0.022*** (3.41) 0.022*** (3.32)
Sales 0.118*** (4.58) 0.120*** (4.46)
TSR 0.102** (2.48) 0.099** (2.41)
EPS 0.000 (-0.02) 0.000 (0.02)
Dummy Variables
Resigned in Year -0.031 (-0.63) -0.030 (-0.61)
Appointed in Year -0.055 (-0.64) -0.054 (-0.64)
Combined Chairman & CEO 0.041 (0.72) 0.042 (0.74)
Female 0.165* (1.61) 0.166* (1.63)
Blockholder -0.038 (-1.28) -0.043 (-1.46)
Constant 2.905*** (3.24) 2.898*** (3.16)
1998 0.248* (1.50) 0.226 (1.20)
1999 0.320* (1.89) 0.300 (1.58)
2000 0.432** (2.70) 0.413** (2.28)
2001 0.410** (2.33) 0.394** (1.96)
2002 0.518*** (2.93) 0.503** (2.48)
2003 0.565*** (3.22) 0.549** (2.73)
2004 0.603*** (3.18) 0.589** (2.72)
2005 0.613*** (2.85) 0.600** (2.47)
N 2141 2141
Groups 681 681
Instruments 79 76
F-stat(27, 680) 57.21 60.67
Hansen J χ2 57.82 57.83
Prob > χ2 (0.238) (0.238)
No second order 0.12 0.16
autocorrelation in first differences (0.908) (0.874)
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which they feel shareholders should be alerted. Manifest will always fail the director if
the Company fails the director.
2.F.1 Combined Code (2003) Provision A.3.1
The board should identify in the annual report each non-executive director it
considers to be independent. The board should determine whether the director
is independent in character and judgement and whether there are relationships
or circumstances which are likely to affect, or could appear to affect, the
director’s judgement. The board should state its reasons if it determines that
a director is independent notwithstanding the existence of relationships or
circumstances which may appear relevant to its determination, including if
the director:
• has been an employee of the company or group within the last five years;
• has, or has had within the last three years, a material business relation-
ship with the company either directly, or as a partner,
• shareholder, director or senior employee of a body that has such a rela-
tionship with the company;
• has received or receives additional remuneration from the company apart
from a director’s fee, participates in the company’s share option or a
performance-related pay scheme, or is a member of the company’s pen-
sion scheme;
• has close family ties with any of the company’s advisers, directors or
senior employees;
• holds cross-directorships or has significant links with other directors
through involvement in other companies or bodies;
• represents a significant shareholder; or
• has served on the board for more than nine years from the date of their
first election.
98
2.G Manifest Information Services Ltd
Manifest provides research and proxy vote solutions for institutional investors and com-
pany advisors. Manifest was the UK’s first on-line proxy voting agency to offer cus-
tomised electronic proxy vote management. Manifest offers a wide range of governance
related support services to fund managers, pension funds, public funds, professional ad-
visors, regulatory agencies and government departments.
Manifest was founded in December 1995 in Witham, Essex. Further information is avail-
able at www.manfiest.co.uk.
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CHAPTER 3
A Competing Risks Analysis of Chief
Executive Turnover
∗
‘I am resigning for personal reasons. . . this is purely a personal decision.’
Jeffrey Skilling on resigning as CEO from Enron Corp.
3.1 Introduction
In a UK public company, whilst the board sets the company’s aims and the broad strategies
for achieving them, the chief executive officer (CEO) is responsible for the day to day
running of the company. Concern has been raised, however, about the ability of the board
to adequately control the actions of the CEO, with the result being that the CEO may
depart from the efficient pursuit of shareholder value maximisation (Jensen and Meckling,
1976; Fama, 1980; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). As seen in chapter 2, one instrument
used to align the interests of the shareholders and the CEO is the CEO’s remuneration
package. The level of remuneration is often twice as high for the CEO as that of the second
highest paid director (MM & K Ltd, 2007) and typically contains large performance-
related elements. A second instrument is the ability of the board of directors to sack
the CEO (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Zajac, 1990; Lin, 1996). Indeed, Fama (1980) argues
that damage to managerial reputation, with the implied threat to future earnings, is the
∗The paper ‘Fired or retired: A competing risks analysis of Chief Executive Turnover’ (forthcoming in
The Economic Journal Conference Volume) co-authored with Steve Thompson and Peter Wright provides
the basis for this chapter.
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main constraint on CEO behaviour. The strength of this incentive will be influenced
by the extent to which boards are able to monitor the actions of the CEO and, as with
remuneration, it is typical that the board will proxy the CEO’s ability by a measure of
firm performance. Poorly performing CEO’s should lose their jobs.
There is a perception in the business press that the typical length of service for CEOs
within large UK companies has decreased in recent times2 and, moreover, CEOs are ex-
periencing shorter tenures due to a greater likelihood of being fired.3 This increased risk
of dismissal in the UK is in turn attributed to the ongoing reform of corporate governance
arrangements that began with the Cadbury (1992) Report and continued in the review of
board effectiveness by Higgs (2003), whose recommendations were included in the re-
vised version of the Combined Code (2003).4 It has also been suggested that an increase
in shareholder activism and voting levels, as called for by the Hampel (1998) and Myners
(2001; 2004) Reports, have contributed to a more demanding governance regime. It is
argued that institutions have increasingly coordinated their behaviour to provide a more
effective constraint on CEO actions (Leech, 2003). Indeed, the ability of shareholders in
the UK to dismiss the board at a company meeting is envied by activists in the US (Monks
and Minow, 2004).
Despite this, there is a body of literature that has raised concerns about whether boards
are willing or able to remove under-performing CEOs, even if these can be identified
(Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). Although boards are traditionally constituted
as guardians of shareholder interests, they are likely to fail in this task if they have in-
adequate incentives to avoid the rational attempts by the CEO to capture or negate their
influence. Indeed, boards have been accused of providing inefficient contracts, that are
heavily weighted in favour of the CEO, because of the undue influence the latter has in
the pay-setting process (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003, 2004). Similarly, if the board gets
‘captured’ by the CEO the latter will become entrenched and difficult, if not impossible,
to dismiss.
The extent to which policy measures are able to impact on the relative power of the CEO
and shareholders is also disputed in the literature (Weisbach, 2007). If CEOs have the
capacity to capture the remuneration and dismissals processes, it follows that efforts to
reduce their power relative to the board might also be captured and rendered ineffective.
2See, for instance, ‘The art of the sweetly timed exit’, Financial Times, 19th Aug 2004.
3As opposed to alternative modes of exit such as voluntary retirements.
4Companies listed on the London Stock Exchange are expected to comply with, or explain their non-
compliance with, the Combined Code (2003).
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For example, the Combined Code relies on the boards themselves to determine the inde-
pendence of their non-executive directors. If the board is already captured, then it could
classify directors as independent to satisfy the provision in the Combined Code, even if
such an assessment might be considered dubious.
A less ambiguous impact of the reform process in relation to CEO tenure has been the
reduction in contract length and of the notice period in a CEO’s service contract. Prior
to the Cadbury (1992) and Greenbury (1995) Reports, contracts with 3 or even 5 year
rolling notice periods were not uncommon. Moreover, contract termination provisions
were typically opaque and often resulted in compensation payments that included forgone
annual bonus opportunities, enhanced pension provision and an acceleration in the vesting
of share options (Trade and Industry Select Committee, 2003). After Greenbury (1995),
contracts were reduced and termination provisions curtailed to the point that, under the
revised Combined Code (2003), service contracts should provide for no more than 12
months’ salary5. In addition, disclosure was made more transparent and formalised in the
Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations (2002).
3.2 Literature Review
Empirical evidence from the US is generally supportive of the premise that prior poor per-
formance increases the likelihood of CEO turnover. Indeed, Shleifer and Vishny (1997)
argue that this is one of the most robust findings in the corporate governance literature. A
summary of this evidence is provided in table 3.1.
Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) were amongst the first to investigate the idea that firms use
the prospect of turnover (in addition to remuneration) in order to discipline behaviour.
Using a logit model, Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) established the inverse relationship
between market-adjusted stock performance and the probability of CEO turnover. Parrino
(1997), analyses companies over a 20 year period and distinguishes between voluntary
and involuntary turnover. Parrino (1997) finds that the probability of involuntary turnover
is significantly correlated with return on assets generated by the CEO. Engel, Hayes, and
Wang (2003), using 25 year panel dataset, find evidence that both market and account-
ing performance measures determine turnover likelihood. Moreover, Engel, Hayes, and
5Note that, at the median, 12 months’ salary is worth approximately double in real terms in 2005 com-
pared to 1995 (Gregory-Smith, 2007). Nevertheless, this still means a substantial reduction in the total cost
of removing a CEO has occurred over this period.
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Wang (2003) demonstrate that accounting measures are more important relative to market
measures when the accounting measure is more precise and when market measures are
contaminated by events outside the CEO’s control. Farrell and Whidbee (2003) find that
deviations between the expectations of earnings performance as measured by analyst fore-
casts and actual reported earnings significantly increase the likelihood of CEO turnover.
Using 1316 CEO successions from 1971 to 1994, Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001) dis-
tinguish between voluntary and involuntary departures and find that the frequencies of
forced turnover and outside succession have increased over time. Furthermore, Huson,
Parrino, and Starks (2001) conclude that it is the more effective internal monitoring by
boards of directors during this period that driven the greater likelihood of forced depar-
ture.
Evidence on UK companies is comparatively thin. Conyon and Florou (2002)’s findings
are consistent with the main US result, that a statistically robust inverse relationship exists
between firm performance. Dahya, Lonie, and Power (1998); Franks, Mayer, and Ren-
neboog (2001) also find this to be the case. Dahya, McConnell, and Travlos (2002) and
Dedman (2003) find that this relationship has strengthened post Cadbury (1992) but unlike
Dahya, McConnell, and Travlos (2002), Dedman (2003) do not attribute the strengthening
to more effective boards following the Cadbury reforms, rather a more active managerial
labour market.
Another an interesting finding within the literature is that CEO replacement decisions
may have similar determinants across different corporate governance regimes. Kaplan
(1994) and Kaplan and Minton (1994) found that CEOs in Japan and Germany, countries
whose governance systems are traditionally characterised as involving long job tenure,
were subject to similar influences to their Anglo-American counterparts. For example,
in both Japan and the US turnover was found to be sensitive to market and accounting
measures of performance.
Yet the literature has found that performance does not entirely determine CEO turnover.
Friedman and Singh (1989) find that performance is important, but so are the particu-
lar conditions which initiate the succession event. These include whether the CEO is
close to retirement age, the extent to which the CEO’s departure is voluntary and whether
an ‘heir apparent’ was identified prior to departure. Murphy (1999) shows that increas-
ing age and firm size considerably diminish the sensitivity of turnover to performance 6.
6Although Murphy (1999) uses a linear probability model, which imposes questionable restrictions on
the distribution of residuals, Murphy (1999) states that qualitatively similar results were achieved with a
logit model.
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Table 3.1: CEO Turnover and Performance
Study Sample Method Finding
Coughlan 249 Forbes Logit CEO turnover reflects
& Schmidt companies regression past stock price
(1985) 1977-1980 performance.
Warner, Watts 269 NYSE and Logit Only extremely good or bad stock
Wruck AMEX companies regression performance impacts probability
(1988) 1962-1978 of CEO turnover
Dalton & 96 NYSE firms Sample Succession associated with poor
Kesner experiencing partitioned. No Return on Equity. Mid performers
(1985) succession regression most likely to hire externally
Friedman 187 Fortune 500 Logit Controlling for the context
& Singh companies regression. of the event, Stock market
(1989) performance is important
Parrino 977 Forbes Logit Forced CEO exit reflects poor
(1997) successions regression Return on Assets, particularly in
1969-1989 homogenous industries
Murphy S&P 500 Linear Performance-turnover sensitivity
(1999) 1970-1995 probability highest amongst smaller firms. Age
model more important in larger firms.
Engel, Hayes 800 Forbes Logit Turnover reflects both industry
& Wang companies regression adjusted accounting returns and
(2003) 1975-2000 market returns
Farrell & ExecuComp and Logit Deviations from analysts
Whidbee Forbes companies Regression earnings forecasts
(2003) 1985-1997 increase turnover likelihood
Mikkelson US industrial Logit Turnover more responsive
& Partch companies regression to performance during an
(1997) 1984-1993 active takeover market
Huson, Parrino 1326 Forbes Logit Increased frequency of forced CEO
& Starks successions Regression exit over time due to improved
(2001) 1971-1994 internal monitoring by boards
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Brickley (2003) acknowledges performance as a significant determinant in exit likelihood
but regards the magnitude of the estimated coefficients on the performance variables re-
ported in the literature as disappointing. Indeed, Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988) and
Conyon and Florou (2002) find that while an inverse relationship between performance
and CEO turnover exists, it is really only extremely good performance or extremely bad
performance that has a major impact on turnover probability.
Mikkelson and Partch (1997) find CEO turnover to be responsive to firm performance
between 1984 and 1988 and but less so between 1989 and 1993. The explanation given
is that the active takeover market in the first period acted as a stimulus to performance-
turnover sensitivity but when takeovers become less common, as occurred in the later
period, the sensitivity of turnover to performance declined. Other anomalous evidence
includes Dalton and Kesner (1985) who find that middle performers are more likely to
replace the CEO with an external appointment. An external appointed is typically inter-
preted in the literature as a signal of under-performance from the prior CEO.
Other variables that have deemed to be important in the probability of CEO turnover
include the composition of the board in terms of its size (Yermack, 1996); and insider-
outsider ratio (Weisbach, 1988; Boeker and Goodstein, 1993). There are obvious gov-
ernance implications if an increase in the proportion of directors with affiliations to the
CEO reduces the threat of CEO dismissal. Such evidence is consistent with a theory of
managerial power and unresolved agency problems as a reduced threat of dismissal might
enable the pursuit of objectives that are not shared by the owners. In the UK, Dahya,
Lonie, and Power (1998) find that a CEO with even a small equity stake is better able to
resist dismissal than a CEO who holds less than 1% of the equity, although this finding is
not confirmed by Conyon and Florou (2002) or Franks, Mayer, and Renneboog (2001).
Yet whilst the aforementioned studies are instructive, there are good reasons to suspect
that they are not telling the whole story. For example, it has been suggested that a CEO
may use their control of information and board appointments to entrench themselves dur-
ing their tenure, ensuring the board of directors becomes increasingly favourably disposed
towards them (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). If this is true, then it is likely that the im-
pact of performance on the probability of CEO exit will vary over time. An alternative
hypothesis, which would also lead to a time varying impact of performance relates to
imperfect monitoring: if the output of a CEO cannot be observed directly and must be
inferred from the firm’s results, then there will be some lag before a CEO is judged to
be under-performing. It is only after this period that a badly performing CEO will be
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removed from their position. Finally, as outlined above, it is widely conjectured that sub-
stantial changes to the governance environment in which CEOs have been operating will
have affected exit probabilities.
3.2.1 Duration Analysis Literature
‘In summary, we have probably reached a point of diminishing returns in
estimating logit models that focus on the relation between CEO turnover and
firm performance measures. We will have to consider other less-explored
issues to increase our understanding of CEO turnovers and replacements.’
Brickley (2003) p.227.
Consistent with the change in direction voiced by Brickley (2003) above, there is a small
literature that has attempted to analysis managerial succession using duration analysis.
This chapter seeks to add to this literature. Duration analysis is an efficient method of
modeling time until an event and enables the analysis of CEO turnover where exit proba-
bilities are allowed to vary over the CEO’s tenure. Section 3.4 examines this method.
Allgood and Farrell (2003) also use duration analysis to examine 1388 US CEO turnover
events between 1981 and 1993. Using a non-parametric graphical hazard analysis they
find that the likelihood of CEO exit increases until the fifth year of tenure and declines
thereafter. They use job match theory to explain this phenomenon; that is bad matches
are increasingly identified and ended in the first five years, after which time only good
matches remain. They support this result with a multinomial logit model with three exit
states: a good match; a bad match that ends in a quit and a bad match that ends in a
dismissal. Our analysis will be shown to be broadly consistent with this finding; however
we will use duration analysis not just to illustrate the hazard but we will incorporate
directly in our formal econometric analysis. This will allow a more flexible examination
of the impact of predictor variables on the likelihood of CEO exit as the likelihood of exit
is allowed to vary continuously over CEO’s tenure.
Geddes and Vinod (1997) focus on non-performance related determinants of CEO tenure.
Using data on 367 US corporations between 1973 and 1983, the find that more indepen-
dent directors results in longer, not shorter, durations, albeit the effect diminishes after
controlling for age and performance. Geddes and Vinod (1997) use a similar framework
to ours, however our approach allows for the different types (competing risks) of CEO exit
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to impact upon the hazard simultaneously. Further, their result is overturned by the au-
thors later work (Geddes and Vinod, 2002) which also finds that the increased competition
arising from deregulation in the US increased the likelihood of turnover.
Using 250 UK companies between 1998 and 2003, Renneboog and Trojanowski (2003)
find that poor prior accounting performance increases the likelihood of CEO. Evidence is
also found suggesting that increasing the proportion of non-executive directors and end-
ing the combined Chairman-CEO role reduces CEO tenure. This result is found using a
binominal model of CEO turnover and duration analysis is used as a robustness check.
Again however, our model, unlike theirs, will analyse the impact of predictor variables on
all the competing risks of CEO exit. This is fundamental to our analysis as we believe
that our performance and insider variables will impact the different risk types in differ-
ent ways. For instance, we expect good performance to reduce the risk of dismissal but
increase the likelihood of being headhunted.
In this chapter, we seek to examine issues surrounding the probability and mode of CEO
exit using a dataset which is unique in terms of its detail. It allows us to model the duration
of CEO tenure and to ascertain the varying likelihood of CEO exit using a competing
risks framework. This permits us to test between a number of the competing hypotheses
outlined above by deriving the determinants of competing exit states for appointed CEOs.
Section 3.3 gives an overview of the data, including a graphical inspection of the hazard
rates before a more formal semi-parametric analysis is presented in Section 3.4. Section
3.5 concludes.
3.3 Data
As in chapter 2, the primary information used in this study is supplied by Manifest and
comprises all UK companies that have featured in the FTSE 350 Index during any finan-
cial year between January 1996 and December 2005. A major advantage of Manifest’s
data is that the name of the CEO, together with their appointment and departure date
are identified.7 The period chosen covers a full economic cycle, with market growth
until 2001, subsequent decline and recovery. Moreover, the period under analysis is par-
ticularly interesting given the steady flow of corporate governance reforms designed to
improve the transparency and accountability of boards. Investment trusts that contained
7Again, to avoid survivorship bias as far as possible, companies that drop out of the index prior to 2006
are included in our sample unless the company is no longer publicly quoted.
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no executive directors are excluded from the sample, although self-managed investment
trusts are retained. Manifest’s data was further supplemented with other control variables
from Thomson Datastream. Summary statistics are provided in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Sample Description
1996-2000 2001-2005 1996-2005
No. of companies 505 508 590
No. of CEOs 676 759 1179
No. of CEO exits 333 579 912
No. of interim appointments 23 84 107
% of CEOs exiting (excluding interim) 47% 73% 75%
Total Observations 2120 2413 4533
Survival times, years
1st quartile 2.53 2.18 2.33
Median 5.41 4.00 4.34
3rd quartile 10.01 6.51 7.24
Age
1st quartile 46 45 46
Median 51 50 51
3rd quartile 55 55 55
Total Shareholder Return
1st quartile -9.40% -18.00% -13.48%
Median 11.74% 8.35% 10.12%
3rd quartile 33.40% 26.30% 29.60%
%Insiders on board (median)
Company assessment 0.510 0.500 0.500
Sales (median) (2006, £) 563m 573m 570m
Board Size (median) 8 8 8
Over our sample period we observe 1179 CEOs working for 590 companies. Of these,
912 end with the termination of the CEO’s contract. The median survival time for a CEO
is about 41
2
years. Note that, in line with popular perception, the proportion of CEOs
experiencing an exit event is significantly higher in the second period, with the median
survival time being approximately 11
2
years shorter in the second half of the sample. This
increase is shown year on year in figure 3.1. This decline in average CEO tenure coincides
with a decline in market performance, as measured by total shareholder return.8
The table also reflects the institutional changes over the period, with the percentage of
insiders falling steadily during the period (Figure 3.2) and the percentage of non-executive
directors rising. The percentage of insiders is defined as the proportion of the board that
consists of executive directors and affiliated non-executive directors.
There are a number of ways in which a CEO can leave their position, only one of which is
8Total shareholder return reflects both the capital gain from the movement in the share price and income
from dividends.
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Figure 3.1: CEO Exits Over Time
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dismissal. We conducted an electronic search of the CEO’s name around the dates of their
exit using Lexis/Nexis database, the Financial Times Archives, Google News Archives
and Regulatory New Service announcements to identify the circumstances under which
the CEO exited. As the CEOs in our sample belonged to companies in the FTSE 350,
information was found in all cases. This allowed us to split the exit events into 9 types,
details of which are given in Table 3.3.
CEOs are rarely officially ‘dismissed’, with only 10 CEOs suffering this fate in the 10
years of the sample. This is consistent with Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988) who found
only one example where the CEO was sacked out of 272 US firms between 1963 and
1978 and Weisbach (1988) who found only nine performance based dismissals out of 286
succession events. In many cases it is suspected that face-saving descriptions are used,
either to avoid further damage to the ousted executive’s reputation or to facilitate the
conclusion of negotiations over compensation. Therefore, a second performance-related
category was established to identify instances where the CEO had resigned under pressure
from the board and/or shareholders. Extreme care was taken in classifying the mode of
CEO dismissal. Only where clear evidence was found to show that the CEO had been
involuntarily removed from their position, the CEO was considered to have been ‘ousted’.
In the majority of cases, the classification of exit type was straightforward as the ousting
of a FTSE 350 CEO would be reported by numerous business sources. We assume these
sources are reliable on the basis that inaccurate coverage of a high profile event would
incur a penalty to the reputation of the reporter’s credibility. However, in a small num-
ber of cases, no clear reason was given for the departure of the CEO and we could find
no clear evidence of either an ousting or an immediate appointment to another company.
These were put into an ‘unclassified’ departure category. The absence of any press ru-
mours of dismissal suggests these cases were not among the more egregious examples of
CEO behaviour, but it is suspected this category includes departures from a number of
causes, including changes of career, moves to private equity companies etc. Company an-
nouncements of such departures often contained references to family or personal reasons
(for instance where the CEO wished to relocate to another country).
Whilst we initially considered dropping these unclassified departures entirely, we have
retained the category since a failure to find evidence of forced or other dismissal in the
many business sources searched is itself instructive. Using an analogy from the medical
literature- where most competing risk studies are published - dropping the unclassified
cases would be comparable to ignoring deaths without visible symptoms!
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The appropriateness of our classification of exit is supported by a number of secondary
statistics which we present above. Table 3.4 shows that those executives who lose their
jobs if ousted, along with those that retire, are relatively unlikely to find future-employment
in FTSE-350. Those who’s departures were ‘unclassified’ are also unlikely to be re-
employed. Unsurprisingly, those that are headhunted, but also those that lose their job
due to a change of ownership, are relatively likely be re-employed.
The table also shows CEO age by exit event. CEOs who retire, or become part time
directors, have the oldest median age of 56. By contrast, CEOs that are ousted have
a median age of 50. ‘Unclassified’ departures appears to be a distinct category, with a
median age of 54.
Finally, the table shows the proportion of CEO’s who exit on the last day of the month by
exit type. Directors who retire, or retire to a part time position, tend to serve until the end
of the month, whereas those that are ousted or dismissed have their contract terminated
during the month. Again, ‘unclassified’ departures appear to be a distinct group.
Table 3.3: CEO Turnover by Mode of Exit
1996− 2000 2001− 2005 1996− 2005
Number % Number % Number %
Dismissed 3 0.90 7 1.21 10 1.10
Ousted 41 12.31 84 14.51 125 13.71
Internal Change 28 8.41 28 4.84 56 6.14
Interim Appointment 23 6.91 84 14.51 107 11.73
Retirement 90 27.03 162 27.98 252 27.63
Retired to Part Time 30 9.01 54 9.33 84 9.21
Change of Control 74 22.22 89 15.37 163 17.87
Head-hunted 23 6.91 27 4.66 50 5.48
Unclassified 21 6.31 44 7.60 65 7.13
Total exits 333 100 579 100 912 100
A common occurrence during the sample period was that the roles of Chairman and Chief
Executive were split, consistent with the post-Cadbury recommendation for best practice.
We code these cases separately as ‘internal change’ since they do not appear to constitute
a forced CEO exit. We also code separately those CEO exits arising from restructuring
or change of control.9 ‘Interim’ appointments to the CEO’s position generally arise as
a consequence of the sudden departure of the previous CEO, when someone, most often
the Chairman, steps in to fill the role of Chief Executive on a caretaker basis. As these
appointments are temporary by definition we exclude them from our analysis.
9Indeed, in some cases the CEO continues as CEO of the new company.
111
Table 3.4: Characteristics of Individuals by Exit Event
Event N Median Age Mean Age % Re-employed % exit
in FTSE 350 at month end
No Exit 303 49 49.06 - -
Dismissed 10 52.5 49.6 10.00% 20.00
Ousted 125 50 50.51 2.45% 18.49
Interim 56 53 51.05 - 21.43
Retirement 239 56 54.75 0.39% 42.86
Retired to part-time 84 56 54.14 0.00% 40.48
Change of control 163 50 49.25 10.42% 6.13
Headhunted 50 49 47.96 16.00% 36.00
Unclassified 65 54 52.13 0.00% 26.15
Total 1095 52 51.12
Table 3.5 breaks down CEO tenure by exit event. The survival times are lowest for interim
appointments, as might be expected, followed by those who are headhunted, who also tend
to be relatively young. Those who are dismissed and ousted have the next shortest tenure.
Those whose positions end with retirement generally have the longest tenures and are
oldest at exit. This further illustrates the importance of carefully distinguishing exit states
in any empirical analysis.
Table 3.5: Tenure by Exit Event
Survival times Age at exit
Lower Median Upper Median Mean
quartile quartile
Dismissed 2.0 2.4 5.0 52.5 49.06
Ousted 1.9 3.0 4.5 50 50.51
Interim appointment 0.3 0.5 0.8 53 51.05
Retirement 2.5 4.8 7.5 56 54.75
Retired to part-time 2.5 3.6 6.0 56 54.14
Change of control 1.4 2.3 4.4 50 49.25
Headhunted 1.7 2.9 5.1 49 47.96
Unclassified 1.9 3.6 6.3 54 52.13
Note: Survival times allow for left truncation and right censoring.
This table illustrates that existing research on executive tenure is likely to suffer from
two inter-related difficulties: first, CEOs resign for a variety of reasons some of which
(e.g. being headhunted) may be associated with success, some (e.g. dismissal) with
failure and others (e.g. retirement) may have ambiguous performance associations. This
clearly requires any analysis to allow for different determinants for the alternative exit
states. Datasets which do not distinguish between these competing events have distinct
disadvantages to those, such as ours, that can. We now consider how best to model the
duration of CEO tenure.
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3.4 Duration analysis
Duration analysis10 has developed as a method to consider the probabilities of exit from a
state conditional upon survival up to a point in time. Duration analysis is commonly used
to examine data in the biological and medical sciences, engineering and technology adop-
tion literatures. It has also been applied in the political sciences and in studies modelling
unemployment durations.
Duration analysis dominates linear regression for the purpose of analysing time to an
event because linear regression models assume normality in the distribution of residuals
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Distributions of time to an event violate this assumption in
ways to which linear regression is not robust. Duration analysis substitutes the assump-
tion of normally distributed residuals with a more realistic and appropriate distribution
for the error term (Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez, 2002). In addition, duration analysis
can handle time varying and time invariant regressors, censored and truncated observa-
tions, multiple exits from the same individual, competing risks, altogether in a coherent
framework (Kiefer, 1988). For these reasons we will proceed within the duration analysis
framework rather than follow the logit model approach that has been used previously in
the literature’.
As we are interested in knowing how the risk of exit changes over time, one of the most
useful concepts of duration analysis for our purposes is the hazard rate. The hazard rate,
λ(t), represents the instantaneous rate of exit at a particular point in time. Instantaneous
in the sense that it represents the probability that a CEO who has occupied some state
until time t will leave that state in the infinitesimally short time interval δ t after t. Where
T is the time to event:
λ(t) =
lim
δ t → 0
Pr[t ≤ T < t+ δ t|T ≥ t]
δ t
(3.4.1)
The hazard function reveals how the risk of CEO of exit varies during the course of their
tenure. If δλ(t)
δ t
> 0 then the CEO is increasingly likely to experience an exit event. The
hazard function does not need to be monotonic over the whole period. Indeed, we will be
interested to know when it is positive and when it is negative.
The hazard function can be combined with a parametric model in order to test the sig-
nificance of covariates using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). Given a parametric
10Also referred to survival analysis in the biomedical and other literatures.
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hazard function λ(ti; θ), where θ represents a set of parameters, the likelihood contribu-
tion for the ith duration ti is:
f(ti; θ) = λ(ti; θ).S(ti; θ) (3.4.2)
Leading to the likelihood function:
L(θ) =
N∏
i=1
λ(ti; θ).S(ti; θ) (3.4.3)
And log-likelihood:
l(θ) =
∏
i=1
ln λ(ti; θ) +
∏
i=1
ln S(ti; θ) (3.4.4)
So maximum likelihood estimates for θ˜ follow by optimizing l(θ) for a given parametric
hazard function. That is, one needs to assume an explicit form for the underlying hazard
function (the hazard function for which all covariates are equal to zero). The choice
of hazard function should be driven by economic theory with respect to the underlying
data generating process. Failure to select an appropriate hazard function will result in
inconsistent likelihood estimates of the covariates (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). This is
potentially a problem, for we approach our data without much prior knowledge of the
shape of the baseline hazard.
In modelling the duration of CEO tenure, we will adopt the Cox (1972) proportional
hazard model which allows estimation of coefficients of the covariates without restricting
the shape of the baseline hazard. A hazard based analysis is useful as our data contains
both left truncation (as some CEOs began their tenure prior to the sample start date) and
right censoring (as some CEOs have not completed their tenure by the end of the sample)
both of which can be readily handled in this framework11.
3.4.1 Non-parametric analysis
Prior to estimation, we briefly present a graphical analysis of the hazard rate by exit type.
To do so, we combine the possible exit types into three groups: Forced exits (dismissals
and ousted), retirements (including remaining as Chairman) and other exits (headhunted,
11See section 3.4.2
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change of control and unclassified).12
Figure 3.3: Cause Specific Hazards
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Figure 3.3 demonstrates the different likelihood of exit to the competing exit states over
the tenure of a CEO. At the start of a CEO’s employment, the least likely reason for exit
is retirement, though this probability steadily increases as time passes. The risk of being
forced out rises steadily in the early years, peaks in the fifth year, and declines thereafter-
eventually becoming the least likely exit state. Hence, once the CEO has completed 6
years, the most likely form of departure is retirement.
Since one might expect different influences to impact on the hazard rates for forced exit
and retirement, Figure 3.4 examines the impact of firm performance. We would expect
poor firm performance to have a stronger influence on the hazard of forced departure than
the hazard of retirement. For simplicity, we identify four performance quartiles deter-
mined by the annual total shareholder return (TSR) ranking within the FTSE 350.
Figure 3.4 shows that TSR has an impact on the hazard of forced exit with the divergence
between the bottom and top quartile performers increasing until year four and remain-
ing higher until year 12. With respect to retirements, the lower quartile performers also
have a marginally higher risk of exit up to year 10 or 11, which could reflect CEOs with
12Interim appointments are not regarded as an exit type.
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Figure 3.4: Breakdown by Firm Performance
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disappointing performance retiring early.
To investigate the possibility that CEOs may be less likely to be ousted from ‘captured’
boards, Figure 3.5 compares the hazard rates of those CEOs who have an insider dom-
inated board with those that have independent boards. As can be seen, the hazard for
forced exits is consistently lower if a board is dominated by insiders. This is suggestive
of an entrenchment effect. Although the effect is less obvious, the probability of early re-
tirement is also less in dominated boards, also suggesting entrenchment. Moreover, since
the difference in the hazard between the dominated boards and the independent boards
is greatest between years 9 and 12, this is consistent with the notion that it may take a
number of years for a CEO to capture their board.
3.4.2 Semi-parametric analysis
All Exit States
Whilst the graphical analysis is indicative, many additional factors could be impacting on
the probability of CEO exit. We therefore proceed with an econometric analysis. In stan-
dard parametric survival analysis one needs to assume an explicit form for the underlying
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Figure 3.5: Breakdown by Board Type
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hazard rate, which imposes restrictions on the range of allowable behaviour. By contrast,
the Cox (1972) proportional hazard model is a semi-parametric method13 which allows
the estimation of the impact of a covariate without restricting the shape of the baseline
hazard. This is convenient for our purposes since we have few priors concerning the form
of the underlying baseline hazard. Under the Cox model, the hazard rate that the j’th CEO
faces is multiplicatively proportional to the baseline hazard, λ0(t), that all CEOs face,
modified by covariates xj (Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez, 2002).
λ(t|xj) = λ0(t) exp(xjβx) (3.4.5)
The Cox model performs separate binary outcome analyses at each of the ordered failure
times returning the probability of the event for those who experienced that event at each
time. Values of βx are then determined by maximizing the likelihood of the function which
combines all the separate binary outcome analyses. As no assumption is made regarding
the distribution of failure times in the individual analyses, no assumption is required when
13Semi-parametric in the sense that time is not parameterised, but the impact of the covariates is param-
eterised.
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the Cox model combines the analyses14.
Figure 3.6: Sample Durations
Like most survival data, Manifest’s data is ‘right censored’ as some CEOs (subjects one
and five in figure 3.6) have not completed their tenure by the end of the sample. Right
censoring requires us to define censoring indicators:
• δi = 1 if the observed duration is completed.
• δi = 0 if the observed duration is right-censored.
In order to maintain consistent estimation in the presence of censoring, the censoring
mechanism must be non-informative. The completion of duration Ti and censoring time
Ci are required to be independent, otherwise the non-censored observations will not be
representative of the whole sample. In other words, at any given point in time, censoring
must not occur because a CEO has an unusually high or low chance of exiting the sample,
given the set of parameters. The observations in our data are right censored when the CEO
is still in office at the end of the sample period. Thus our censoring mechanism is entirely
undiscriminating, affecting all CEOs regardless of their tenure, equally. Therefore, our
estimated coefficients should be free from any potential bias that may arise when the
sample is right censored.
14The Cox model only concerns itself with the ordering of failure times, not the distribution of failure
times. The baseline hazard λ0 is, therefore, left unestimated.
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Subjects one, two and three in figure 3.6 are appointed prior to the sample start date. The
period between appointment date and sample start date is referred to as the (left) truncation
period. The subject can not be considered as being ‘at risk’ of an exit event during this
period as they are only observed because they survived the truncation period. CEOs that
exited prior to the sample start are unobserved (subject two in figure 3.6). To adjust for
left truncation in the Cox model, the subject is omitted from all individual binary outcome
analyses during the truncated period.
Results
Table 3.6 shows the results from running a basic Cox proportional hazards model with
all exit states constituting a single failure event.15 The t-statistics indicate whether the
co-variate has a statistically significant impact, as normal. However, for ease of interpre-
tation, hazard ratios are reported, and thus a coefficient indicates the probability of exit
compared to the baseline. A number greater than one indicates the hazard is increased, a
number less than one indicates that it is decreased.
The null hypothesis of this chapter is that poorly performing CEOs are dismissed. In
our regressions, the total shareholder return variables identify annual performance quar-
tiles compared to the lower quartile performers in the FTSE 350 Index. TSR ranking
against FTSE 350 companies is a commonly used performance measure in equity incen-
tive schemes.
The rationale for choosing annual TSR rather than a cumulative measure of TSR is that
TSR incorporates past performance and market expectations of future performance and
should therefore be closely aligned with current shareholder satisfaction of managerial
performance. Cumulative TSR is incorporated later on in this chapter in an attempt to
distinguish between more subtle hypotheses (see section 3.4.2) but the results indicate
that current TSR is the more important determinant of CEO exit. The only accounting
measure for which sufficient data was acquired was underlying earnings per share (EPS),
as recorded by Manifest. However, EPS growth was not found to be significant in the
determination of the likelihood of exit and therefore not included in the analysis.
Even with all exit states bundled together, the impact of a low performance ranking is
clear. The probability of exit for low to median performers is 76% that of the worst
performers, whilst those in the upper quartile have a hazard that is only 46% of the lowest
15The model is estimated in STATA using the stcox command.
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quartile.
The theoretical caveat to our null hypothesis is that the threat of dismissal is mitigated if
the CEO is able to entrench themselves and capture the board. Table 3.6 shows that the
insider variables are also important. Increasing the proportion of independent directors
on the board by 20 percentage points, whilst holding the total number of directors the
same, would result in an increase in the hazard rate of approximately 14%. In addition,
CEOs with larger boards face lower hazard rates, with the results indicating that losing 4
directors from the board would increase the hazard rate by 33%. Age also has a positive
impact on the probability of exit.16 A 65 year old CEO has double the hazard rate of a 55
year old.
Boards which comprise a greater proportion of directors appointed during the tenure of
the current CEO result in lower hazard rates. In the UK, directors are appointed by the
Nomination Committee, a subcommittee of the board, typically led by the chairman or a
non-executive director. However, the CEO or other executive directors may also sit on this
committee. The percentage of the Board appointed by the CEO variable is constructed by
recording the proportion of the board appointed during the tenure of the CEO. This vari-
able is a proxy for the friendliness of the board towards the CEO on the presumption that
the CEO is unlikely to preside over the appointment of hostile board members. The aver-
age length of service of the non-executive directors decreases the hazard, suggesting that
a non-executive director does not become more rigorous at monitoring with experience,
but rather the CEO carries more influence the longer the director serves in office.
The ownership structure of the firm may also be important in determining CEO turnover
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). CEO’s who hold large portions of
the company’s equity relative to the company’s major shareholders may be better to resist
pressure to resign from such shareholders. To control for this, we include the difference
between the equity holdings of the largest shareholder (blockholder) and those of the
CEO. The results indicate that the higher the relative holdings of the blockholder, the
more likely the CEO is to exit their position. A ten percentage point increase in the
difference between the holdings of the blockholder and the CEO results in a 13 percent
increase in the likelihood of exit.
It is possible that the governance of the company modifies the effect that performance has
on the likelihood of CEO exit. To investigate this, we interact board size, % insiders, %
board appointed by the CEO and average non-executive tenure with the total shareholder
16Age is entered as a squared term beginning at age 50.
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Table 3.6: Hazard to Any Exit
a b
Total shareholder return
Lower quartile-Median 0.764*** (-2.83) 0.530 (-1.13)
Median-Upper quartile 0.612*** (-4.59) 0.432 (-1.37)
Upper quartile 0.458*** (-7.20) 0.367* (-1.85)
Ln Sales 1.092*** (2.99) 1.094*** (2.96)
Age 1.005*** (4.06) 1.005*** (4.08)
Board Size 0.918*** (-4.47) 0.905*** (-3.04)
% Insiders on Board 0.322*** (-3.44) 0.323*** (-3.18)
% Board Appointed by CEO 0.257*** (-6.64) 0.248*** (-5.08)
Ave NED Tenure 0.909*** (-4.87) 0.894*** (-3.44)
Block equity-CEO equity 1.013*** (4.20) 1.013*** (4.08)
Total shareholder return interactions
Board Size
Lower quartile-Median 1.028 (0.66)
Median-Upper quartile 1.010 (0.23)
Upper quartile 1.024 (0.50)
% Insiders on Board
Lower quartile-Median 1.073 (0.12)
Median-Upper quartile 1.076 (0.11)
Upper quartile 0.968 (-0.05)
% Board appointed by CEO
Lower quartile-Median 0.936 (-0.18)
Median-Upper quartile 1.145 (0.32)
Upper quartile 1.081 (0.17)
Ave non-executive tenure
Lower quartile-Median 1.029 (0.62)
Median-Upper quartile 1.031 (0.59)
Upper quartile 1.000 (0.00)
N 3364 3364
No. CEOs 871 871
No. Failures 607 607
Wald (χ2) 252.096(19) 256.561(31)
1. Robust t-statistics, clustered on CEO, are reported in the parentheses.
2. *** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%.
3. Year dummies included.
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return variables. The results are show in column b of Table 3.6. None of these interactions
are statistically significant and so the structural measures of entrenchment described above
appear not to diminish the impact of performance on the likelihood of exit.
Competing risk estimates
By grouping all exit types together, the model presented in Tables 3.6 implicitly assumes
the same underlying hazard rate across all failure types. However, as we have seen, there
are good reasons to suspect that the baseline hazard is likely to vary depending on the
event from which the CEO is at risk. For example, under an entrenchment hypothesis,
one would expect the hazard of dismissal to reduce over the course of the CEO’s tenure
but the hazard of retirement will increase. One strategy, as used by Geddes and Vinod
(1997), is to exclude observations that experience the competing event and just analyse
the event of primary interest, in this case dismissal. However, a more efficient and in-
formative approach is to directly compare alternative exit states in a common framework.
We therefore adopt a competing risks methodology (Prentice et al. (1978), Kalbfleisch
and Prentice (1980)). The risks are competing in the sense that the exit states are mutually
exclusive (i.e. upon retirement the CEO can no longer be dismissed) and thus each event
censors each other event. We distinguish between three competing exit types: forced de-
partures; retirements; and other exits. We follow the method of Lunn and McNeil (1995)
and stratify by risk type, since we do not wish to restrict the baseline hazards of the dif-
ferent risk types to share a constant ratio. This is achieved by duplicating the data so that
there are three entries per observation, one for each risk type. The duplicated entries show
the other risk types and are always censored. If the original observation is right censored,
then three entries exist, one for each failure type, all of which are censored. A Cox regres-
sion, stratified by failure type, is then performed with the covariates interacted with each
risk type. By this method we can identify how the covariates impact upon each competing
risk.
Examining the competing risk estimates, a clear distinction can be observed in Table
3.7 with respect to the influence of covariates upon CEO turnover. Firm performance
is critical in the hazard of a forced exit, with CEOs of firms in the top quartile having
a hazard rate only 20% of that of the bottom quartile. In contrast, performance has a
positive impact on exits to other states, presumably as high performers move on to other
jobs.
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Table 3.7: Hazard to Competing Risks
Forced Departure Retirement Other Forced Departure Retirement Other
Total shareholder return
Lower quartile-Median 0.402*** 2.220** 2.072** 0.246 2.685 4.762
(-3.70) (2.69) (2.34) (-0.90) (0.56) (0.83)
Median-Upper quartile 0.360*** 1.829* 2.034** 0.074* 8.066 10.477
(-4.17) (1.93) (2.21) (-1.70) (1.10) (1.20)
Upper quartile 0.196*** 3.317*** 2.325** 0.103 10.907 2.599
(-5.15) (3.28) (2.18) (-1.19) (1.13) (0.43)
Ln Sales 1.194** 0.933 0.883 1.209** 0.922 0.869
(2.53) (-0.80) (-1.42) (2.60) (-0.91) (-1.55)
Age 0.999 1.008*** 0.998 0.999 1.008*** 0.998
(-0.41) (2.84) (-0.58) (-0.41) (2.78) (-0.52)
Board Size 0.936 0.966 1.003 0.910 0.999 0.987
(-1.42) (-0.60) (0.05) (-1.42) (-0.01) (-0.13)
% Insiders on Board 0.205** 2.252 1.707 0.182** 2.137 2.423
(-2.08) (0.88) (0.54) (-2.16) (0.76) (0.85)
% Board Appointed by CEO 0.196*** 2.260* 0.957 0.147*** 2.946 1.964
(-4.26) (1.72) (-0.10) (-3.77) (1.55) (0.97)
Ave NED Tenure 0.806*** 1.160** 1.150** 0.814** 1.155 1.120
(-3.57) (2.24) (2.00) (-2.38) (1.35) (1.09)
Block equity-CEO equity 1.017** 0.994 0.997 1.017** 0.993 0.996
(2.38) (-0.72) (-0.36) (2.48) (-0.82) (-0.41)
Total shareholder return interactions
Board Size
Lower quartile-Median 0.997 1.045 1.034
(-0.03) (0.37) (0.26)
Median-Upper quartile 1.121 0.829 0.949
(1.29) (-1.49) (-0.42)
Upper quartile 1.023 0.957 1.093
(0.16) (-0.28) (0.53)
% Insiders on Board
Lower quartile-Median 1.643 1.026 0.284
(0.30) (0.01) (-0.59)
Median-Upper quartile 1.130 1.218 0.662
(0.08) (0.10) (-0.21)
Upper quartile 2.096 0.462 0.391
(0.36) (-0.34) (-0.37)
% Board appointed by CEO
Lower quartile-Median 3.278 0.189 0.141*
(1.29) (-1.46) (-1.69)
Median-Upper quartile 0.774 2.572 0.788
(-0.29) (0.81) (-0.20)
Upper quartile 2.982 0.316 0.138
(0.78) (-0.72) (-1.19)
Ave non-executive tenure
Lower quartile-Median 0.878 1.128 1.221
(-0.77) (0.64) (1.05)
Median-Upper quartile 1.152 0.877 0.846
(1.09) (-0.85) (-0.97)
Upper quartile 0.835 1.115 1.262
(-1.20) (0.63) (1.22)
No. CEOs 871 871
No. Failures 607 607
Wald (χ2) 375.810(59) 410.609(95)
Equality of coefficients across risks (χ2) 78.97(20)*** 104.96(44)***
1. Robust (clustered around CEO) t-statistics reported in the parentheses.
2. *** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%.
3. Year dummies included.
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Table 3.7 shows that CEOs with a larger proportion of the board appointed during their
tenure are at significantly lower risk of dismissal. Ceteris paribus, increasing the pro-
portion of the board who have been appointed during the tenure of the CEO by 50 per-
centage points reduces the risk of dismissal by 40%. Boards comprising longer serving
non-executive directors also reduce the risk of dismissal for the CEO.
As with the single risk estimates, we also interact the performance with the governance
variables, but again these effects are largely insignificant. Therefore, we are unable to con-
clude that the impact of poor performance upon dismissals is reduced in weakly governed
firms.
To summarise, we have provided evidence that poorly performing CEOs are at a greater
risk of dismissal. We have also shown that governance matters: CEOs with larger boards,
with more directors appointed during their tenure, with established non-executive direc-
tors and with a greater proportion of insiders have lower hazard rates of dismissal. Yet,
we fail to find evidence of an interaction between performance and governance.
Robustness Checks
The percentage of insiders is the proportion of the board consisting of executive direc-
tors and affiliated non-executive directors. To determine independence, the companies’
own assessments of the directors’ independence is used. Companies are required to state
whether or not each serving director is independent according to criteria laid out in the
Combined Code (2003).
Some concern has been raised in the literature regarding the reliability of company own
assessments (Lin, Pope, and Young, 2003; Young, 2000). To examine whether our re-
sults are sensitive to this issue, we re-estimated the model using Manifest’s assessment of
independence, which is based on criteria differing only marginally from those suggested
by Lin, Pope, and Young (2003)17. The results of this estimation are given in Table 3.8.
With the Manifest measure, the % Insiders on board loses statistical significance. This
is because of the higher correlation of the Manifest measure with average non-executive
tenure (since in the Manifest measure a non-executive director will fail independence if
they have been on the board for more than 9 years, whereas the company measure would
17Manifest’s assessment does not fail directors on the solely on the grounds that the director represents
a venture capitalists (although many such directors would fail under Manifest’s assessment if they hold a
major equity stake) and Manifest would not fail solely on the grounds that the director receives more than
£50,000 in fees (but again many such directors would fail on other grounds.)
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not typically fail for tenure alone). The results for the other variables are not qualitatively
different from the results given in the paper. Since the company definition is readily avail-
able and widely used, for comparative purposes our specification uses the companies’ own
assessments.
It may also be sensible to briefly explore how sensitive our results were to the classifi-
cation of the nine original exit states into the three used in the analysis. To investigate
this issue we have experimented whether ‘unclassified’ departures might be better classi-
fied as forced exits or retirements. The results are given in Table 3.9 below, and are not
qualitatively different from those in section 3.4.2, perhaps because of the relatively small
number of unclassified exits. Finally in Table 3.10 we experiment with ‘unclassified’ as
a 4th distinct risk type. Although the results for other risks do not change markedly, the
relatively few number of ‘unclassified’ exits makes the risk to this exit state badly defined
statistically. In the absence of additional information relating the unclassified exits, our
preferred specification is based on our initial aggregation.
Performance Revelation vs Entrenchment
In the non-parametric analysis in section 3.4.1 we showed that the hazard of forced exit
varied over a CEO’s tenure, increasing until year 4 and declining thereafter. This is a
pattern that we might expect to see under entrenchment. The hazard rate will decrease if
the CEO captures the board, which might take the CEO a number of years. Now, even if
shareholders desire to remove the CEO, they will have lower rates of success due to the
increasingly entrenched position of the CEO.
However, Figure 3.3 also describes what we might expect to see with performance rev-
elation. As information regarding the CEOs ability increases as a result of observing
additional years of firm performance under their tenure, shareholders may become more
willing to stick with the CEO, even if current performance is relatively poor. However,
if the declining hazard is due to information revelation, we would additionally expect the
impact of cumulative good past performance to make the CEO more secure. To this end,
we additionally add the cumulative change in TSR ranking to our regressions.18 We then
allow the impact of the performance and insider variables to vary, by splitting our sample
at 5 years of tenure.19 Table 3.11 presents the results of this exercise.
18The cumulative change in TSR ranking captures performance in all years since appointment, assuming
each year’s performance is equally important.
19We have experimented with break points at other tenures, but that at 5 years gives the model with the
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Table 3.8: Hazard to Competing Risks: Definition of % Insiders on Board
Company definition Manifest definition
a b c a b c
Total shareholder return
Lower quartile-Median 0.402*** (−3.70) 2.219** (2.69) 2.071** (2.34) 0.399*** (−3.74) 2.203** (2.67) 2.082** (2.36)
Median-Upper Quartile 0.361*** (−4.17) 1.829* (1.93) 2.034** (2.21) 0.357*** (−4.21) 1.802* (1.89) 2.044** (2.23)
Upper Quartile 0.195*** (−5.16) 3.323*** (3.28) 2.327** (2.18) 0.191*** (−5.24) 3.348*** (3.31) 2.360** (2.22)
Ln Sales 1.194** (2.53) 0.933 (−0.81) 0.883 (−1.42) 1.200** (2.43) 0.947 (−0.60) 0.881 (−1.34)
Age 0.999 (−0.41) 1.008*** (2.84) 0.998 (−0.58) 0.999 (−0.47) 1.009*** (2.93) 0.998 (−0.56)
Board Size 0.936 (−1.43) 0.966 (−0.60) 1.003 (0.05) 0.933 (−1.42) 0.962 (−0.65) 1.005 (0.08)
% Insiders on Board 0.207** (−2.07) 2.237 (0.88) 1.704 (0.54) 0.395 (−1.24) 2.955 (1.19) 1.494 (0.41)
% Board appointed by CEO 0.196*** (−4.26) 2.260* (1.72) 0.956 (−0.10) 0.199*** (−4.19) 2.308* (1.74) 0.944 (−0.12)
Ave non-executive tenure 0.807*** (−3.57) 1.160** (2.24) 1.150** (2.00) 0.821*** (−3.31) 1.138** (1.96) 1.140* (1.88)
Block equity-CEO equity 1.017** (2.38) 0.994 (−0.70) 0.997 (−0.37) 1.016** (2.31) 0.995 (−0.66) 0.997 (−0.32)
N 10092 10092
No. CEOs 871 871
No. Failures 607 607
Wald χ2 375.81 360.26
1. T-statistics reported in the parentheses.
2. *** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%.
3. Year dummies included.
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Table 3.9: Experiments with ‘Unclassified’ Exits
Unclassified as forced Unclassified as Retired Unclassified Dropped
Forced departure Retirement Other Forced departure Retirement Other Forced departure Retirement Other
Total shareholder return
Lower quartile-Median 0.505*** 1.786** 1.675* 0.406*** 2.213*** 2.087** 0.398*** 2.212** 2.100**
(-3.46) (2.27) (1.75) (-3.66) (2.75) (2.23) (-3.72) (2.67) (2.24)
Median-Upper Quartile 0.390*** 1.713* 2.205** 0.364*** 1.753* 2.377** 0.356*** 1.862** 2.393**
(-4.58) (1.92) (2.57) (-4.12) (1.84) (2.56) (-4.22) (1.99) (2.58)
Upper Quartile 0.170*** 3.840*** 3.417*** 0.198*** 2.796*** 2.996*** 0.194*** 3.237*** 2.989***
(-6.10) (3.93) (3.26) (-5.11) (2.84) (2.76) (-5.19) (3.21) (2.74)
Ln Sales 1.161*** 0.959 0.897** 1.214*** 0.904 0.874* 1.215*** 0.918 0.871*
(3.04) (-0.61) (-2.01) (3.10) (-1.29) (-1.87) (3.02) (-1.04) (-1.86)
Age 1.000 1.007*** 0.993** 0.999 1.008*** 0.995 0.999 1.008*** 0.995
(0.15) (3.72) (-1.97) (-0.47) (2.66) (-1.31) (-0.50) (2.88) (-1.29)
Board Size 0.956 0.946 0.961 0.932 0.988 0.980 0.938 0.969 0.979
(-1.26) (-1.13) (-0.72) (-1.53) (-0.23) (-0.32) (-1.40) (-0.55) (-0.33)
% Insiders on Board 0.152 3.142 4.127* 0.224** 1.505 2.874** 0.213 2.136 2.856
(-2.92) (1.39) (1.58) (-2.02) (0.46) (1.08) (-2.08) (0.84) (1.07)
% Board Appointed by CEO 0.293*** 1.500 0.457* 0.196*** 2.368* 0.702 0.210*** 2.147* 0.680
(-3.55) (0.92) (-1.74) (-4.29) (1.89) (-0.74) (-4.11) (1.62) (-0.81)
Ave NED Tenure 0.859*** 1.090 1.072 0.809*** 1.155** 1.140* 0.806*** 1.155** 1.143*
(-3.18) (1.56) (1.14) (-3.53) (2.21) (1.85) (-3.56) (2.15) (1.85)
Block equity-CEO equity 1.019*** 0.992 0.992 1.016** 0.995 0.996 1.018** 0.994 0.995
(3.43) (-1.12) (-0.89) (2.34) (-0.66) (-0.41) (2.49) (-0.66) (-0.47)
1. T-statistics reported in the parentheses.
2. *** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%.
3. Year dummies included.
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Table 3.10: Experiments with ‘Unclassified’ Exits Continued
‘Unclassified’ as 4th risk type
Forced departure Retirement Other Unclassified
Total shareholder return
Lower quartile-Median 0.403*** 2.220** 2.085** 1.936
(-3.68) (2.69) (2.23) (1.53)
Median-Upper Quartile 0.363*** 1.838* 2.373** 1.316
(-4.14) (1.95) (2.56) (0.57)
Upper Quartile 0.198*** 3.321*** 2.999*** 0.523
(-5.12) (3.28) (2.76) (-0.79)
Ln Sales 1.195*** 0.934 0.884* 0.891
(3.12) (-0.91) (-1.87) (-1.42)
Age 0.999 1.008*** 0.995 1.003
(-0.41) (2.84) (-1.34) (0.81)
Board Size 0.934 0.966 0.977 1.084
(-1.52) (-0.61) (-0.37) (1.18)
% Insiders on Board 0.207** 2.283 3.065 0.395
(-2.16) (0.93) (1.16) (-0.66)
% Board Appointed by CEO 0.188*** 2.282* 0.706 5.465**
(-4.46) (1.77) (-0.74) (2.23)
Ave NED Tenure 0.806*** 1.159** 1.142* 1.198*
(-3.62) (2.26) (1.88) (1.83)
Block equity-CEO equity 1.016** 0.995 0.996 0.998
(2.27) (-0.67) (-0.41) (-0.12)
1. T-statistics reported in the parentheses.
2. *** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%.
3. Year dummies included.
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Current performance, measured by total shareholder return does indeed appear to become
less important after 5 years, as predicted by both the entrenchment and performance rev-
elation hypotheses. Our reported estimates also show that the impact of insiders on the
hazard of forced departures increases after the CEO has been in office for 5 or more years.
This is consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis. No evidence is found for information
revelation however- the coefficient on the change in TSR ranking moves in the opposite
direction to that expected. This suggests that shareholders continue to regard recent, rather
than good past, performance as the key indicator of CEO competence.
Governance Environment
As indicated in the introduction, the period of investigation was one of an ongoing pro-
gramme of corporate governance reforms (Cadbury, 1992; Greenbury, 1995; Combined
Code, 1999, 2003; Higgs, 2003) which might be expected to have impacted upon exec-
utive tenure: First, as noted above, these changes had the consequence of progressively
reducing the contract length for UK senior executives from three years or more, in the
early 1990s to 12 months or less by 2003 (Combined Code, 2003). This would have had
a corresponding impact on the compensation requirements in the event of severance and
hence be expected to reduce the costs of CEO dismissal. Second, the reforms from Cad-
bury onwards have consistently sought to strengthen the role and independence of non-
executive directors (Solomon, 2007). If successful, this would be expected to increase the
accountability of CEOs and increase the risk of dismissal for poorer performers among
their number.
Finally, if less obviously, there is a widespread perception that shareholder activism has
increased over the period (Davies, Platts, and Lewis, 2008). In part, this has been encour-
aged by corporate governance reforms which have increased direct shareholder voice - on
such issues as calling shareholder meetings, replacing directors, approving remuneration
committee reports etc. (Davies, Platts, and Lewis, 2008) - and thereby encouraged par-
ticipation at shareholder AGMs. This is reinforced by the increased role of shareholder
pressure groups and governance consultancies, such as Manifest, in providing alternative
sources of information to shareholders. However, above all it reflects the view that the
growth of institutional shareholdings challenges the received wisdom of the diffuse con-
trol of large public companies (PIRC, 2003). Indeed work such as Leech (2001, 2003)
suggests that effective voting control in many large UK companies could rest in the hands
highest log-likelihood.
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Table 3.11: Performance Revelation Versus Entrenchment
Tenure<5 Tenure≥5
Forced Departure Retirement Other Forced Departure Retirement Other
Total shareholder return
Lower quartile-Median 0.406*** 2.393** 1.464 0.320** 2.868* 2.867*
(-3.06) (1.98) (0.96) (-2.12) (1.83) (1.72)
Median-Upper Quartile 0.359*** 1.432 1.565 0.231** 3.511* 2.536
(-3.17) (0.69) (1.02) (-2.40) (1.90) (1.28)
Upper Quartile 0.148*** 3.269* 2.037 0.186** 3.979* 1.731
(-3.59) (1.64) (1.09) (-2.40) (1.82) (0.64)
Change TSR Ranking 0.943 1.340 1.973 3.055* 0.285* 0.607
(-0.15) (0.51) (1.36) (1.60) (-1.68) (-0.60)
Ln Sales 1.194** 0.905 0.894 1.217** 0.928 0.865
(2.43) (-1.08) (-1.24) (2.05) (-0.72) (-1.41)
Age 1.001 1.014*** 0.990 0.998 1.008* 1.001
(0.35) (3.07) (-1.40) (-0.47) (1.67) (0.11)
Board Size 0.913 0.963 0.970 0.974 0.932 1.023
(-1.57) (-0.44) (-0.39) (-0.43) (-0.99) (0.31)
% Insiders on Board 0.345 3.723 8.220 0.045** 6.341 0.644
(-1.18) (0.93) (1.68) (-2.43) (1.34) (-0.30)
% Board Appointed by CEO 0.298** 0.271 0.227** 0.297** 1.311 3.297
(-2.07) (-1.42) (-1.99) (-2.09) (0.38) (1.48)
Ave NED Tenure 0.825** 1.086 1.132 0.862** 1.067 1.055
(-2.34) (0.70) (1.28) (-2.15) (0.88) (0.62)
Block equity-CEO equity 1.020** 0.987 0.992 0.993* 1.021 1.016
(2.42) (-1.00) (-0.65) (-0.58) (1.64) (1.05)
Wald χ2 544.947(95)
Equality of coefficients: 101.84(30)
tenure< 5 & tenure> 5 (χ2)
1. T-statistics reported in the parentheses.
2. *** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%.
3. Year dummies included.
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of a few fund managers if they co-ordinate their voting. Furthermore, the large abso-
lute size of these holdings reduces their liquidity and thereby provides an incentive for
intervention (Leech, 2003). Following the Myners’ Reports (2001; 2004) institutional
shareholders’ organisations have acknowledged the role of fund managers in corporate
governance (Davies, Platts, and Lewis, 2008).
Since changes in the governance environment have occurred progressively, but incremen-
tally, over the period, we test for their impact by splitting our data at 2000 and labelling
the sub-periods thereby created as ‘pre-reform’ and ‘post-reform’, respectively. The re-
sults of this exercise are given in Table 3.12. We find supportive evidence of an increase
in the importance of firm performance post-reform. In particular, the hazard of forced
departure for the bottom quartile performers doubles between the two sub-periods, with a
corresponding fall in the other exit states. There is some suggestive decline in the hazard
for the top performing companies, although these changes are not significant.
The results for our governance variables suggest a rather limited impact of the reform pro-
cess. Although the impact of insiders is weaker in the post reform period, the entrenching
effect of board members appointed by the CEO appears to have increased. However,
again, neither of these differences are statistically significant. In sum, our estimates cast
doubt on the success of the reforms in weakening the ability of CEOs to entrench them-
selves in their position.
3.5 Conclusions
We have presented evidence that the threat of CEO dismissal responds to performance
as measured by total shareholder return. We have also shown that the threat of dismissal
falls with certain structural measures of entrenchment such as the proportion of insiders
on the board or number of directors appointed during the CEO’s tenure. However, we
were unable to find a strong interaction between governance conditions and the impact of
performance in determining the threat of dismissal.
Our investigation has also exposed distinct differences between the hazard rates of com-
peting risk types and in the variation of these hazard rates over time. Whilst the risk of
retirement increases steadily throughout the CEO’s tenure, the risk of an exit under pres-
sure from the board and/or shareholders only increases to year four, after which time a
forced exit becomes decreasingly likely. Broadly speaking, such a result can be inter-
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Table 3.12: Impact of Governance Reforms
Pre-Reform Post-Reform
Forced departure Retirement Other Forced departure Retirement Other
Total shareholder return
Lower quartile-Median 0.260*** 3.103** 3.220** 0.526** 1.735 1.605
(-2.78) (1.97) (2.09) (-2.19) (1.57) (1.20)
Median-Upper Quartile 0.389** 1.583 1.676 0.367*** 1.772 2.251**
(-2.26) (0.86) (0.99) (-3.22) (1.47) (1.94)
Upper Quartile 0.220*** 2.913* 1.081 0.181*** 3.423** 3.454**
(-3.19) (1.89) (0.12) (-3.94) (2.54) (2.45)
Ln Sales 1.274* 0.822 0.954 1.183* 0.959 0.812*
(1.82) (-1.23) (-0.29) (1.95) (-0.39) (-1.89)
Age 1.006** 1.002 0.993* 0.988** 1.019*** 1.007
(2.01) (0.69) (-1.80) (-2.11) (3.22) (1.11)
Board Size 0.976 0.970 0.976 0.899* 0.984 1.029
(-0.35) (-0.36) (-0.29) (-1.76) (-0.22) (0.37)
% Insiders on Board 0.096* 4.792 0.958 0.280 1.533 3.505
(-1.83) (1.02) (-0.03) (-1.29) (0.36) (0.94)
% Board Appointed by CEO 0.349** 2.769 0.574 0.114*** 2.787* 1.480
(-2.05) (1.23) (-0.85) (-4.13) (1.65) (0.61)
Ave NED Tenure 0.833** 1.139 1.121 0.769*** 1.209** 1.165
(-2.25) (1.43) (1.21) (-3.14) (2.10) (1.50)
Block equity-CEO equity 1.019 0.977 0.990 1.018** 1.020 1.007
(1.08) (-1.11) (-0.47) (2.31) (0.86) (0.29)
Wald χ2 488.997(89)
Equality of coefficients: 56.41(30)
Pre- and Post-reform (χ2)
1. Robust (clustered around CEO) t-statistics reported in the parentheses.
2. *** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%.
3. Year dummies included.
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preted in two ways. Either boards are placing increased trust in the competence of CEOs
who have survived until year four and therefore are more forgiving in light of subsequent
poor performance. Alternatively, and less optimistically, CEOs who survive beyond year
four are more capable of entrenching themselves in the position, perhaps by filling the
board with compliant directors who are less rigourous in their duty as monitors of the
CEO’s activity. Thus, the CEO is better able to resist punishment for poor company per-
formance in the later years of their tenure. Our results, favour the latter explanation, as
the composition of the board appears to be increasingly important as a predictor variable
in the determination of the hazard rate in the later years of a CEO’s tenure.
We also find a greater frequency of dismissals in the post 2000 period. This is perhaps re-
flective of increased churn following the stock market downturn in 2001, but our reported
estimates also provide some support for the view that corporate governance reforms have
made it harder for CEOs to resist the consequences of poor share performance. The post
2000 period is characterised by a higher ratio of outsider directors on the board and the
progressive reduction in average contract length has made CEO service contracts cheaper
to terminate. These changes, reflecting a succession of revisions to the Combined Code,
are suggestive of a positive role for policy in increasing the incidence of performance re-
lated departures in UK business. However, the corporate governance reforms appear to
have been ineffective in reducing the ability of CEOs to entrench themselves during their
tenure. The threat of removal after year four continues to recede at least as fast as it did
before the implementation of most of the reforms.
3.5.1 Future Work
This chapter has achieved some interesting insights into the CEO turnover process, by
applying duration analysis within a competing risks framework. As we approached this
topic without prior knowledge of the shape of the baseline hazard, a semi-parametric
method was employed. However, further work would do well to explore the possibility
of adopting a full parametric form. Parametric models have the advantage of using full
maximum likelihood in estimation. The estimated coefficients will be more efficient than
under a semi-parametric model and likelihood ratio tests can be used to assess the model’s
goodness of fit.
The distributional form of the error term (i.e. the shape of the baseline hazard) determines
the particular type of parametric regression model. The assumed distribution would have
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to cope with the apparent initial increase and subsequent decline in the hazard function
that is suspected in tenure of CEOs. Parametric models in the standard proportional haz-
ards (PH) framework such as the Exponential or Weibull models would be inappropriate.
The Exponential model’s hazard function is constant over time, while the Weibull’s is
monotonic. Rather, the distribution would belong to the accelerated failure-time (AFT)
framework which allows the slope of the hazard function to change sign over time. For
instance, the log-logistic model where the natural logarithm of time follows a logistic dis-
tribution. Interpretation of the effect of covariates in the AFT framework is different to
the PH framework. In the PH framework an increase in a covariate increases the baseline
hazard as it does in the Cox (1972) model, whereas under the AFT framework an increase
in a covariate implies a delay in failure, or an increase in the expected waiting time for
failure (Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez, 2004).
It may also be interesting to explore the extent to which unobserved effects that are specific
to certain groups impact the results. Specific individuals, firms or sectors may certain
unobserved attributes that increase or decrease the likelihood of exit. While adjustments
for unobserved individual effects were made to the standard errors used for inference on
the hazard ratios (by clustering on individuals), it might be worth exploring the potential
of modelling these effects directly applying a ‘shared frailty’ model.
This chapter controlled for the impact of ownership structure on CEO exit probabilities
with a measure of the CEO’s holdings relative to those of the largest shareholder (block-
holder). A complete analysis of control in a public company requires more detailed knowl-
edge of (at least the upper tail of) the distribution of voting shares, as in Leech (2001).
In particular, it would be useful to know the identity of the major equity shareholders as
certain types of owners might be more vigilant in their monitoring of CEO performance
than others. The collection of this data would be valuable for any future related research.
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Appendix
3.A Definition of exit events
Table 3.13: Definition of Exit Events
Event Definition
Retirement Retirement (including early retirement, illness or death).
Headhunted CEO gave notice to immediately pursue a position at another company.
Change of Control The CEO exits the sample due to their Company being acquired,
wound up or taken private.
Ousted The CEO leaves under pressure from the Board or shareholders.
Dismissed The CEO is officially removed from their position either by
shareholders or the Board.
Interim Appointment The CEO resigns having been appointed only on a temporary
basis following a sudden departure.
Internal Position Change A positional change but the CEO effectively continues as CEO.
Retired to Part Time Position The CEO retires to become a non-executive director
or Chairman of the same company.
Unclassified The CEO exits the Company and there is no evidence to suggest
they had resigned under pressure.
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CHAPTER 4
Shareholder Activism and Voting
‘I can see you are going to give me an uncomfortable afternoon’.
GlaxoSmithKline Chairman Sir Christopher Hogg to shareholders at the 2003 Annual
General Meeting1.
4.1 Introduction
The concern that the managers of public limited companies may deviate from optimising
shareholder returns is well documented. If corporate governance is largely concerned
with ‘how suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on
their investment’ (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) then a comprehensive examination of the
issue should include the myriad possible actions available to shareholders to achieve this
end. ‘Activism’ by shareholders is one possible strategy. Activism is typically modeled
as a check managerial discretion thereby curtailing abuses and reducing agency costs
(Monks and Minow, 2004). This may include direct interventions by shareholders and/or
exercising voting rights thoughtfully and independently from the recommendations of
management.
Under the Jensen and Meckling (1976) principal-agent framework, corporate governance
devices, which could include activism, are employed up to the point when the marginal
benefit of such devices equates to the marginal cost. However, given the discipline of
1The directors’ remuneration report was voted down by shareholders. See ‘Glaxo defeated by share-
holders’, BBC News 19th May 2003.
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the market for corporate control2 and other corporate governance devices3, it is possi-
ble that the costs of direct shareholder intervention outweigh the benefits. Traditionally,
shareholders are thought to do best by delegating the initiation and implementation deci-
sions to management, retaining only powers of ratification and a limited monitoring func-
tion (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Complete managerial discretion in the decision making
process might even be inherently value-adding if it elicits firm-specific investment from
managers (Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi, 1997). Such investment could include the de-
ployment of managerial initiative in seeking out the most profitable investment projects, if
one believes the use of managerial initiative increases when shareholders interfere less4.
Therefore, active intervention by shareholders in the decision making process has been
regarded by some scholars as self-defeating (Webb, Beck, and McKinnon, 2003). There
is a considerable body of evidence from the US that would argue that this assumption is
not unreasonable (Pound, 1992; Black, 1998; Gillan and Starks, 2000; Romano, 2001a).
Karpoff (2001)’s literature review of the impact of shareholder activism concludes that
while efforts by activists can achieve changes to target companies’ governance structures
these do not translate into improved earnings or shareholder returns.
The arguments that have been advanced favouring non-active shareholders are founded
upon the lack of credible incentives experienced by shareholders to overcome the large
costs associated with activism (Grossman and Hart, 1980). As shareholders typically seek
to minimise their exposure to the variance of any one particular stock by holding a diverse
portfolio of shares, holdings in any one particular stock are likely to be small. Thus an
active shareholder will only experience a fraction of returns resulting from improved gov-
ernance. The costs associated with activism are thought to dominate any private benefit.
Moreover, activism has the non-rivalrous and non-excludable properties of a public good.
As such, shareholders experience the temptation to free ride on the efforts of other share-
holders. Any fund manager rewarded on the basis of performance relative to a benchmark
would do better relative to the competition by doing nothing and reaping the benefits of
others’ intervention. Thus it is thought that active shareholders are neither capable, nor
possess the appropriate incentives to add value to their target companies.
‘There has been, and there will remain, a dearth of credible incentives for
2The effectiveness of the market for corporate control has been discussed extensively in the literature
(Manne, 1965; Grossman and Hart, 1980; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).
3For example, remuneration contracts and the treat of dismissal as discussed in chapters 2 and 3.
4Top managers often argue that compliance with shareholder expectations of corporate governance rules
limits their ability to deliver shareholder value. See ‘Mindless corporate governance box-ticking even af-
flicts FTSE 100 bosses’ Telegraph 18 July 2008.
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institutional investors to involve themselves more systematically in corporate
governance matters and fund managers may be doing their best by remaining
passive’ (Webb, Beck, and McKinnon, 2003).
However, Leech (2003) believes that the incentive and free riding problems to activism
have been overstated. Firstly, if the check on managerial discretion is sufficiently value
enhancing, institutions with only a small holding may experience sufficient private incen-
tives to provide the public good of activism. Although institutions have low holdings in
percentage terms they may be large in absolute economic terms. It is also unclear the
extent to which the transaction costs of activism are prohibitive. Moreover, there are real
costs associated with alternatives to activism such as exit. An institution is unlikely to
be able to dump all their shares without depressing the share price. The free-riding prob-
lem remains, but a complete failure to engage in a value adding activity in the hope that
somebody else might do it appears rather ‘irrational and pathological’ (Leech, 2003). It
is not unreasonable to suppose that institutions could co-ordinate a commitment to ac-
tivism by establishing some sort of code of best practice or share the costs of activism
through membership of a lobby group such as the Association of British Insurers (ABI)
or National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF).
The notion of passive shareholders is inconsistent with the conventional wisdom that has
shaped institutional arrangements in the UK5. A call for more participation by sharehold-
ers has been central to the ethos that has driven corporate governance reform. Throughout
the 1990s, institutional shareholders have been encouraged to become active investors in
the governance of the companies in which they invest (Hampel, 1998; Myners, 2004).
It is acknowledged by governance activists (Monks and Minow, 2004) that institutional
arrangements, particularly relating to the election and removal of directors in the UK, pro-
vide much more scope for successful activism than in the US (Black and Coffee, 1994;
Karpoff, 2001; Bebchuk, 2005).
The model of delegating the whole of the decision making function to management is also
inconsistent with the beliefs of the managers of activist funds, who presumably believe
that their interventions add value. Active investors seek to increase value in the compa-
nies in which they invest by improving existing corporate governance practices (Smith,
1996). The underlying assumption driving these practices is that corporate governance
is an important determinant of long term shareholder value. Gompers et al (2003) as-
sert that a strategy of buying firms with strong shareholder rights and selling firms with
5See chapter 1 for an overview and history of UK institutional arrangements.
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weak shareholder rights would have earned an abnormal return of 8.5% per year during
the 1990s. Core et al (2006) explicitly investigate this finding and conclude poor gover-
nance leads to operational underperformance, albeit this underperformance is anticipated
and priced efficiently by the market. Other authors, have found corporate governance to
be important in determining the severity of agency problems (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith,
2007) and that governance rules and law can impact on firm value (Chhaochharia and
Grinstein, 2007; Daines, 2001). Certainly, some individual activists pursue social, envi-
ronmental or political objectives that have little to do with shareholder returns. However,
professional UK activist funds have an explicit goal of shareholder value maximisation
and their managers are typically remunerated with packages that contain a large incentive
element that is contingent on the delivery outperformance of the benchmark. An in-depth
analysis of the activism undertaken by Hermes UK Focus Fund by Becht, Franks, Mayer,
and Rossi (2008) estimated that 90% of the per annum abnormal returns of 4.9% for the
period 1998-2004 were due to activist outcomes.
Activism takes many guises. First, active investors may engage and consult with man-
agement and non-executive directors to resolve any governance issues behind the scenes
(Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach, 1998). Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2008) re-
port that the gains from activism are largely attributable to these types of engagements.
Second, poorly governed companies or companies that restrict shareholder rights may
be identified and embarrassed into changing their actions. For example, the Association
of British Insurers (ABI) issues ‘Red Tops’ prior to general meetings, which highlight
serious breaches of best practice6. Third, shareholders are able to propose resolutions
and exercise their vote at general meetings. Finally, shareholders may pressure the board
to appoint or dismiss certain directors, including the CEO. This chapter will focus upon
shareholder voting and the threat of dismissal.
4.2 Shareholder Voting
Companies are required by UK listing rules to hold an Annual General Meeting (AGM) at
least once every 15 months (Companies Act 1985) and companies rarely deviate from the
best practice of holding an AGM every 12 months. At the AGM, shareholders are asked
to approve resolutions proposed by the board. These will include proposals to approve
the report and accounts, to approve the directors’ remuneration report, to (re)appoint the
6www.ivis.co.uk/pages/corporate.html
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auditors, to (re)elect directors, request authorities to issue/purchase company shares and
any other items that the board needs approval by shareholders7. Shareholders are entitled
to add their own resolutions. Motions are carried either on a show of hands or on a
poll, depending on the provisions contained within the company’s articles of association.
Institutions typically cast their votes by proxy. Prior to the meeting, the Chairman will be
informed of the proxy poll results and is obligated to put the resolution to a poll if proxy
poll results could affect the outcome of the resolution.
Best practice in the UK conducts voting arrangements on the basis of ‘one share one
vote’ (Hampel, 1998). Deviations from this arrangement may occur when the company
has more than one class of share capital, for instance with start-up companies that have
recently floated. Passive shareholders may delegate their votes to management. However,
institutions such as pension funds, mutual funds and local authorities are encouraged by
best practice to vote their shares in an informed and responsible manner (Myners, 2004).
The first formal statement with respect to responsible voting in the UK was the Insti-
tutional Shareholder’s Committee’s (ISC’s)8 ‘The responsibilities of institutional share-
holders and agents - statement of principles’ in 1991. In 1999, the ABI and NAPF issued
a joint statement titled, ‘Responsible Voting’ restating the Hampel Committee’s (1998)
principle that, ‘the right to vote is an asset and institutional investors owe it to their clients
to make considered use of it’. The Myners report (2001) further confirmed that, ‘voting
is one of the central means by which shareholders can influence the companies in which
they have holdings’, and the review believes that a culture in which informed voting was
more universal is very much to be desired.
Practically, it has become very cheap for shareholders to vote their shares. Developments
such as electronic proxy voting and the emergence of professional proxy voting and ad-
visory firms for shareholders has greatly reduced the cost of shareholders exercising an
informed and considered vote9. The incentive and free-rider arguments previously de-
scribed regarding other methods of shareholder activism are founded upon the large costs
incurred by the activist. However, because the practical costs of voting are negligible, if
7See appendix for an example of a proxy card.
8ISC includes the Investment Management Association (IMA), the ABI, the NAPF and the Association
of Investment Trust Companies (Its)
9In the UK, the dominant proxy voting agency is Research Recommendations and Electronic Voting
(RREV), a subsidiary of Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). Black (1998) shows that in many cases,
a proposal’s success hinges upon the ISS voting recommendation. ISS launched in 1986 and was sold to
RiskMetrics for more than US$500m in Nov 2006. The combined group generates $200m in revenue a
year, with 900 employees and 2,400 clients (www.riskmetrics.com).
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voting delivers any tangible benefit it is likely that there will be an incentive to vote.
While the practical costs of voting are nominal, shareholders who vote against manage-
ment risk the possibility of a negative market reaction to their votes. The market might
react adversely to shareholder dissent if dissent signals fundamental problems with the
company’s governance structure and hence an expectation of poorer future performance.
It may also indicate that discrete ‘behind the scenes’ engagements between management
and shareholders have failed and that a time and resource consuming power struggle is
about to take place. This risk may or may not be worth taking, depending on the like-
lihood that a negative vote will to prompt management to make changes and that these
changes translate to shareholder returns in the longer term.
Even if there is no impact of voting upon equity value, shareholders may still experience
an incentive to vote if they have motives other than equity value maximisation. Sharehold-
ers may be willing to sacrifice financial returns in pursuit of non-financial objectives, if
they value these objectives more than the foregone return incurred by such actions. These
alternative motives could include a desire for more equitable remuneration arrangements
or to remove certain individuals from the board. Such a finding would be consistent with
Karpoff’s (2001) literature review, which reports that most activist efforts in the US cause
governance changes that do not translate into improved shareholder returns.
This chapter will analyse the impact of shareholder voting on shareholder returns and
governance arrangements. As such, this chapter will constitute the first formal analysis
of the poll results from company meetings. Voting is the cheapest form of activism and
hence is likely to be the first mechanism tried by shareholders to increase value. If voting
is effective, then other, more costly mechanisms might be less necessary. It will be par-
ticularly interesting to ascertain the extent to which voting has influenced governance and
remuneration arrangements over the period of our sample given the increased emphasis
regulators have placed on informed voting as a means of improving governance.
However, it is known that some shareholders undertake direct engagements with manage-
ment10. Therefore, it is likely that an analysis of voting alone is not sufficient to capture all
activist efforts by shareholders. Voting might be even interpreted as a substitute for more
direct activism, if all initiation and implementation decisions are delegated to manage-
ment with voting constituting the ratification function as envisaged by Fama and Jensen
(1983). Active shareholders use direct communications with the board board to influence
10There is specific provision in the Combined Code to facilitate engagements between management and
major shareholders. See section 1.D Combined Code (2006).
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the operation of their companies and improve returns. These engagements with the board
are unobservable to this large sample study. However, chapter 3 was able to identify the
instances of forced CEO departure, where the CEO was removed by the board under pres-
sure from shareholders. Therefore, as a comparison to the impact of shareholder voting,
this chapter will conduct an event study to estimate the market’s reaction to the removal
of the CEO.
4.3 Data
This chapter uses the sample from Manifest as described in chapters 2 and 3. In addition,
the data includes unique information on the poll results of shareholder votes cast at annual
general meetings. Two resolutions are proposed by almost all FTSE 350 companies: the
proposal to approve the annual report and accounts; and the proposal to approve the direc-
tors’ remuneration report. Approval of the annual report and accounts is not mandatory
but was almost universal market practice throughout the years of our sample. The Direc-
tors’ Remuneration Report Regulations (2002) require FTSE 350 companies incorporated
under UK company law to propose a non-binding vote on the directors’ remuneration. As
the vote is non-binding the resolution is essentially a confidence vote on the remuneration
setting process. Between 1998 and 2002 remuneration report voting was on a voluntary
basis only. Prior to 1998, no remuneration report resolutions were proposed. Table 4.2
shows the number of companies in our sample and the proportion proposing the remuner-
ation report.
In addition, our data contains the poll results of the resolutions to elect/re-elect the CEO.
The Combined Code (1999) recommends that companies’ articles of association require
all directors, including the CEO, to retire (and propose themselves for re-election) in the
year of their appointment to the board and then at least once every three years. Compliance
amongst FTSE 350 companies is unanimous with this provision. Some companies require
annual re-election for all directors. Prior to this provision, best practice recommended that
one third of the board was required to retire each year with the intention that the whole
board is re-elected every three years. However, under the former provision some directors
deemed essential to the company, such as the CEO, could be exempt from re-election.
Unfortunately, public disclosure of poll results, though established as a basic compliance
with UK Codes of best practice (Combined Code, 2006), is not mandatorily required by
UK law. Consequently, a proportion of companies refused to disclose their poll results,
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Table 4.1: Report and Account Resolutions
Financial No. of R&A Average Ave Dissent No. of Reports No. of Reports
Year Resolutions % of ISC on Rem Voted more than 10%
Ending Voted Report Down Dissent
1996 55 47.20% 1.04% 0 1
1997 149 43.98% 0.76% 0 2
1998 230 47.85% 1.12% 1 3
1999 239 49.04% 0.83% 0 4
2000 277 52.88% 0.95% 0 3
2001 294 56.12% 1.33% 0 7
2002 332 55.97% 1.72% 0 13
2003 331 58.95% 1.73% 2 13
2004 312 61.46% 2.02% 0 7
2005 143 61.01% 2.14% 0 6
R&A = Report and Accounts
ISC = Issued Share Capital
The Myners Report (2001) refers to an NAPF sponsored, ‘Report of the Committee of Inquiry into UK
Vote Execution’ which found average turnout had risen from 20% in 1990 to approximately 50% by
1999.
particularly for earlier years in the sample. This introduces the possibility of a selection
bias in our data, as it is conceivable that the companies that do not disclose their results do
so because their results are embarrassing. However, it is also possible that the companies
that refused to disclose were distributed randomly, i.e. uncorrelated with the level of
dissent or our regressors11. Companies that refused to disclose were consistent in their
non-disclosure until the first year in which results are disclosed. Once results have been
disclosed, all subsequent years are disclosed. This is consistent with the random policy
explanation for non-disclosure rather than any selection bias. Further, an examination
of the poll results in the first year of disclosure revealed that they were not significantly
different in terms of dissent than other years (ceteris paribus), which would be expected
if the company discloses from the first good year onwards. We proceed on the basis that
our poll data is not biased in terms of disclosure.
Consistent with the prior chapters, investment trusts, which have no executive directors,
are excluded from the analysis, although self managed investment trusts are retained. Data
in relation to share prices and number of shares in issue was obtained through Datastream.
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 shows the votes cast and dissent in relation to the resolutions to ap-
prove the report and accounts and the remuneration report respectively. Dissent levels on
the report and accounts are typically very low, with meaningful levels of dissent being reg-
istered in a very few companies. Dissent on the report and accounts marginally increases
11When asked by Manifest, companies who did not disclose typically argued that historic company policy
was the reason for non-disclosure.
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Table 4.2: Remuneration Report Resolutions
Financial No. of Rem Average Ave Dissent No. of Reports No. of Reports Nature
Year Report % of ISC on Rem Voted more than 25% of
Ending Resolutions Voted Report Down Dissent Proposal
1998 4 49.23% 8.94% 0 0 Voluntary
1999 9 47.28% 7.34% 0 0 Voluntary
2000 14 52.84% 5.49% 0 1 Voluntary
2001 79 56.52% 8.37% 0 2 Voluntary
2002 242 55.56% 12.73% 1 35 Voluntary
2003 333 58.76% 12.66% 3 55 Mandatory
2004 315 61.43% 9.77% 3 32 Mandatory
2005 142 60.84% 6.45% 0 7 Mandatory
Proposal of the remuneration report became mandatory for UK incorporated and LSE listed companies
with the financial year ending on or after 31 December 2002.
Figure 4.1: Remuneration Report Resolutions
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over the course of our sample. This may reflect the increasing levels of shareholder vot-
ing and developments in best practice which encouraged informed voting as opposed to
automatically voting with management on all resolutions.
In relation to the remuneration report resolutions, it is interesting that trend of executive
pay growth was unrelenting during a period of increasing poll turnout. Dissent is signifi-
cantly larger than on other resolutions and peaks when the resolution becomes mandatory
in 2002/3. Prior to 2002, companies who expected voting dissent were unlikely to vol-
unteer a vote on remuneration. The peak also coincides with a period of poor market
performance. It is possible therefore, that the decline in voting dissent 2002-2005 re-
flected an uptake in best practice and/or a general decline in dissatisfaction. Section 4.4
seeks to isolate the effect of poll turnout and dissent on executive pay and shareholder
return.
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Table 4.3: To Elect/Re-elect the CEO
Financial No. of elect/ Median Mean Standard No. of Reports
Year re-elect CEO Dissent Dissent Deviation more than
Ending Resolutions 10% Dissent
1996 11 6.32% 6.62% 6.19% 3
1997 39 2.32% 5.50% 6.31% 9
1998 60 3.62% 6.23% 7.17% 13
1999 68 1.69% 4.42% 6.02% 10
2000 85 1.01% 4.80% 6.76% 15
2001 88 1.79% 6.15% 7.89% 26
2002 93 2.79% 5.88% 7.82% 23
2003 115 1.28% 3.46% 6.24% 15
2004 112 1.11% 2.09% 3.01% 4
2005 135 0.71% 1.78% 3.31% 3
Table 4.3 shows the number of resolutions and movement in dissent in relation to reso-
lutions that propose to elect or re-elect the CEO. Dissent is typically larger than on the
report and accounts but there are even fewer examples of very large dissent. Similar to
the remuneration report resolution, average dissent declines post 2002 reflecting either
improved market performance and/or uptake in best practice.
4.4 Results
In this section we seek to determine whether prior voting decisions on the companies’
report and accounts affect Total Shareholder Return (TSR). Care is needed when consid-
ering the timing of the voting decision on performance. To clarify, votes relating to a
particular year under review are cast part way through the following year. The majority of
companies report their accounts with the year ending 31 December and votes are cast in
April or May in the following year. Therefore if we are seeking to explain TSR with the
voting levels, voting levels must be lagged at least by one year. Time and sector dummies
respectively control for macroeconomic and industry specific shocks. To retain consis-
tent estimators in the event that unobserved firm-specific effects are correlated with our
regressors, the results of the within estimator are reported.
Table 4.4 shows the effect of shareholder voting on total shareholder return as measured by
the turnout and dissenting votes as a percentage of total votes cast. The reported estimates
on the voting variables are mostly negative and statistically insignificant. There is no
evidence to suggest that active voting by shareholders improves TSR in the immediate
subsequent years. Dissent also doesn’t appear to improve returns in the following year.
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Table 4.4: Shareholder Voting on Total Shareholder Return
OLS Random Effects Fixed Effects
Shareholder Voting
V otes Cast(t− 1) 0.006 -0.021 -0.105
(0.08) (-0.27) (-0.97)
V otes Cast(t− 2) -0.069 -0.096 -0.107
(-0.95) (-1.13) (-1.03)
Dissent(t− 1) -0.417* -0.573** -0.761***
(-1.71) (-2.33) (-2.96)
Dissent(t− 2) -0.742 -0.720 -0.577
(-1.44) (-1.24) (-0.96)
CH&CEO 0.038 0.107** 0.050 0.097 0.099* 0.104
(0.73) (2.16) (0.87) (1.46) (1.62) (1.22)
Board Size -0.007* 0.001 -0.006 0.003 -0.009 0.001
(-1.92) (0.23) (-1.48) (0.59) (-1.32) (0.08)
% Insiders 0.064 0.023 0.069 -0.021 0.102 0.004
(0.86) (0.27) (0.87) (-0.21) (1.11) (0.03)
Ln Sales 0.002 -0.013 0.000 -0.029* -0.076** -0.128***
(0.22) (-1.18) (-0.01) (-1.86) (-2.37) (-2.86)
Blockholder 0.024 0.018 0.033 0.022** 0.066 0.037
(0.90) (0.61) (1.15) (0.71) (2.14) (1.08)
CEO Holdings -0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.003 -0.001
(-0.67) (-0.53) (0.01) (-0.43) (1.07) (-0.35)
N 1973 1581 1973 1581 1973 1581
No. Companies 451 412 451 412 451 412
R-squared 17.54% 17.36% 18.96% 17.71% 19.89% 19.24%
T-stats robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered around company.
Year and sector dummies included.
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Rather it appears that returns fall, perhaps because dissent identifies issues that remain
unresolved, resulting in continued poor performance. Alternatively, corporate resources
could have been wasted in addressing shareholder opposition and therefore companies
without dissent have performed better. Either way, shareholder dissent has not driven
managers to actions that result in superior returns.
The other control variables are largely statistically insignificant. This is not unexpected as
market efficiency predicts the effect of these variables would be anticipated and priced cor-
rectly by the market. Table 4.5 repeats the exercise by measuring performance with Earn-
ings Per Share (EPS) growth12. The coefficients of dissent upon EPS growth are broadly
consistent with the effect of dissent on TSR, albeit the variance is such that the coeffi-
cients are statistically insignificant. Larger companies appear to have lower EPS growth
while companies with at least one major shareholder experience greater EPS growth. The
remaining control variables are largely insignificant and the explanatory power of the
model as measured by R-squared is low suggesting that earnings growth is determined
predominately by factors for which we do not have data.
4.4.1 Shareholder voting on remuneration
It appears that protesting through casting ‘abstention’ or ‘against’ votes does not improve
returns for shareholders or improve accounting performance as measured by EPS growth,
at least in the short to medium term. Indeed, if anything, it appears that prior dissent is
correlated with under-performance.
It is possible that shareholders could vote for some other non-financial reason. One high
profile issue for activist shareholders is executive remuneration13. Concerns that exec-
utives are over-paid are discussed in chapters 1 and 2. In table 4.6 we test the impact
of activism upon pay levels. For the reasons described in chapter 2, these estimations
use a system GMM estimator14. We find no evidence that shareholder voting or dissent
reduces the level of remuneration in the following years. Indeed, shareholder turnout is
correlated with higher levels of future pay. This may reflect a greater desire to vote where
12EPS growth is measured here by the difference in logged EPS hence negative values of EPS are
dropped. The measure of EPS is the underlying measure as reported in the financial statements which
is typically adjusted for exceptional items such as write offs and acquisitions.
13Excessive pay levels are not the only remuneration related issue for activists. Institutional attention
often focuses upon the details of the remuneration package, such as vesting conditions for bonuses, the
structure of equity incentive schemes, cost of severance or independence and accountability in the pay
setting process.
14xtabond2 in STATA.
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Table 4.5: Shareholder Voting on EPS Growth
OLS Random Effects Fixed Effects
Shareholder Voting
V otes Cast(t−1) -0.072 -0.023 0.061
(-0.74) (-0.21) (0.35)
V otes Cast(t−2) -0.036 -0.030 -0.046
(-0.32) (-0.27) (-0.25)
Dissent(t−1) -0.480 -0.455 -0.263
(-0.94) (-0.79) (-0.39)
Dissent(t−2) -0.332 -0.319 0.080
(-0.43) (-0.40 (0.07)
CH&CEO 0.030 -0.019 0.048 -0.018 0.021 -0.006
(0.35) (-0.20) (0.58) (-0.19) (0.25) (-0.06)
Board Size -0.006 -0.010 -0.004 -0.010 -0.003 -0.003
(-0.92) (-1.63) (-0.51) (-1.60) (-0.29) (-0.23)
% Insiders 0.020 0.112 -0.062 0.111 -0.143 0.093
(0.18) (1.02) (-0.51) (1.00) (-0.88) (0.58)
Ln Sales -0.030** -0.011 -0.046*** -0.012 -0.204** -0.118*
(-2.22) (-0.80) (-2.99) (-0.85) (-2.75) (-1.90)
Blockholder 0.038 0.074* 0.056 0.076* 0.131** 0.126**
(0.86) (1.71) (1.13) (1.73) (2.00) (2.27)
CEO Holdings -0.003 0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.001 -0.004
(-0.76) (-0.01) (-0.97) (-0.06) (-0.27) (-0.92)
N 1793 1447 1793 1447 1793 1447
No. Companies 418 379 418 379 418 379
R-squared 3.40% 4.33% 4.40% 6.97% 3.23% 1.86%
T-stats robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered around company.
Year and sector dummies included.
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the remuneration package has been identified as one that has potential for larger future
pay levels. It may also reflect a greater desire to vote as the company’s profile increases
which will be correlated with both company size and remuneration levels. Lagged dissent
on the remuneration report acts in the same direction as turnout but is short of statistical
significance.
Given the distribution of dissent in our sample it is possible that the impact of shareholder
dissent on pay may not be linear. While lagged dissent is broadly positively correlated
with pay, a very large level of lagged dissent may reduce pay. However, repeating the
above regression with dummy levels of dissent at 10% and 20% did not find a significant
impact in any of the measures of remuneration.
4.4.2 Shareholder voting on CEO turnover
By applying the techniques of duration analysis, chapter 3 found some evidence of man-
agerial entrenchment and some evidence that, in the latter half of the sample conditions
for entrenchment were less favourable. It is possible that it was the increasing levels of
shareholder activism that served to reduce managerial entrenchment.
Using the poll results from the proposal to (re)elect the CEO we examine whether prior
dissent influences the likelihood of CEO exit. Table 4.7, however finds no evidence that
shareholder voting increases the likelihood of CEO exit in the following year.
The experiments performed in chapter 3 suggested that splitting the mode of exit into
competing events was statistically sensible. We would expect shareholder activism to
impact the hazard of forced exit more than the other modes of exit. We repeat this here.
However, splitting the exit likelihood into competing risks, does not produce a significant
voting effect on the hazard of forced departure as shown in table 4.8. As in chapter 3, our
insider variables suggest a significant reduction in the hazard of forced departure when
friendly directors are appointed to the board.
It is possible that shareholders do not choose voting as the mechanism by which they
exercise their power to dismiss the CEO. UK shareholders certainly face less obstacles to
firing the CEO than encountered by investors in most other territories (Monks and Minow,
2004). Shareholders can fire the CEO by requisitioning a company meeting and passing
a motion to dismiss the CEO. However, this is a rare event. Indeed, the only instance
of shareholders dismissing the CEO by voting in our sample was at Eurotunnel in an
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Table 4.6: Shareholder Voting on Remuneration
ln(Salary) ln(Emoluments) ln(Total Pay)
Shareholder Voting
Turnoutt−1 1.109*** 2.340*** 0.611**
(2.98) (3.69) (2.35)
Turnoutt−2 1.576*** 1.625*** 1.374**
(5.36) (4.08) (2.40)
Dissentt−1 1.120 -0.893 -1.869
(0.62) (-0.50) (-1.16)
Dissentt−2 1.021 3.501* 2.419
(0.65) (1.66) (0.61)
Payt−1 0.407 0.233 0.319 0.288 0.490 0.426
(1.57) (2.00) (3.14) (1.67) (2.66) (2.16)
BoardSize 0.000 -0.014 0.009 0.011 0.003 0.013
(-0.04) (-0.78) (0.49) (0.48) (0.22) (0.64)
LnSales 0.331 0.433 0.376 0.391 0.325 0.319
(2.04) (5.57) (5.26) (2.87) (2.61) (3.54)
TSR 0.082 0.141 0.250 0.515 0.210 0.147
(0.98) (1.11) (2.34) (2.12) (2.32) (0.53)
1999 0.110 0.183 0.282
(1.04) (0.62) (0.79)
2000 0.351 0.235 0.553 0.112 0.323 0.095
(1.83) (1.32) (1.54) (0.52) (0.87) (0.32)
2001 0.138 0.372 0.494 0.518 0.322 0.223
(0.39) (1.46) (1.27) (0.72) (1.62) (0.34)
2002 0.114 0.444 0.072 0.513 0.063 0.395
(1.23) (1.42) (0.52) (0.62) (0.61) (0.43)
2003 0.085 0.082 0.240 0.388 0.217 0.253
(1.17) (0.46) (2.67) (0.79) (2.78) (0.47)
2004 0.061 0.021 0.185 0.097 0.149 0.068
(0.94) (0.19) (2.01) (0.25) (2.04) (0.22)
N 695 376 685 372 697 377
No. CEOs 330 263 327 260 331 264
No. Instruments 35 31 35 31 35 31
H0: Overidentifying Restrictions are Valid
χ219 31.12 14.05 26.03 13.88 31.44 14.11
Prob > χ2 0.120 0.828 0.299 0.837 0.112 0.825
H0: No Second Order Autocorrelation
Z Stat 0.44 1.14 1.65 0.81 -0.84 -1.21
Prob > Z 0.657 0.255 0.098 0.421 0.399 0.227
Two-step system GMM with Windmeijer Corrected Standard Errors
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Table 4.7: Voting on CEO Election on Any Exit
Shareholder Voting
Dissentt−1 1.876 (0.47)
> 10% Dissentt−1 0.874 (−0.62)
Total Shareholder Return
Lower Quartile - Median 0.757*** (−2.81) 0.759*** (−2.78)
Lower Quartile - Upper Quartile 0.750*** (−3.01) 0.756*** (−2.94)
Upper Quartile 0.616*** (−4.65) 0.618*** (−4.61)
Ln Sales 1.052** (2.10) 1.053** (2.13)
Age 1.002** (2.14) 1.002** (2.10)
Board Size 0.992 (−0.52) 0.993 (−0.50)
% Insiders 0.394*** (−3.52) 0.396*** (−3.50)
% of CEO appointments 0.354*** (−5.84) 0.354*** (−5.85)
Ave tenure of NEDs 0.941*** (−3.44) 0.942*** (−3.39)
N 3366
No. CEOs 871
No. Failures 607
Semi-parametric (Cox (1972) Proportional Hazards Model).
Hazard ratio’s reported
Extraordinary General Meeting15. Resolutions to remove the CEO were also proposed at
British Land (2003) and Skypharma (2006) but the motions were not carried. The largest
dissent recorded against the CEO in an Annual General Meeting was 34% at Hewden
Stewart plc in June 2000 but even this was due to a technicality16.
Therefore, to account for the 134 instances of forced CEO exit in our sample, it must be
that shareholders exercise their power to oust the CEO through non-voting means, such
as informal engagements with the chairman and non-executive directors. As we can not
observe these engagements directly, we will consider the impact of shareholder activism
by the market’s reaction to the dismissal of the CEO.
4.5 Market Reaction to CEO Dismissals
In chapter 3 it was argued that the ability of shareholders to dismiss the CEO is a fun-
damental control right retained by shareholders of public limited companies to prevent
the CEO deviating from optimising shareholder value. It was found that that poorly per-
15See Guardian ‘Rebels sack Eurotunnel board’ 8 April 2004;
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2004/apr/08/politics.transportintheuk.
16The large dissent was a result of the CEO resigning from the company very close to the meeting
date. It was too late for the company to withdraw his name from the poll card so the board recommended
shareholders to vote against his re-election.
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Table 4.8: Voting on CEO Elections Competing Risks
Forced Departure Retirements Other
Shareholder Voting
Dissent(t− 1) 0.133 9.822 0.164
(-0.51) (0.48) (-0.34)
> 10% Dissent(t− 1) 0.651 1.872 0.796
(-0.60) (0.73) (-0.25)
Total Shareholder Return
Lower Quartile - Median 0.410*** 0.410*** 2.201** 2.202** 2.034** 2.033**
(-3.62) (-3.61) (2.62) (2.63) (2.35) (2.35)
Lower Quartile - Upper Quartile 0.357*** 0.358*** 1.796* 1.789* 2.020** 2.021**
(-4.12) (-4.12) (1.82) (1.81) (2.24) (2.24)
Upper Quartile 0.202*** 0.202*** 3.160*** 3.157** 2.311** 2.315**
(-5.04) (-5.04) (3.08) (3.08) (2.22) (2.23)
Ln Sales 1.137*** 1.136*** 0.956 0.958 0.942 0.941
(3.00) (2.97) (-1.09) (-1.05) (-1.43) (-1.46)
Age 1.000 1.000 1.007** 1.007*** 0.999 0.999
(-0.07) (-0.08) (2.53) (2.55) (-0.47) (-0.47)
Board Size 0.951 0.951 0.949 0.949 0.985 0.985
(-1.16) (-1.14) (-0.96) (-0.97) (-0.27) (-0.28)
% Insiders 0.173** 0.173** 2.461 2.466 2.286 2.267
(-2.43) (-2.43) (1.05) (1.05) (0.94) (0.93)
% of CEO appointments 0.182*** 0.182*** 2.155* 2.146* 1.029 1.026
(-4.56) (-4.55) (1.61) (1.60) (0.06) (0.06)
Ave tenure of NEDs 0.800*** 0.800*** 1.165** 1.164** 1.156** 1.156**
(-3.66) (-3.66) (2.28) (2.28) (2.10) (2.11)
N † 10100
No. CEOs 2613
No. Failures 607
Semi-parametric (Cox (1972) Proportional Hazards Model).
Hazard ratio’s reported
† Post duplication for competing risks as in Lunn and McNeil (1995).
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forming UK CEOs are more likely to lose their jobs, particularly in the early years of
their tenure. This result was consistent with the wider literature on managerial turnover
(Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Dalton and Kesner, 1985; Friedman and Singh, 1989; Par-
rino, 1997; Audas, Dobson, and Goddard, 1999; Brickley, 2003). Shareholders who fire
their CEO presumably attribute the underperformance of the Company, at least in part, to
the CEO and believe that the successor will do a better job.
Shareholders can engage with board members and propose the CEO’s removal at a board
meeting. If successful, this action will then be immediately announced to the stock mar-
ket. However an announcement of a formal dismissal is also rare. In chapter 3 it was
shown that only 10 instances of formal dismissals were recorded. Rather, the announce-
ment is more likely to declare that the CEO ‘resigned’ even though he was actually forced
out under pressure from shareholders (see chapter 3.3 for a detailed discussion).
4.5.1 Literature Review
Competing theories have been advanced each seeking to explain why poor performance
leads to managerial turnover. Under the ‘scapegoat hypothesis’ (Khanna and Poulsen,
1995; Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino, 2004) poor performance is thought only to be an
inevitable statistical property of a random distribution. CEOs dislike effort so must be
threatened with dismissal, but in equilibrium, all managers will supply the same effort
(Holmstrom, 1979). As managerial competence does not vary between individuals under
the scapegoat hypothesis, only the unlucky CEOs will be dismissed. The incoming CEOs
are not more competent than the prior CEOs but subsequent performance is likely to be
better than the unusually poor prior performance. Performance over the long term will
tend towards the mean (Kim, 1996).
In contrast, the ‘improved management hypothesis’ (or performance revelation hypoth-
esis, see chapter 3) argues CEO talent does vary between individuals but is not directly
observable. Firm performance reveals CEO competence with increasing certainty over
time. Consequently, poor CEOs are replaced and improved returns should follow, above
those that would occur just from mean reversion. However, certain factors may compli-
cate the dismissals process. First, it may not be easy to identify poor firm performance. If
the conditions are favourable, bad CEOs may escape dismissal by delivering acceptable
returns in absolute terms, even if they under-perform their benchmarks. Second, as found
in chapter 3, CEOs may capture the monitoring process by influencing board nominations.
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Family and friends of the CEO are, perhaps, less rigourous in their duties than indepen-
dent directors. Finally, the power of the CEO relative to the institutional shareholders may
be important in determining the success of attempts to oust the CEO. If the CEO controls
a large proportion of the company’s equity then institutions may struggle to raise enough
opposition to remove the CEO.
In seeking to examine these theories, several prior studies have analysed the market’s
reaction to the announcement of a CEO departure. A summary of these are provided in
table 4.9. The majority of studies use a market model of prediction errors (PE)17. Using
Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988)’s notation, prediction errors are calculated as:
PEit = Rit − (αˆi + βˆiRmt) (4.5.1)
where Rit is the stock return of firm i at time t; Rmt is the market’s return at time t; and αˆi
and βˆi are estimates of market model parameters. These are then averaged over a sample
of N firms to calculate the mean daily abnormal return as follows:
PEt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
PEit (4.5.2)
While some evidence from the US suggests that the market reacts favourable to a CEO
turnover announcement (Bonnier and Bruner, 1989), the literature relating to the UK has
found that the market initially reacts negatively to the announcement of a CEO dismissal
(Dedman and Lin, 2002; Hillier, Marshall, McColgan, and Werema, 2006). While the
actual dismissal of the CEO might be viewed favourably by the market, it is difficult to
decontaminate the information pertaining to the CEO’s dismissal from the other informa-
tion that is implied about the company’s earnings or future prospects in the announcement
to the stock market (Beatty and Zajac, 1987). However, when measurement is conducted
over a longer time horizon, operational performance and shareholder returns have been
shown to improve both in UK and US firms (Reinganum, 1985; Friedman and Singh,
1989; Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino, 2004; Hillier, Marshall, McColgan, and Werema,
2006). Our results are consistent with these findings.
After using a control group to adjust for mean reversion, Huson, Parrino, and Starks
(2001) and Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2004) find the companies experiencing a suc-
17Finance scholars have proposed other methods of calculating abnormal returns which include attempts
to control for company size and growth opportunities (Fama and French, 1993).
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Table 4.9: Market Reaction to CEO Turnover
Study Sample Method Finding
Reinganum 218 paired Market model Positive reaction for
(1985) changes of prediction errors external appointments
1978-1979 t-1 to t+1 in small firms
Beaty & 420 US CEO Market model Market reacts negatively
Zajac changes of prediction errors to CEO
(1987) 1979-1980 t-10 to t+10 turnover
Warner, Watts 269 NYSE and Market model of Small positive reaction
Wruck AMEX companies prediction errors to CEO turnover.
(1988) 1962-1978 t-60 to t+30
Weisbach 387 NYSE Market model of Positive abnormal returns to
(1988) companies prediction errors turnover announcement
1974-1983 t-120 to t-60
Lubatkin, Chung, 477 Large Three Step excess Positive
Rogers & Owers US companies returns Long term reaction to outsiders
(1989) 1971-1985 t-50 to t+50 in financially healthy firms
Friedman 187 Fortune 500 Market model of Market reacts positively
& Singh companies prediction errors. when prior performance was
(1989) t-2 to t+2 poor
Bonnier 87 NYSE Market model of Positive abnormal returns to
& Bruner successions prediction errors turnover announcement
(1989) t-200 to t+100 in poorly performing firms
Khanna & 128 US firms Cumulative Negative reaction on the
Poulsen filling for Abnormal Returns day of announcement
(1995) Chapter 11 t-5 to t+1
Dahya, Lonie 271 UK firms Market model of Larger positive reaction to
& Power 1987-1994 prediction errors CEOs who own above 1%
(1998) t-351 to t+352 equity
Dedman 251 FTSE CEO Log model of Negative reaction
& Lin Departures prediction errors on day of
(2002) 1990-1995 t-1 to t+1 announcement
Huson, Malatesta 1344 Forbes Fama-French Poor performance initiates forced exit.
& Parrino successions Three factor Positive reaction over 36 months from
(2004) model replacement
Hillier, Marshall, 705 UK CEO Daily returns minus Negative reaction
McColgan, & Werema, changes FTSE AllShare on day of
(2006) 1993-2000 t-1 to t+1 announcement
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cession event following under-performance achieved superior returns and operational per-
formance over the 36 months following the announcement. Moreover, Huson, Malatesta,
and Parrino (2004) find the improvement in performance was greater in the latter half of
their sample. As such these results tend to favour the improved management hypothe-
sis as an explanation for CEO turnover decisions. Khanna and Poulsen (1995) however,
favour the scapegoat hypothesis finding no positive market reaction to the announcement
of a managerial change in financially distressed firms and no significant differences in the
decisions made by a control group of managers who performed better.
Weisbach (1988) and Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2004) find that the positive reaction
to forced dismissals is stronger when the removed CEO was deemed to be entrenched,
as measured by the CEOs equity stake and proportion of board insiders. Using a sample
of UK companies Dahya, Lonie, and Power (1998) finds even small equity stakes for the
CEO are associated with a larger positive market reaction to the ousting of the CEO.
4.5.2 Data
Manifest’s sample has some advantages over previous samples used to examine these
questions. In particular, because the name and date of the CEO are declared within the
dataset it is possible to manually search news archives for information to distinguish be-
tween genuine resignations and instances when the CEO was actually forced to resign
(See chapter 3 for further details on the categorisation of exit types).
In order to capture the stock market’s reaction to a CEO exit, one needs to exactly identify
the date on which the stock market learns of the CEO exit. While Manifest records the date
on which the CEOs service contract is terminated this may, or may not, correspond to the
day when the market learns of the CEO exit. Therefore, in order to be precise as possible,
a manual search of Regulatory News Service (RNS) announcements was undertaken to
determine the day of the announcement. This was then reinforced by a search of financial
news articles to ensure as far as possible that news of the CEO’s exit was not in the public
domain prior to the official RNS announcement. It remains possible that city traders learn
of the CEO exit prior to the business press, through the (illegal) leaking of confidential
information, but this section proceeds on the assumption that the extent of this problem
is not sufficient to materially distort the share price for the majority of companies in our
sample.
Using 134 instances of forced CEO exits between years 1995-2006, figure 4.2 shows
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Figure 4.2: Market Reaction to CEO Dismissals
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the market’s reaction to the announcement of a CEO dismissal. Consistent with Hillier,
Marshall, McColgan, and Werema (2006) abnormal return is calculated as the daily return
on the stock less the daily return on the FTSE 350 index. This is equivalent to assuming
β = 1 in the market model outlined above. This simple calculation of abnormal returns is
sufficient for our purposes18.
One other technical issue is determining relevant the length of time before and after the
announcement date with which to compare the return of the announcement date. Figure
4.2 shows four time periods, one week, one month, half a year and two years respectively
before and after the announcement date. Consistent with the extant literature on CEO
turnover, a CEO dismissal is associated with a strong negative initial reaction by the mar-
ket. This is also shown in table 4.10. The average abnormal return for the half year either
side of the announcement is -0.24%. The mean return on the day of the announcement is
-5.85%, 24 times lower than the mean.
To quantify this effect further, table 4.11 reports estimates of a simple regression of abnor-
mal return against the timing of an announcement of a CEO resignation. The estimating
18The assumption of β = 1 is not unreasonable. Companies implicitly make this assumption when using
incentive schemes with abnormal return vesting conditions.
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Table 4.10: Daily Abnormal Return: One Week
Time Mean Abnormal Time Mean Abnormal
Return (%) Return (%)
t-7 -1.00 t+1 -0.66
t-6 -0.48 t+2 0.19
t-5 0.01 t+3 0.62
t-4 0.23 t+4 0.83
t-3 -2.56 t+5 0.28
t-2 -0.17 t+6 0.45
t-1 -3.42 t+7 -0.41
t-0 -5.85
t-182, t+182 -.0024
T 365
Time is measured in calender days.
Table 4.11: Daily Abnormal Return Regression
1 2 3 4 5
Dummy Variables
Prior Week -0.598* -0.831*** -0.913*** -0.914***
(-1.98) (-4.11) (-5.49) (-6.08)
Day of Announcement -4.800*** -5.398*** -5.631*** -5.714*** -5.714***
(-4.22) (-7.18) (-10.63) (-13.03) (-14.43)
Following Week 1.243** 0.645** 0.412** 0.268 0.236
(2.18) (2.14) (2.04) (1.61) (1.57)
Following Two Years 0.062**
(2.67)
Following Four Years 0.093***
(5.17)
Constant -1.057** -0.459*** -0.226*** -0.143*** -0.143***
(-2.63) (-4.19) (-7.98) (-8.77) (-9.69)
T 15 61 365 1457 2191
R-squared 70.71% 52.00% 27.09% 12.71% 11.54%
Daily abnormal return measured as a percentage.
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equation is as follows:
γt = α + β Xt + µt (4.5.3)
where γt is the mean daily abnormal return from the 134 companies and Xt represents a
vector of time dummies.
Consistent with the existing UK literature, the week prior to the announcement and the
day of an announcement yield below average returns for shareholders. The literature
interprets this as capturing the uncertainty and negative information pertaining to future
earnings that occur simultaneously with the ousting of the CEO, rather than a negative
reaction to the ousting of the CEO. However, shareholders experience higher returns in
the week following the announcement. The short term pain of lower returns on the day of
the announcement is very quickly balanced by the gains in the following week.
Table 4.11 also shows the longer term reaction to a CEO change. Shareholders experience
marginally superior returns in the two years following the announcement date compared
with the two years prior to the announcement, after controlling for the poor results of the
announcement day, week prior to announcement and the week following the announce-
ment. This is interesting as if markets are efficient, the expectation of daily abnormal
returns after the announcement should be zero. It appears that the companies that were
previously under-performing, outperform the market after the new CEO is appointed.
For illustrative purposes, figure 4.3 plots cumulative returns of the mean abnormal daily
returns, starting with an initial value of 100. On average, the CEO is ousted after 16
months of steadily declining market adjusted returns. We compare this with a projected
value of the investment had the companies continued the trend of declining returns. To do
this, we use the mean return from the two years prior to the CEO’s dismissal (the constant
term in table 4.11, columns 4 and 5) to project the cumulative returns of the investment
going forward. We interpret this as the return shareholders would have received had they
taken no action and the companies had continued to perform as they had in the prior two
years.
Figure 4.3 shows that the decision to fire the CEO recovers the initial cost of removing
the CEO almost immediately. Unlike the decision to vote on the report and accounts,
remuneration report or re-election of the CEO, actually removing the CEO appears, on
average, to stop the declining value of the firm’s stock and generate positive returns to
shareholders.
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Figure 4.3: Returns to Firing vs Not Firing
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4.5.3 Market Reaction to Headhunted CEOs
As a robustness check, we wish to compare the market reaction to fired CEOs against
those for other exit types. Specifically, we examine the case of the headhunted CEO and
the retired CEO. CEOs are presumably headhunted after a period of good performance.
The performance associated with retired CEOs may be more ambiguous but the results of
chapter 3 would indicate that, while some CEOs may retire early as a result of underper-
formance, the majority retire voluntarily following good performance.
Like with ousted CEOs, table 4.12 indicates an initial negative reaction to the CEO being
headhunted, although this reaction is approximately 7 times less than the reaction to the
fired CEOs. The reaction also falls just short of statistical significance at the 10% level.
Figure 4.5 shows that, as expected, the companies where the CEO is headhunted outper-
form the market on average over the proceeding four years. Interestingly, figure 4.5 also
shows a decline in returns in the months prior to the CEO being poached. It is possible
that this reflects some anticipation of the CEO being headhunted. In addition, the declin-
ing returns may reflect a reduction in effort and less concern for shareholder value if the
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Figure 4.4: Market Reaction to the CEO Being Headhunted
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Figure 4.5: Headhunted vs Not Headhunted
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Table 4.12: Headhunted
1 2 3 4 5
Dummy Variables
Prior Week -.025 -.086 -.066 -.094
(-1.13) (-0.46) (-0.36) (-0.48)
Day of Announcement -.705 -.731 -.791 -.771 -.799
(-1.51) (-1.49) (-1.63) (-1.57) (-1.54)
Following Week .176 .150 .090 .071 .063
(0.76) (0.77 ) (0.49) (0.39) (0.32)
Following Two Years .038
(1.48)
Following Four Years .018
(0.97)
Constant -.089 -.063 -.003 -.022 .004
(-0.54) (-0.89) (-0.12) (-1.26) (0.37)
T 15 61 365 1457 2921
R-squared 20.21% 4.95% 0.85% 0.36% 0.13%
Daily abnormal return measured as a percentage.
CEO knows that he has a job secure at a better company19.
After the headhunted CEO has left the company, the company continues to perform well
generating positive abnormal returns for shareholders on average, broadly in line with
those that occurred under the prior administration. It would appear that a company who
loses their CEO to another company is able to replace the CEO with somebody who is
just as able to generate returns for shareholders. This is consistent with the scapegoat
hypothesis, where there is no variation in competence and talent between CEOs. Indeed,
given that the long term good performance of the company is largely unaffected by having
the CEO headhunted, figure 4.5 may suggest that the underlying business model is the
more important determinant of shareholder value than the individual CEO.
4.5.4 Market Reaction to CEOs Retirement
The four years prior to retirement generate on average positive market-adjusted returns.
This is further evidence that retirements identified during the categorisation into different
exit types are genuine retirements rather than forced early retirements. Other than the
small negative reaction on the day of the announcement, a retirement doesn’t appear to
materially affect the future returns to shareholders. As with the headhunted CEOs, the
company appears to be able to replace the retired CEO with somebody equally capable of
19For illustrative purposes, consider the poor performance of Dimitar Berbatov at Tottenham Hotspur
Football Club immediately prior to his record breaking £30.75m transfer to Manchester United.
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Figure 4.6: Market Reaction to the CEO Retiring
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Figure 4.7: Retired vs Not Retired
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Table 4.13: Retireds
1 2 3 4 5
Dummy Variables
Prior Week .068 .020 .003 -.006
(0.81) (0.27) (0.05) (-0.08)
Day of Announcement -.352 -.283 -.332* -.348* -.359*
(-1.55) (-1.33) (-1.68) (-1.66) (-1.67)
Following Week .040 .109 .061 .042 .045
(0.36) (1.28) (0.81) ( 0.53) (0.55)
Following Two Years .002
(0.25)
Following Four Years -.010
(-1.36)
Constant .024 -.044 .004 .020*** .031***
(0.31) (-1.42) (0.43) (2.67) (5.57)
T 15 61 365 1457 2921
R-squared 20.09% 6.72% 0.97% 0.22% 0.16%
Daily abnormal return measured as a percentage.
generating returns for shareholders. Moreover, the trend of returns is smoother during the
transition from a retiring CEO to their successor. This likely reflects an awareness that
the CEOs retirement date is approaching and hence the board is able to plan for a smooth
succession thereby minimising the shock of retirement.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the effect of shareholder voting on returns, earnings, executive
pay and likelihood of CEO dismissal. For the first time, poll data from shareholder votes
on proposals to approve the report and accounts, to approve the directors’ remuneration
report and to (re)elect the CEO have been examined. Voting turnout has increased from
approximately 50% to 60% over the sample period. This is consistent with the uptake
of best practice guidance (Hampel, 1998; Myners, 2001, 2004) which has encouraged in-
creased levels of shareholder participation. Voting on the remuneration report consistently
attracts the highest level of dissent from activists. Yet voting dissent appears largely in-
consequential in terms of improving returns or earnings, reducing executive remuneration
or increasing the likelihood of CEO exit.
In addition, the market’s reaction to the removal of the CEO by pressure from sharehold-
ers has been considered. Unlike the decision to vote, the removal of the CEO appears to
significantly affect the future direction of the firm. While the market initially reacts neg-
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atively to the announcement of a CEO dismissal, the 16 months of declining returns that
typically precedes a CEO’s dismissal is, on average, turned around following the CEO’s
dismissal. In the parlance of shareholder activism, ‘rocking the boat’ by ousting the CEO
appears to quickly steady the ship. However, whether or not, these gains represent an im-
provement above that expected under mean reversion is difficult to assess without creating
a control group of companies that experienced 16 months of declining abnormal returns
but did not replace the CEO. The identification of such a group would require a large
expansion of the present sample but might be worthwhile for a future project. Further
research is required to determine why a newly appointed CEO appears outperform the
market in a company that was previously under-performing.
Therefore, while shareholder voting has a negligible impact on both returns and gover-
nance arrangements, substantial events, such as the dismissal of the CEO are significant.
One interpretation could be that there is far more benefit for shareholders to pursue direct
engagements with the board than casting votes at the AGM. This is perhaps not surprising
given that if voting was sufficient for shareholders to optimise returns, then there would
be little need for expensive resource-consuming direct engagements. Alternatively, it is
possible that the absence of any positive effect from voting is a result that the behind the
scenes engagements have already resolving the major issues of shareholder concern prior
to the company meeting. As such, large levels of dissent are likely to be an indication of a
fundamental breakdown in shareholder engagements, which adversely impacts on future
returns.
Given the findings here, future research might focus on understanding the extent to which
behind the scenes active shareholder engagements result in the tangible events such as
CEO change that are more easily observable. Following single case studies such as Becht,
Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2008) it would be interesting to extend such work to understand
shareholder interventions across wide sample of companies.
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Appendix
4.A Proxy Poll Voting
Table 4.14 shows the resolutions to be voted upon at a typical FTSE 350 annual general
meeting. The notice of meeting must be published at least 21 working days prior to the
meeting. The annual report and accounts, notice of meeting and other meeting related
documents are sent to every registered member of company. To count towards the poll
result, votes by proxy must be cast at least 48 hours prior to the meeting.
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Table 4.14: Tesco’s 2007 AGM
Resolution Text Proposed By Mangagement For Abstain Against
Recommendation
To adopt the report & accounts for the year ended 24 February 2007 Management For 4,866,245,456 8,722,259 11,360,233
(99.59%) (0.18%) (0.23%)
To adopt the remuneration report for the year ended 24 February 2007 Management For 4,458,755,571 112,277,918 315,436,845
(91.25%) (2.30%) (6.46%)
To declare a dividend Management For 4,885,598,517 597,592 275,902
(99.98%) (0.01%) (0.01%)
To re-elect as a director, E M Davies Management For 4,826,267,375 1,402,926 58,443,319
(98.78%) (0.03%) (1.20%)
To re-elect as a director, H Einsmann Management For 4,698,049,962 123,238,775 65,134,501
(96.14%) (2.52%) (1.33%)
To re-elect as a director, K Hydon Management For 4,857,133,391 1,063,322 28,192,076
(99.40%) (0.02%) (0.58%)
To re-elect as a director, D Potts Management For 4,760,466,612 65,416,941 60,410,641
(97.42%) (1.34%) (1.24%)
To re-elect as a director, D Reid Management For 4,797,400,863 49,523,858 39,464,751
(98.18%) (1.01%) (0.81%)
To re-elect as a director, Ms L Neville-Rolfe Management For 4,759,021,976 66,180,692 61,088,561
(97.40%) (1.35%) (1.25%)
To re-appoint as auditors, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP Management For 4,782,333,987 45,597,901 58,456,692
(97.87%) (0.93%) (1.20%)
To authorise the directors to determine the auditor’s remuneration Management For 4,802,604,283 1,941,803 81,702,338
(98.29%) (0.04%) (1.67%)
To approve a general authority to the directors to issue shares Management For 4,855,936,168 2,464,036 27,927,656
(99.38%) (0.05%) (0.57%)
To approve a general authority to the directors to dis-apply Management For 4,863,173,551 3,720,840 19,518,303
pre-emption rights on the issue of shares for cash (99.52%) (0.08%) (0.40%)
To allow the Company to make market purchases of its own shares Management For 4,882,367,704 1,207,951 2,771,393
(99.92%) (0.02%) (0.06%)
To authorise political donations by the Company Management For 4,604,255,925 86,955,469 195,086,645
(94.23%) (1.78%) (3.99%)
To authorise political donations by Tesco Stores Ltd Management For 4,604,053,313 86,888,303 195,291,777
(94.22%) (1.78%) (4.00%)
To adopt new Articles of Association Management For 4,872,280,122 10,334,596 3,644,941
(99.71%) (0.21%) (0.07%)
To adopt the Group New Business Incentive Plan 2007 Management For 4,020,637,161 76,794,337 788,704,662
(82.29%) (1.57%) (16.14%)
To adopt the US Long-term Incentive Plan 2007 Management For 4,546,767,893 153,149,500 180,901,293
(93.16%) (3.14%) (3.71%)
To amend the Performance Share Plan 2004 Management For 4,293,775,917 126,341,660 466,098,999
(87.88%) (2.59%) (9.54%)
To adopt the Executive Incentive Plan Management For 4,611,362,185 54,371,226 220,523,917
(94.37%) (1.11%) (4.51%)
To adopt the International Bonus Plan Management For 4,785,658,243 10,942,029 89,572,877
(97.94%) (0.22%) (1.83%)
To take appropriate measures to ensure workers in its supplier factories
are guaranteed decent working conditions, a living wage, job security, Shareholders Against 405,669,462 543,341,796 3,936,607,050
freedom of association and of collective bargaining including, (8.30%) (11.12%) (80.58%)
where available, the right to join a trade union of their choice.
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CHAPTER 5
Executive Remuneration and
Tournament Theory
‘Money was never a big motivation for me, except as a way to keep score. The
real excitement is playing the game.’
Donald Trump, ‘Trump: The Art of the Deal’ (1987).
5.1 Introduction
Economists and management scholars have given plenty of attention to the pay of top
executives in recent years. However, the majority of empirical work has focused solely
upon the remuneration of the Chief Executive (CEO) or Highest Paid Director (HPD).
This is understandable as the CEO is the natural starting point for any examination under
an agency framework. Moreover, the level of disclosure from public companies and the
subsequent availability of data, has, in the past, forced studies to restrict their investigation
to the pay of the Chief Executive.
However, in UK law, there is no legal distinction between the directors of a public com-
pany. Although each director is employed under their own service contract, and the terms
of the CEO’s contract will differ from the other executive directors, all directors bear an
equal fiduciary duty to their shareholders. Therefore, provided sufficient data is available,
then there is no reason for remuneration studies within the principal-agent framework to
restrict their attention to the CEO. Indeed, since the widespread adoption of the Greenbury
Report (1995) recommendations, disclosure of executive directors’ remuneration from
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UK listed companies has improved markedly.
Numerous prior studies using US or UK data have examined how CEO pay varies against
a vast number of individual and firm-level characteristics. Characteristics of particular rel-
evance to this thesis have included: performance and firm size (Jensen and Murphy, 1990;
Main, Bruce, and Buck, 1996; Hall and Liebman, 1998; Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Tosi,
Werner, Katz, and Gomez-Mejia, 2000; Gregg, Jewell, and Tonks, 2005); non-executive
director independence; (Benito and Conyon, 1999; Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999;
Conyon and He, 2004; Gregory-Smith, 2007), CEO turnover (Coughlan and Schmidt,
1985; Barro and Barro, 1990; Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1995; Harris and Helfat, 1997;
Jenter and Kanaan, 2006) and shareholder activism (Karpoff, 2001; Black, 1998; Romano,
2001b).
An extension of such studies to the pay of the whole board would be interesting in its own
right. For example, Bonet and Conyon (2005) using a sample of 504 companies listed
on the London Stock Exchange, focus on the composition of the pay setting committee
and its influence on the pay arrangements for all executive directors. Prior investiga-
tions (Conyon and Peck, 1998; Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand, and Dalton, 1998; Newman and
Mozes, 1999) have provided mixed evidence as to whether the insider presence on the
committee inflated the remuneration of the CEO. By extending the dependent variable to
the remuneration of all executive directors and controlling for the position of CEO, Bonet
and Conyon (2005) found a positive relationship between the number of insiders serving
on the remuneration committee and total executive remuneration. However, the study was
limited by the data available and as a result was unable to control for certain factors that
might be believed to be important in the determination of pay (e.g. company performance
and specific executive roles such as the Finance Director). In addition, the authors did
not have access to time series information on remuneration committee independence, pre-
cluding the use of a fixed effects estimator. Consequently, Bonet and Conyon (2005) use
a random effects estimator which assumes no selection issues in the data (directors with
particular unobserved attributes do not select companies with particular unobserved at-
tributes and vice versa). This might be problematic given that committee independence is
correlated with company size which is an important determinant of executive pay. If the
no sorting bias assumption does not hold then the reported estimates of an insider effect
would be unreliable. Indeed, the analysis that this thesis presents in chapter 2 suggests that
the relationship between pay and remuneration committee independence is very sensitive
to the econometric specification employed.
169
An examination of the whole board’s pay, offers some unique opportunities for research
which a study that examines only CEO pay cannot investigate; for example, the distri-
bution of pay within the executive management team. Commercial remuneration surveys
typically present their statistics by the position of the executive on the board (MM & K
Ltd, 2007) so that practitioners can review pay on a like-for-like basis. Bebchuk, Cre-
mers, and Peyer (2007) have begun to formalise the distribution of pay within the board,
distinguishing between the boards where the CEO is a ‘dominant player’ (receives a large
proportion of the whole board’s pay) as opposed to a ‘team player’ (pay is more evenly
distributed between board members). Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2007) find that the
pay slice given to CEOs of US public companies has been increasing over the last decade
and has a relationship with a number governance variables, including performance and
CEO turnover. Specifically, the CEO’s slice of board pay is inversely related both to
the performance of the company as measured by Tobin’s Q and the sensitivity of CEO
turnover to performance but positively related to the CEO’s entrenchment1 and lack of a
large outside shareholder (blockholder). This suggests dominant CEOs are more common
when performance is poor and the conditions for entrenchment are favourable.
Furthermore, Ryan and Wiggins (2004) examine how the remuneration of board direc-
tors varies according to CEO entrenchment and power. They find that firms who have
entrenched and powerful CEOs also have board directors who are paid less than average
and are less likely to be paid in equity. If the level of equity is a proxy for the directors’
incentives to monitor effectively, it follows that powerful and entrenched CEOs occur in
firms where the incentives to monitor the CEO from the board are weak. These findings
are also consistent with the rents capture narrative being advanced by Bebchuk and Fried
(2003, 2004).
Another avenue of research that becomes possible with data on the whole board is an ex-
amination of tournament theory. Tournament theory proposes that agents give up some
remuneration in order to participate in a promotions competition with the prospect of win-
ning the prize if victorious (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). Agents experience an incentive to
exert effort to win the prize with success or failure determined by one agent’s performance
relative to his competitors. In the context of a firm hierarchy, success at one level allows
the individual to enter the next promotion competition. At the highest level, the CEO
1Entrenchment is measured by board characteristics such as a CEO who also serves as Chairman and
external indicies which rate companies in terms of their provision for shareholder rights. These are Investor
Responsibility Research Center’s (IRRC) EIndex and the GIndex as used by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick
(2003).
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will command a prize that reflects their ultimate victory; being in excess of their marginal
product but still economically efficient (Main, O’Reilly, and Wade, 1993). The argument
of efficiency is made on the grounds that the tournament is self-financing; the prospect
of winning the inflated ultimate prize induces players to accept pay less than their own
marginal product (Rosen, 1986). As such, tournament theory provides a conceptually
simple justification for the very large pay of the CEOs relative to their subordinates2.
However, a tournament reward structure may not always be economically efficient. Mil-
grom and Roberts (1988) and Lazear (1989) suggest that as only relative and not absolute
performance determines success in a tournament, workers could engage in ‘influence ac-
tivities’ or ‘destructive strategies’ to win promotion competitions. This could extend as
far as active sabotage against competing players (Dye, 1984). Drago and Garvey (1998)
find evidence that when large benefits from promotion are present, workers were less
likely to co-operate with each other, share equipment or tools. Further, Dye (1984) and
Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) argue that promotion competitions could invoke the
Peter Principle; i.e. promotion competitions may not be efficient if the new role requires
different skills to that which determined the winner of the preceding competition. Conse-
quently, firms may prefer a more compressed reward structure, with more workers earning
closer to their marginal products at each level of the hierarchy.
Clearly then, there is a role for empirical research to determine the extent to which firms
operate tournaments. Lazear and Rosen’s (1981) model generates four propositions which
have been subject to empirical examination (see table 5.1). First, a larger difference be-
tween winning pay and losing pay leads to larger effort; second the prize should be in-
creasing in the number of participants, since an increase in the number of players leads to
a fall in the probability of winning and hence a fall in the expected return to a marginal
increase in effort. Third, remuneration is increasing in organisational level. A firm hi-
erarchy should exhibit exponential growth in remuneration from one level to the next as
entering the ‘advancement opportunities’ of the next promotion competition is less valu-
able than lower down in the organisation. At the highest level, the difference between
winning and losing must compensate for the fact that there are no further advancement
opportunities. Finally, where performance is luckier, or less controlled by the agent, the
prize needs to be increased to induce the same level of effort.
Tournament theory has often been subject to empirical examination in sporting contexts
such as golf, bowling and tennis tournaments (Ehrenberg and Bognanno, 1990; Abrevaya,
2The ratio of CEO pay to average pay is thought to currently be between 200:1 and 300:1 (Baker, 2008).
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Table 5.1: Tournament Theory: Propositions and Evidence
Prop- Study Finding Comment
osition
Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) Effort increasing in prize money to pro golfers.
1 Becker and Huselid (1992) Higher prizes lead to faster driving in NASCAR. Incentives matter.
Closed-form compeititons
Knoeber and Thurman (1994) Higher prizes for chicken farmers
result in fatter chickens
Main, O’Reilly, and Wade (1993) Each extra competitor increases prize by 3%.
210 US companies (1980-84).
Conyon, Peck, and Sadler (2001) Extra competitor increases total prize by 3.5%. Support for tournaments
2 100 UK companies (1997-98). but external hires cause
problems of
Eriksson (1999). Each extra competitor increases prize by 1.8%. identifying the
111 Danish companies (1992-95). number of players
Bognanno (2001) Prize increasing in players
600 US firms (1981-1988)
Lambert, Larcker, and Weigelt (1993) Convex relationship found together with
‘extraordinarily’ large difference between CEO
and next position 303 US companies (1982-84).
Main, O’Reilly, and Wade (1993) Increasing ratio of pay at the highest levels.
Eriksson (1999) Hierarchical pay differentials generally consistent Consistent with
3 with tournament theory predictions, tournament theory and
except no exponential hike for top position. employee sorting.
Conyon, Peck, and Sadler (2001) Broad support for convex relationship.
Conyon and Sadler (2001) Pay-performance sensitivity is convexly increasing
with job level. 100 UK Companies (1997).
Bognanno (2001) Support for convex relationship
Convexity reduced if long pre-promotion tenure
Eriksson (1999) Riskier environment leads to modestly Consistent with tournament
4 greater prizes. theory and risk aversion.
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2002; Sunde, 2003). This is due, at least in part, to a lack of sufficient data on ‘players’
in corporations. Evidence broadly consistent with tournament theory has been presented.
Effort was seen to increase with the value of the prize, particularly when the field of
players were of a similar calibre (see table 5.1). However, two caveats to these findings
should be highlighted. The first, as noted by Prendergast (1999), is that a prize-effort
correlation is evidence that incentives matter but not that reward structures have been
designed to elicit the responses predicted by tournament theory. Secondly, these settings
constitute a closed-form competition in which only players in the tournament can win the
prize. In contrast, employees in corporations are free to move between companies and as
such the prize of being CEO can be won by an individual who was not internal to the firm.
Indeed, 43% of CEOs hired in our sample were not on the company’s board prior to their
appointment.
Moreover, Rees (1992) considers the time-frame over which the game is played. This may
be important as, unlike a sports tournament, the rules at each level may change over the
course of an employee’s career. Again, this might be a particular concern for our sample
as a number of reforms in corporate governance and remuneration guidelines occurred.
Rees (1992) also notes that the success of an manager in an organisation is also dependent
on the effort of his subordinates, whereas the success in a golf tournament depends only
of the performance of the player (and perhaps his caddie).
A few studies have data on individuals at different hierarchical levels within corpora-
tions. Of particular note in table 5.1 are the studies by Main, O’Reilly, and Wade (1993);
Eriksson (1999) and Bognanno (2001). The strategy employed by these studies is to test
several of the tournament theory propositions and in general they are supportive of the
theory. Although each of the propositions in table 5.1 has an alternative non-tournament
explanation3, support for a combination of the tournament propositions outlined above
would be difficult to explain with a single alternative theory.
Main, O’Reilly, and Wade (1993), using panel data on US firms, found that the ratio of
pay from one hierarchial level to the next increased in organisational level as envisaged
by tournament theory. Consistent with this result, aggregated data on UK companies
provided by Hay Group Inc, in figure 5.1, shows remuneration increasing exponentially
through the job level. The levels are determined by Hay Group’s job evaluations which
consider the job’s size, complexity and importance, prior to any assessment of individual
3For instance, Rosen (1986) advances a marginal productivity justification for the convexity of remuner-
ation through job grades, on the reasonable assumption that the employee’s impact on value is exponentially
greater at higher hierarchical levels.
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Figure 5.1: Convexity of Remuneration Through Job Grades
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performance. The reference levels have been used in discrimination court cases to deter-
mine equal pay for equal worth4. A CEO of a large international organisation will have
a reference level towards the top end of the scale. A CEO of a smaller organisation and
a senior executive of a larger organisation could have the same reference level. A lower
level executive of a smaller company will be towards the beginning of the scale. Within a
firm, a typical promotion is considered to be approximately 2 reference levels.
Main, O’Reilly, and Wade (1993) also found that the CEO prize is increasing in the num-
ber of vice presidents below the CEO. Here the prize is measured as the net present value
of the pay differential over the whole of the expected CEO tenure. If one accepts that the
number of vice presidents is a reasonable estimate of the number of players in the com-
petition, this result is also consistent with the idea that the tournament is self-financing;
i.e. as the chances of winning decrease, as estimated by the number of players, the prize
should increase.
Eriksson (1999) finds broad support for the operation of tournaments using a panel of
Danish firms, most of which are privately owned. Similarly to Main, O’Reilly, and Wade
(1993) he finds a convexity of the reward structure through job grades and the prize in-
4See http://www.haygroup.com/ww/services/index.aspx?ID=1529 for further details.
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creasing in the number of players. In addition, he finds that prizes are higher in riskier
environments, also consistent with tournament theory. Neither Eriksson (1999) nor Main,
O’Reilly, and Wade (1993) consider the possibility that external hires might upset the
operation of internal tournaments.
Bognanno (2001) is, perhaps, the most comprehensive test of tournament theory to date.
Again, prizes are largely consistent with the convex structure predicted by tournaments
and prizes are seen to increase in the number of participants. Yet Bognanno (2001) also
found some anomalous evidence. For instance, the prize was not larger for promoted
executives who had been in their prior position for longer. One might this because the
number of future promotion opportunities over the remainder of the executive’s career will
be less. Therefore, in order to adjust for the declining probability of success the prize must
increase to maintain incentives. Moreover, the prize was decreasing in the square of the
number of participants, albeit only nominally, suggesting that the overall response of the
CEO prize was nearly linear in the number of participants. Nevertheless, the tournament
model, under certain conditions, would have predicted a convex relationship between the
prize and the number of participants rather than a linear one.
In addition, Bognanno (2001) considers the possibility that the winner of the tournament
can be identified from their pay earlier in the contest. Indeed, Bognanno (2001) finds
that the highest paid individual in the prior round is often the eventual winner. This is
problematic for the operation of tournaments as if the winner can be predicted, then the
incentive to compete is diminished.
Bognanno (2001) identifies the external hires in their dataset but only briefly considers
how the presence of external hires might reduce the probability of winning for the tour-
nament player. In this matter, Bognanno (2001) follows Chan (1996) who proposes that
firms give preferential treatment to insiders to adjust for the reduced probability of win-
ning if the firm hires from outside. This is preferred over the alternative of increasing the
prize for insiders. The premise of a handicap is consistent with the frequency of external
appointments in Bognanno (2001)’s data (only 17%) and the finding that new hires are
paid 5% less after controlling for their individual characteristics (experience, education
etc).
Most recently, Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaran (2007) proxy the extent of tournament style
promotion incentives to the vice presidents (VPs) of US organisations by measuring the
pay differential between the CEO and the VP and the likelihood of promotion. Kale, Reis,
and Venkateswaran (2007) also compare the significance of these tournament incentives
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against equity based performance incentives. Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaran (2007) find a
positive correlation between performance and promotion incentives which increases when
the CEO is close to retirement. The relationship is weakened when the firm has a new
CEO hired from outside the firm and when the firm belongs to a homogenous industry.
5.1.1 Compensation to Tournament Losers
As tournaments are thought to be self-financing, executive directors should accept pay
less than marginal product for the chance of winning the CEO prize. Therefore, following
a rival’s promotion to CEO, the existing executive directors might expect compensation
to the level of their marginal product if it is understood they are either too old or unsuited
to participate in the next succession competition.
However, there may be practical difficulties in compensating losing directors. It may
simply be socially unacceptable to increase a director’s remuneration just because a rival
has been promoted. If losing directors, for whatever reason, are not compensated they
will experience a strong financial incentive leave the company and earn their marginal
product elsewhere or join a new competition in another company. Furthermore, it might
also be expected that the loser compensation/exit effect will be stronger for older directors
as such directors are less likely to be around for the next CEO succession competition.
The need to compensate directors for the loss in promotion incentives may be counter-
balanced by a reduction in external employment opportunities for losing directors. Given
that a CEO succession is a public event, the market may reassess the director’s quality in
light of the fact that a company has invested a significant amount of resources in holding
a succession competition and concluded that somebody else is better suited to the posi-
tion of CEO. Therefore, the very act of being passed over may reveal previously hidden
adverse information to the market regarding the competence or suitability of the director
for the position of CEO. If this hypothesis holds true, then losing directors who are not
compensated would not face a strong financial incentive to leave. Indeed, if the reduction
in external employment opportunities is sufficiently severe, the losing directors may even
be less inclined to seek employment elsewhere as it is well known that companies do not
cut director’s salaries except in truly exceptional circumstances5. Thus, by remaining in
their current position the director may, in fact, be receiving more than their market wage.
5Directors of failing companies have been known to on occasions to offered to ‘share the pain’ with
investors by refusing bonuses or freezing salary.
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Again, it is reasonable to assume that this effect may be increasing in the director’s age as
older losing directors have less time to acquire the missing skills and/or experience which
would make them suitable for a CEO position.
The need to compensate losing directors may also be moderated if the director has made
investments of firm-specific or job-specific capital. For example, the director may have
spent time and effort developing non-transferable skills and gaining experience that is
only relevant to their current post. This capital is lost if the director seeks employment
elsewhere. This firm specific investment by the director should be reflected in their current
wage and hence even if the director loses the value of promotion incentives he may still
be best off remaining in his current role.
The idea that employees might be compensated for losing a tournament has significance
for employment contracts in which the company commits to promoting or firing the em-
ployee after a specified period (Sattinger, 1993; Gibbons and Waldman, 1999). From a
tournament theory perspective, ‘up or out’ contracts have the potential to increase em-
ployee effort as the differential in prizes is greater than under standard employment con-
tracts6. However, up or out contracts may not be appropriate in certain situations, for
instance where large investments in firm-specific human capital are required (Ghosh and
Waldman, 2006). An employee will be less willing to make firm-specific investments if
exit is a near possibility. If compensation is provided to the losers of promotion com-
petitions then the incentive to make firm-specific investments is further increased at the
expense of reducing the prize differential7. Yet reducing the prize differential may not
necessarily reduce the incentives to exert effort. A literature has started to emerge that
allows second prizes to elicit effort from competition participants (Moldovanu and Sela,
2001; Clark and Riis, 1998; Szymanski and Valletti, 2005). Indeed, Szymanski and Val-
letti (2005) show that second prizes can be effort increasing if there is a contest between
more than two players, particularly if one player is very strong relative to the others. Weak
players will not exert effort for a first prize they cannot win but they will try to win the
second prize, possibly to the point where the strong player also increases effort to counter
the pressure from the weaker contestants. It is easy to imagine such a scenario occurring
during a boardroom succession competition.
6Up or out contracts have also been proposed as tools for solving employee allocation problems in the
presence of imperfect information (Kahn and Huberman, 1988).
7A similar tradeoff exists when considering the extent to which contracts should provide for compen-
sation following termination. Institutional guidance in the UK recommends that contracts provide for no
more than 12 months’ salary and benefits (Combined Code, 2003).
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An analysis of the compensation to competition losers potentially solves problems that
arise from the incidence of external appointments in an empirical test of tournament the-
ory. As eluded to above, the possibility that the firm will award the prize of CEO to
somebody outside the company reduces the probability of an internal player winning the
tournament but to what extent is unclear. Even if one observes an internal appointment it
is difficult to know whether or not external candidates were considered for the post. The
history of the firm’s appointments could be examined for the frequency of external hires
in order to arrive at an estimated probability of external hire. However, this is less than
satisfactory as the firm’s policy could vary between appointments or change going for-
ward, perhaps inspired by a move in market conditions or governance environment both
of which changed significantly during the period under review.
Under a tournament model, one would not expect the compensation paid to the losers or
their likelihood of exit to differ when the CEO is appointed from inside or external to
the company’s current board of directors. However, a desire to capture the board may
prompt externally appointed CEOs to pay-off the incumbent directors or replace them
with their own, more friendly, directors. An internally promoted CEO is likely to already
have formed relationships with the other directors and might be less likely to replace the
incumbents or compensate them. Moreover, according to the philosophy of the institu-
tional best practice (Combined Code, 2003), a CEO with a board of independent directors
will have less control of the pay-setting and nominations process. The composition of the
board is not relevant to the tournament model but under a rents capture model the ability
of the CEO to bribe or oust the directors should be correlated with the independence of
the directors, if we believe that independence is important. Therefore, information on the
board composition and the origin of the CEO will be useful when seeking to distinguish
between competing hypothesises.
This chapter will investigate the extent to which tournament remuneration structures oc-
cur within FTSE 350 companies by examining four related propositions. First, the CEO’s
remuneration both in absolute levels and as a proportion of boardroom pay is sufficiently
greater than the other executive directors such that CEO remuneration represents a prize.
Second, executive directors who lose a CEO promotions competition and do not partici-
pate in the next competition will either i) receive compensation or ii) leave. Third, the first
proposition will be stronger for older winners and the second proposition will be stronger
for older losers as the likelihood of participating in the next competition will be correlated
with age.
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The first and second propositions are also consistent with a rents capture model, but the
third proposition is not. In addition, under a rents capture model we would expect the
first and second propositions to diminish with the proportion of independent directors
on the board. A loss of external employment opportunities that may result from being
passed over may dominate the effect of the second proposition and it is expected this
counteracting effect will be increasing with the director’s age.
Section 5.2 will provide some summary statistics relating to the distribution of executive
directors’ remuneration. Section 5.3 will test the propositions above before section 5.4
concludes.
5.2 Descriptive Statistics
Summary statistics pertaining to the remuneration of executive directors in our sample
are provided in table 5.2. Remuneration was calculated on an annualised basis with the
requirement that a director served at least three months of the financial year. Emoluments
comprise salary, benefits, bonus and any cash received through the exercise of share op-
tions or the vesting of long term equity incentives. Total remuneration comprises salary,
benefits, bonus and an estimated fair value of the grants of options and equity incentives
received during the financial year8. CEOs receive approximately 65%, 69% and 75%
more salary, emoluments and total remuneration respectively than executive directors at
the median. Mean levels are greater than the median due to the presence of a small number
of extremely large values. Moreover, the variance of emoluments and total remuneration
is much greater than salary, indicating a wide spread of values in these measures.
Consistent with other remuneration surveys (Gregg, Jewell, and Tonks, 2005) both CEO
and executive director remuneration is found to have increased significantly in real terms
over the period. At the median, executive directors receive an annual increase in total
remuneration of 8.14% after adjusting for inflation. If the director is promoted to CEO,
they receive an average increment of 28.9% in the year of their promotion. Losers of
CEO competitions receive a median increase of 8.31%, in the year of their defeat, which
is not materially above the average executive director’s increment. However, there is a
greater variation in the loser increments, reflected in the larger mean increment and larger
standard deviation. Therefore it is possible that some companies may be compensating
8To provide a workable estimate, these are approximated at one third of their face value (see chapter 2
for justification).
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Table 5.2: Summary Statistics
Median Mean Standard Growth
Deviation 1995-2005
Chief Executives
Salary 346,000 390,000 225,000 52.9%
Emoluments 555,000 884,000 1,383,000 131.0%
Total Remuneration 615,000 918,000 1,342,000 166.1%
Total Remuneration Relative Pay Slice 1.37 1.41 .381 7.13%
Age 51 50 6.55 -0.06%
Annual Increment 10.9% 33.8% 410%
Increment: Year of Win 28.9% 50.2% 77.3%
Tenure (years) 6.35
Tenure of winners 3.91
Executive Directors
Salary 210,000 240,000 148,000 47.2%
Emoluments 328,000 494,000 670,000 125.7%
Total Remuneration 351,000 512,000 744,000 152.0%
Total Remuneration Relative Pay Slice .856 .894 .345 -8.62%
Age 50 49 7.09 0.12%
Annual Increment 8.14% 23.4% 176%
Increment: Year of loss 8.31% 32.0% 319%
Tenure (years) 4.98
Loser tenure 5.95
TSR 10.9% 8.13% 43.3% 96.0%
Sales 2.00m 411m 3,070m 79.4%
Pre-tax profits 50.9m 275m 1,160m 8.48%
N (director years) 22,600
No. Directors
Combined Chair&CEO 94
CEOs 974
Chairman 307
Finance Directors 1,066
Executive Directors 3,092
Players 2,382
Winners 234
External CEO Hires 834
1. May 2006 prices.
2. TSR growth represents accumulated return at the mean.
3. Tenure is the median survival times by position. Therefore, for promoted CEOs, time at the same
company prior to their promotion to CEO is not included. However, loser tenure includes the time as an
executive director prior to the succession defeat.
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the losers of CEO competitions. Of course, annual increments will depend on several
factors such as performance and market conditions. Therefore, section 5.3 will test the
compensation hypothesis more formally.
In terms of tenure, CEO’s who are promoted from within the company have shorter me-
dian survival times than externally hired CEOs9. This reflects the incidence of interim
appointments whereby an existing director assumes the role of CEO on a temporary basis
following the sudden departure of the prior CEO. In addition, contracts for external hires
typically contain a greater emphasis on lock-in provisions such as long term equity incen-
tives and retention bonuses on appointment. Internal CEOs will already have part-fulfilled
the vesting conditions on their incentives and, if on a defined benefit pension scheme, will
have built up more years of service so reducing the cost of retirement. Moreover, the
Company is more likely to hire a specialist from outside the existing board when a ma-
jor change in strategic direction is required. Such specialists enjoy a honeymoon period
during which dismissal is very unlikely because all parties understand that it takes time
before the merits of the CEO’s new strategy can be assessed.
Directors’ who experience a CEO succession defeat during their tenure have a longer
average tenure than those who do not. At face value, this is the opposite of what is
expected under the up or out model. However, the possibility remains that some CEOs
leave quickly after defeat because those with longer tenures are more likely to experience a
succession competition in the first instance. Therefore the exit hypothesis will be tested by
adopting a duration analysis framework and examining the impact of a rival’s succession
upon the directors’ hazard rate10.
5.2.1 Regression Estimates
Table 5.3 estimates the following remuneration equation in which there may be a firm
specific effect γi and an individual specific effect δj.
(Remuneration)ijt = γi + δj + αt + β(Position)ijt + λ(Controls)ijt + µijt (5.2.1)
Remuneration is measured as logged levels of salary, emoluments and remuneration11.
9Mean survival times cannot be reported with accuracy due to censoring.
10See chapter 3 for an explanation of duration analysis.
11Please refer to chapter 2 for further details of the measurement of the dependent variable.
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Table 5.3: Remuneration Levels
OLS Fixed Effects
Sal Emol Rem Sal Emol Rem Sal Emol Rem Sal Emol Rem
Executive Position
CH&CEO 0.4282*** 0.3857*** 0.3662*** 0.5014*** 0.4862*** 0.5452*** 0.3865*** 0.3114*** 0.4886*** 0.3866*** 0.3038*** 0.5073***
(7.72) (4.79) (4.47) (9.78) (5.91) (6.57) (5.01) (3.34) (5.96) (5.00) (2.84) (5.81)
CEO 0.4554*** 0.4704*** 0.4772*** 0.4732*** 0.4872*** 0.5179*** 0.2763*** 0.2707*** 0.3434*** 0.2766*** 0.2861*** 0.3582***
(21.97) (16.84) (16.90) (26.10) (18.80) (20.19) (14.83) (9.15) (11.80) (14.26) (9.45) (11.64)
Chair 0.2519*** 0.1684*** 0.1263** 0.2616*** 0.2160*** 0.2412*** 0.1631*** 0.0678 0.2274*** 0.2126*** 0.1632* 0.3304***
(6.03) (3.35) (2.49) (6.99) (4.26) (4.67) (3.35) (0.82) (3.01) (4.26) (1.88) (4.02)
FD -0.0196 -0.0601** -0.0412* 0.0403** 0.0001 0.0165 0.0129 0.0452 0.0752** 0.0141 0.0544 0.0770*
(-1.13) (-2.60) (-1.75) (2.74) (0.00) (0.77) (0.46) (1.03) (1.97) (0.49) (1.16) (1.89)
Age Group
50-55 0.0757*** 0.0555*** 0.0554*** -0.0137 -0.0053 0.0079
(5.88) (2.96) (2.94) (-1.43) (-0.27) (0.48)
55-60 0.0996*** 0.0494** 0.0186 -0.0448*** -0.0496* -0.0338
(5.72) (1.92) (0.73) (-3.22) (-1.68) (-1.35)
60-65 0.1113*** 0.0332 -0.0092 -0.0880*** -0.1261** -0.1531***
(3.29) (0.69) (-0.20) (-3.23) (-2.55) (-3.65)
>65 -0.0209 -0.1167 -0.1822* -0.2399*** -0.3509*** -0.3819***
(-0.28) (-1.13) (-1.95) (-4.62) (-3.76) (-4.96)
Tenure 0.0047 0.0212*** 0.0010 0.1546* 0.5509*** 0.3443***
(1.37) (4.76) (0.23) (1.76) (3.68) (3.06)
Tenure2 0.0000 -0.0005** 0.0000 -0.0004** -0.0009*** -0.0005***
(-0.32) (-2.77) (-0.08) (-2.49) (-4.30) (-3.20)
Largest Non-CEO Owner
0%-5% 0.0030 0.0033 -0.0016 0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0047*
(0.94) (0.72) (-0.37) (0.36) (-0.24) (-1.88)
5%-25% -0.0057*** -0.0064*** -0.0042** -0.0009* -0.0018 0.0009
(-4.60) (-3.43) (-2.27) (-1.74) (-1.51) (0.92)
>25% -0.0054*** -0.0065*** -0.0072*** -0.0001 0.0003 0.0010
(-4.56) (-3.77) (-4.31) (-0.18) (0.28) (0.88)
No. EDs 0.0102*** 0.0117** 0.0176*** 0.0009 -0.0177*** -0.0048
(2.98) (2.44) (3.68) (0.49) (-3.78) (-1.20)
No. NEDs 0.1035*** 0.1392*** 0.1474*** 0.0053** 0.0054 0.0047
(34.52) (31.07) (31.54) (2.42) (1.04) (1.04)
% Independent NEDs 0.1987*** 0.0939*** 0.1276*** -0.0103 0.0394 0.0164
(9.24) (2.87) (4.00) (-0.86) (1.51) (0.77)
Sales 0.0388*** 0.0365*** 0.0411*** 0.0497*** 0.0655*** 0.0664***
(19.74) (13.56) (15.07) (7.02) (4.08) (4.17)
TSR -0.0212** 0.1900*** 0.0880*** 0.0032 0.1447*** 0.0701***
(-2.69) (12.05) (6.49) (0.72) (10.32) (6.50)
N 21486 21595 21627 15671 15734 15742 21486 21595 21627 15671 15734 15742
Groups 5198 5226 5234 4067 4078 4078 5198 5226 5234 4067 4078 4078
R-Squared 17.06 15.14 17.74 44.40 34.36 38.99 48.74 29.21 32.66 51.99 30.28 35.87
1. Year dummies included.
2. Dependent Variables and Sales in logarithms.
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In chapter 2 it was shown that whilst incorporating prior period pay as an explanatory
variable was desirable in estimation of CEO pay, the model failed the diagnostic test
for the validity of the instruments when applied to the remuneration of the whole board.
Again, when estimating the equation 5.2.1, we experimented with the instrument set but
were unable to find valid instruments for prior period pay. Therefore, we proceed in this
chapter by using the most robust and valid estimation strategy available but we are unable
to control for prior period pay.
Executive Position represents four dummy variables: Chairman & CEO; CEO; Chair-
man; and Finance Director, with the base being the executive director. We control for
age, tenure, outside equity, board composition, size and performance as measured by total
shareholder return. As we will be interested in the interactions between age and other
variables in this chapter, we use a series of age group dummy variables for greater flex-
ibility. Also, following Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2007) we use a piecewise linear
specification to capture the effect of the largest non-CEO shareholder, which we might
expect to vary for different levels of equity.
If the director is the CEO, they earn around 50% more than executive directors ceteris
paribus. Looking at the fixed effects results, if a director becomes CEO they earn around
30% more than they did as an executive director. If they become a combined Chairman
and CEO they earn around 50% more in terms of total remuneration. Older directors
generally receive greater salaries than their younger counterparts up to the age of 65, but
this does not translate into greater levels of emoluments or total remuneration (holding
tenure constant). At low levels, an increase in equity for the largest owner doesn’t reduce
director remuneration. However, beyond 5% an increase in the monitor’s equity holding
significantly reduces pay. Therefore, for monitoring to impact director remuneration, it
appears that the monitor needs at least 5%. Here, monitors are defined as anybody other
than the CEO12.
The control variables for size and performance are consistent with results found in recent
surveys (Bruce and Buck, 2005; Bonet and Conyon, 2005). A 1% increase in firm size, as
measured by sales, leads to an increase in total remuneration of 4-6.5%. A 1% increase
in total shareholder return leads to an increase in total remuneration of approximately
7%-8.8%. Salary is not positively correlated with performance. In fact, the OLS results
12Unfortunately, the identify of the monitor is not recorded, only that they are not the CEO. It is likely
that different equity owners have varying impacts on governance and remuneration. An active investment
fund may, for instance, be more vigilant at monitoring directors’ remuneration than a trust fund controlled
by members of the CEO’s family.
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Figure 5.2: Pay Slice by Number of Executives on the Board
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suggest that increased salary may be a substitute for performance related remuneration.
This accords with the claim that companies switch a greater proportion of the director’s re-
muneration package to non-variable elements such as salary when performance conditions
germane to incentive schemes are less likely to be satisfied. This may reflect an exercise
of power and manipulation of the remuneration package by the directors themselves or an
optimal response by the firm to retaining executive talent. A thorough exploration of this
matter is not the focus of this chapter but is dealt in greater depth in chapter 2.
Remuneration is generally increasing in tenure, albeit the negative coefficient on tenure
squared suggests that an additional year of tenure has a declining influence on remunera-
tion as tenure increases. Our other control variables are consistent with standard results:
remuneration is increasing in company size as measured by board size and sales; the in-
dependence of the non-executive directors does not reduce pay levels as found in chapter
2.
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Table 5.4: Relative Pay Slice
OLS Fixed Effects
Sal Emol Rem Sal Emol Rem Sal Emol Rem Sal Emol Rem
Executive Position
CH&CEO 0.5085*** 0.4691*** 0.4775*** 0.4663*** 0.4197*** 0.4668*** 0.3736*** 0.3845*** 0.4117*** 0.3423*** 0.3209*** 0.4034***
(15.16) (10.70) (11.17) (14.21) (9.75) (10.88) (8.69) (5.47) (6.87) (7.77) (4.60) (6.80)
CEO 0.4883*** 0.5097*** 0.5146*** 0.4713*** 0.4844*** 0.5042*** 0.3362*** 0.3617*** 0.3521*** 0.3150*** 0.3124*** 0.3531***
(53.21) (42.85) (46.61) (50.27) (39.44) (44.27) (21.03) (14.94) (16.25) (19.59) (12.72) (15.87)
Chair 0.2893*** 0.2326*** 0.2017*** 0.2534*** 0.1908*** 0.2014*** 0.1685*** 0.1859*** 0.1529*** 0.1595*** 0.1409** 0.1848***
(12.16) (7.02) (6.01) (10.58) (5.29) (5.50) (4.41) (3.18) (2.96) (4.14) (2.38) (3.58)
FD -0.0223*** -0.0423*** -0.0328*** -0.0194*** -0.0368*** -0.0326** -0.0412** -0.0909*** -0.0263 -0.0324* -0.0733*** -0.0254
(-3.57) (-5.04) (-4.31) (-3.13) (-4.47) (-4.25) (-2.05) (-3.35) (-1.10) (-1.66) (-2.79) (-1.07)
Age Group
50-55 0.0242*** 0.0326*** 0.0261*** -0.0060 0.0124 0.0176*
(3.89) (3.70) (3.23) (-0.81) (1.04) (1.74)
55-60 0.0138 0.0217* -0.0040 -0.0275** 0.0020 0.0008
(1.58) (1.93) (-0.38) (-2.35) (0.11) (0.05)
60-65 0.0203 0.0164 -0.0250 -0.0465* -0.0262 -0.0436
(0.99) (0.68) (-1.07) (-1.86) (-0.78) (-1.57)
>65 -0.1652*** -0.1811*** -0.2243*** -0.1650*** -0.1514** -0.2074***
(-4.38) (-3.93) (-5.22) (-2.98) (-2.09) (-3.31)
Tenure 0.0069*** 0.0134*** 0.0023 0.0148*** 0.0263*** 0.0052**
(3.78) (6.02) (1.13) (7.88) (9.18) (2.12)
Tenure2 0.0000 -0.0002** 0.0001 -0.0005*** -0.0008*** -0.0004***
(-0.27) (-2.09) (0.72) (-4.64) (-5.50) (-3.61)
N 21486 21595 21627 21098 21202 21234 21486 21595 21627 21098 21202 21234
Groups 5198 5226 5234 4936 4959 4967 5198 5226 5234 4936 4959 4967
R-Squared 37.35 21.86 26.18 39.41 23.90 27.49 37.08 21.36 25.98 35.04 21.38 22.58
1. T-stats in parenthesises based on standard errors clustered around groups and robust to heteroscedasticity
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5.2.2 Pay Slice
Following Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2007), this section presents data on the distri-
bution of pay within the boardroom13. The pay slice of the each director relative to his
colleagues is of interest in order to distinguish between movement in pay arising from
changes to the budget for the whole board’s remuneration from movement in individual
pay arrangements. The pay slice is also of interest when considering the proportion of
boardroom pay allocated to the CEO. High allocations of boardroom pay to the CEO
could reflect the large contributions to productivity attributed to the CEO (the so-called
‘star CEOs’) or it may reflect dominance and an extraction of rents by the CEO. Al-
ternatively, a high CEO pay slice might represent the prize for winning the promotions
tournament.
Figure 5.2 shows the proportion of boardroom pay the CEO receives decreases exponen-
tially with the number of executive directors on the board. Therefore, in order to present
information that is comparable across boards of different sizes, the pay slice relative to
board size will be used going forward14.
Figure 5.3 shows the movement in relative pay slices of CEOs and executive directors over
the duration of the sample. The proportion of boardroom pay the CEO receives relative
to the other executive directors is mostly stable with a slight increase at the beginning and
ends of the sample period. The more demanding disclosure requirements and increased
scrutiny from institutional investors of CEO pay has not compressed the pay distribution
in the boardroom. If anything, consistent with the US market (Bebchuk, Cremers, and
Peyer, 2007), the CEO’s slice has increased. This is difficult to reconcile with a rents
capture narrative unless one accepts that the reforming efforts of UK regulators have had,
at best, no affect on CEO dominance and could even have served to enhance it. In terms
of tournament theory, the movement in pay slice could be interpreted as a small increase
in the prize differential.
Figure 5.4 and table 5.4 present the relative pay slice by role. Across all measures of
remuneration, CEO’s receive a substantially greater proportion of boardroom pay than
executive directors. The combined Chairman and CEO role does not command a greater
pay slice than just the single CEO role although executive chairmen do receive less, prob-
ably reflecting the presence of another lead executive on the board. Finance Directors
13Excluding non-executive director fees.
14i.e. For each executive director on the board, the pay slice is divided by the number of serving directors.
A relative pay slice of 1 would be recorded for all directors if all members of the board were paid the same.
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Figure 5.3: Relative Pay Slice by Year
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Figure 5.4: Relative Pay Slice by Position
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Figure 5.5: CEO Relative Pay Slice by Sector
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sector
receive a marginally smaller slice, on average, than other executive directors. This may
be a reflection of the small number of times where the Finance Director is the only other
executive director besides the CEO, whereas if there is an executive director it is more
than likely that there will be a Finance Director as well. The variables for age group and
tenure follow the same trend when explaining the pay slice that they do when explaining
remuneration levels as in table 5.3.
There is not a large amount of variance in the proportion of boardroom pay the CEO com-
mands between sectors. Aside from Health, Investment Companies and Forestry sectors,
the median relative CEO pay slice is in the range 1.3-1.5. This is shown in figure 5.5 and
table 5.5.
Table 5.6 shows the positions held by the winners of the CEO succession competition
in our sample, prior to their promotion. A higher proportion of chairmen succeed in
becoming chief executives compared to finance directors or executive directors.
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Table 5.5: Sector Definitions for Figure 5.5
Sector Definition Relative CEO Sector Definition Relative CEO
Total Rem Slice Total Rem Slice
1 Health 1.23 19 Banks 1.42
2 Investment Companies 1.27 20 Speciality & Other Finance 1.42
3 Software & Computer Services 1.31 21 Mining 1.43
4 Electronic & Electrical Equipment 1.31 22 Engineering & Machinery 1.44
5 Steel & Other Metals 1.32 23 Telecommunication Services 1.44
6 Transport 1.32 24 General Retailers 1.44
7 Insurance 1.34 25 Tobacco 1.44
8 Utilities - Other 1.35 26 Leisure & Hotels 1.45
9 Support Services 1.36 27 Oil & Gas 1.46
10 Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 1.37 28 Electricity 1.46
11 Real Estate 1.37 29 Food Producers & Processors 1.46
12 Information Technology Hardware 1.39 30 Aerospace & Defence 1.47
13 Chemicals 1.40 31 Beverages 1.48
14 Food & Drug Retailers 1.41 32 Household Goods & Textiles 1.49
15 Personal Care & Household Products 1.41 33 Media & Entertainment 1.50
16 Construction & Building Materials 1.41 34 Automobiles & Parts 1.54
17 Unclassified 1.41 35 Forestry & Paper 1.74
18 Life Assurance 1.41
Table 5.6: Positions Leading to CEO
Chairman Finance Director Executive Director Total
Players 163 660 1,559 2,382
Winners 23 44 167 234
Success Rate 14.10% 6.66% 10.71% 9.82%
Players are defined as directors who experience a succession event at some point during their tenure.
5.3 Executive Remuneration Analysis
Descriptive statistics have been presented on both executive directors’ pay levels and di-
rectors’ relative pay slices. The following section will examine the determinants of salary,
emoluments and remuneration. Firstly, an examination of the remuneration to players of
CEO succession competitions will be undertaken. This will be assessed in terms of logged
compensation levels and relative pay slices. Secondly, the remuneration of all directors
will be analysed, again using both logged levels and relative pay slices but splitting the
sample between CEOs (both external hires and internal winners) and executive directors
(players, losers and those directors who did not compete).
5.3.1 Compensation for Tournament Players
Table 5.7 seeks to explain the logged levels of salary, emoluments and total remuneration
of players of CEO promotion tournaments. A director is considered a player if a CEO
succession occurred during their tenure, whether or not the successful candidate was an
external hire or an internal promotion. Consistent with proposition one, upon winning
a competition, the player is paid a significantly greater amount across all measures of
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compensation. Table 5.8 also shows that the pay slice to winners is significantly greater
than the pay slice of players and losers. However, it is difficult to distinguish between
the extent to which this increase reflects a prize for winning a promotion’s tournament
and the increase that arises from the new position’s greater responsibility, status, and
presumably higher marginal impact on firm productivity. Therefore, to test the theory of
tournaments, the impact to an executive director’s remuneration package when somebody
else is appointed to the position of CEO will be examined. A model with the following
form is used to test this loser compensation hypothesis:
Remunerationijt = β(Loser)ijt + γ(Controlsijt) + µijt (5.3.1)
where individual j is a board member in firm i. Loser is a dummy variable that equals one
if the individual j has been passed over for promotion in firm i. We estimate the dependent
variable in logs so that a unit change in our regressors corresponds to a percentage change
in remuneration. We consider the possibility that unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity
between groups might be correlated with our regressors by estimating equation 5.3.1 using
a fixed effect methodology.
Table 5.7 provides mixed evidence of the loser compensation hypothesis. The estimated
coefficients using Ordinary Least Squares suggest that losers earn more than other players,
particularly in terms of salary (7.5%). However, after controlling for both individual
and firm fixed effects along with other control variables15, the impact of losing a CEO
succession competition is insignificant in terms of salary and even negative in terms of
emoluments and total remuneration. Further, the proportion of boardroom pay allocated
to players does not appear to increase when a rival is promoted to the position of CEO.
Indeed, players receive a smaller slice of boardroom pay upon losing a CEO succession
competition in terms of total remuneration. This may, in part, reflect the increase in
total board pay that arises during a succession year owing to the fact that two individuals
in that year command CEO level compensation. The CEOs in these years may receive
compensation for loss of office and/or recruitment incentives which would also reduce the
relative pay slice of losers. Nevertheless, given that the impact on logged levels is also
negative for the fixed effects results, it does not appear that losers of CEO competitions
are being compensated.
15Prior to including age groups and year dummies in the regression, the estimated coefficients on the
loser dummy variable were strong (0.16-0.32) and significant.
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Lower levels of remuneration may result from losing a CEO tournament if being passed
over sends a negative signal of the director’s quality to the market for executive hires.
Given that the appointment of the CEO is a public event, a succession defeat could reveal
information regarding the suitability of the director for a top job, that was previously only
known within the firm. Optimal contracting theory would expect this reduced demand
to be reflected in the director’s remuneration package. Therefore, it is possible that any
loser compensation effect is being dominated by the reduction in external employment
opportunities for the director.
Under a tournament compensation framework, those who have a longer wait for promo-
tion should receive a greater prize (Gibbs, 1995; Bognanno, 2001). The longer the director
serves without being promoted to CEO, the less likely it will be that they will become CEO
as there are fewer succession opportunities for that director prior to his retirement. Indeed,
no director over 65 is promoted to CEO in this sample. Therefore, in order to preserve
incentives a longer wait ought to be accompanied by a larger prize. Table 5.7 shows that
older winners do indeed receive a greater prize than younger winners, albeit the estimated
coefficients are short of significance except for emoluments16. In terms of pay slice, the
older age group coefficients are mostly positive but are again short of significance.
Older losers who presumably have less chance of participating in a future succession
competition do not receive more compensation than younger losers. Indeed, tables 5.7
and 5.8 show they receive less. This is the opposite of what would be expected under the
loser compensation hypothesis. Rather, this is consistent with the negative signal effect
and the resulting reduction in employment opportunities which would be magnified for
older losers.
5.3.2 Compensation for Directors
Chief Executives
Table 5.9 shows the impact various predictor variables upon CEO salary, emoluments and
total remuneration, while table 5.10 examines the CEO’s relative pay slices. Consistent
with the standard literature on CEO compensation, internally hired CEOs receive less
than externally hired CEOs. Hired CEOs may sacrifice firm-specific human capital for
16Emoluments will mechanically be higher for older directors as emoluments includes the exercise of
stock options and vesting of equity incentives which require the satisfaction of certain criteria which often
takes at least three years.
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Table 5.7: Remuneration of Players
OLS Fixed Effects
Sal Emol Rem Sal Emol Rem Sal Emol Rem Sal Emol Rem
Winner 0.4596*** 0.4396*** 0.4498*** 0.4365*** 0.3870*** 0.4588*** 0.2463*** 0.1703*** 0.2169*** 0.2402*** 0.1803*** 0.2332***
(8.46) (6.77) (6.05) (9.95) (7.13) (7.51) (10.69) (4.03) (5.27) (10.18) (4.17) (5.51)
Loser 0.0761*** 0.0564** 0.0407 -0.0440 -0.0697 -0.0745 0.0138* -0.0248* -0.0057 -0.0221 -0.1149*** -0.0966**
(4.12) (2.21) (1.56) (-1.20) (-1.36) (-1.45) (1.93) (-1.63) (-0.43) (-1.29) (-2.89) (-2.73)
Age Group
50-55 0.1588*** 0.1570*** 0.1418*** 0.0382* 0.0090 0.0144 -0.0201* -0.0116 0.0200 -0.0158 -0.0048 0.0037
(6.98) (5.21) (4.54) (1.78) (0.30) (0.47) (-1.78) (-0.51) (0.99) (-1.27) (-0.18) (0.17)
55-60 0.2786*** 0.2794*** 0.2405*** 0.1173*** 0.0652 0.0487 -0.0319* -0.0969** -0.0149 -0.0234 -0.0995** -0.0454
(7.93) (5.66) (4.73) (3.78) (1.29) (0.96) (-1.64) (-2.54) (-0.45) (-1.24) (-2.38) (-1.25)
60-65 0.2989*** 0.3353*** 0.2701*** 0.2436*** 0.2609** 0.2383** -0.1336** -0.2690*** -0.1733** -0.1040** -0.2462*** -0.2005**
(4.61) (3.87) (3.19) (3.51) (2.71) (2.46) (-2.54) (-3.77) (-2.48) (-1.97) (-2.92) (-2.37)
>65 0.3627*** 0.2889* 0.1074 0.2843** 0.2943 0.1044 -0.2469** -0.4181*** -0.3605*** -0.1468* -0.2670* -0.2678**
(3.32) (1.70) (0.72) (2.48) (1.54) (0.66) (-2.78) (-3.27) (-3.79) (-1.69) (-1.73) (-2.32)
Winner*Age
50-55 0.0496 0.1259 0.1590 0.0097 0.0612 0.0601 -0.0084 0.0548 0.0944** 0.0081 0.0405 0.0856*
(0.68) (1.36) (1.51) (0.17) (0.84) (0.74) (-0.30) (1.08) (2.11) (0.25) (0.76) (1.91)
55-60 -0.0664 -0.0001 -0.0295 -0.0779 0.0097 -0.0294 -0.0029 0.1271* 0.0989 0.0095 0.1421** 0.1119*
(-0.72) (0.00) (-0.22) (-1.07) (0.10) (-0.27) (-0.07) (1.89) (1.58) (0.22) (2.06) (1.74)
60-65 0.0575 0.1162 0.0256 -0.0495 0.0400 -0.0843 0.1125 0.2941** 0.2249* 0.1054 0.3043** 0.2113
(0.40) (0.58) (0.12) (-0.38) (0.23) (-0.45) (1.23) (2.38) (1.93) (1.05) (2.07) (1.54)
>65 (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
Loser*Age
50-55 -0.0555* -0.0633* -0.0670* -0.0229 -0.0401 -0.0335 -0.0426*** -0.0580** -0.0748*** -0.0300** -0.0317 -0.0319
(-1.94) (-1.63) (-1.65) (-0.90) (-1.08) (-0.88) (-4.27) (-2.67) (-3.88) (-2.80) (-1.22) (-1.48)
55-60 -0.0513 -0.0561 -0.0652 -0.0417 -0.0471 -0.0385 -0.0647*** -0.0259 -0.0593** -0.0467*** 0.0266 -0.0074
(-1.29) (-1.00) (-1.14) (-1.23) (-0.89) (-0.72) (-4.12) (-0.87) (-2.16) (-3.12) (0.77) (-0.23)
60-65 -0.1132 -0.1386 -0.1837* -0.1537** -0.2011** -0.2264** -0.0184 0.0145 -0.0326 -0.0047 0.0369 0.0419
(-1.54) (-1.47) (-1.93) (-2.36) (-2.30) (-2.40) (-0.55) (0.28) (-0.58) (-0.15) (0.63) (0.58)
>65 -0.2487** -0.3039* -0.2575 -0.2597*** -0.3898** -0.2773* -0.2051*** -0.3018** -0.2964*** -0.1278** -0.2310 -0.1947**
(-2.52) (-1.76) (-1.56) (-3.22) (-2.27) (-1.87) (-2.94) (-2.33) (-3.76) (-2.35) (-1.40) (-2.16)
Tenure 0.0108** 0.0282*** 0.0066 0.1566* 0.3796** 0.3125**
(2.52) (4.77) (1.15) (1.64) (2.26) (2.30)
Tenure2 -0.0001 -0.0007** -0.0001 -0.0006*** -0.0012*** -0.0009***
(-0.83) (-2.76) (-0.55) (-3.55) (-4.24) (-3.75)
Largest Non-CEO Owner
0%-5% 0.0045 0.0021 -0.0014 0.0009 -0.0041 -0.0057**
(1.12) (0.38) (-0.26) (0.60) (-1.15) (-2.00)
5%-25% -0.0069*** -0.0056** -0.0040* -0.0010 -0.0011 0.0015
(-4.16) (-2.28) (-1.66) (-1.39) (-0.70) (1.21)
>25% -0.0021 -0.0058** -0.0063** 0.0003 0.0004 0.0020
(-1.03) (-2.30) (-2.66) (0.41) (0.26) (1.11)
No. EDs 0.0118** 0.0029 0.0103* -0.0004 -0.0169** -0.0075*
(2.76) (0.51) (1.79) (-0.15) (-2.97) (-1.55)
No. NEDs 0.1031*** 0.1413*** 0.1502*** 0.0054** 0.0057 0.0028
(25.42) (23.97) (24.11) (2.02) (0.89) (0.53)
% Independent NEDs 0.1122*** 0.0455 0.0947* -0.0241 -0.0163 -0.0310
(3.39) (0.90) (1.88) (-1.28) (-0.44) (-1.03)
% Ind NEDs*Loser 0.1063** 0.1255** 0.1268** 0.0298 0.0981* 0.0855**
(2.44) (1.97) (1.99) (1.41) (1.89) (1.98)
Sales 0.0371*** 0.0366*** 0.0407*** 0.0406*** 0.0697** 0.0691**
(14.08) (10.39) (11.15) (4.98) (2.76) (2.77)
TSR -0.0368*** 0.1844*** 0.0796*** -0.0096** 0.1270*** 0.0505***
(-3.81) (8.96) (4.39) (-1.78) (7.27) (3.70)
N 11863 11903 11917 9272 9296 9301 11863 11903 11917 9272 9296 9301
Groups 2356 2360 2361 2088 2092 2093 2356 2360 2361 2088 2092 2093
R-Squared 15.29 15.45 16.79 42.16 35.24 39.39 51.74 34.22 37.63 55.27 34.61 40.79
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Table 5.8: Pay Slice to Players
OLS Fixed Effects
Sal Emol Rem Sal Emol Rem Sal Emol Rem Sal Emol Rem
Winner 0.4444*** 0.4849*** 0.4638*** 0.4121*** 0.4321*** 0.4304*** 0.3579*** 0.4111*** 0.3714*** 0.3074*** 0.3216*** 0.3107***
(24.94) (22.38) (23.03) (21.17) (17.53) (17.21) (17.01) (14.90) (14.11) (13.63) (9.38) (9.71)
Loser -0.0083 0.0014 -0.0430*** -0.0130* -0.0034 -0.0357*** -0.0009 0.0175** -0.0384*** -0.0188*** -0.0222** -0.0497***
(-1.46) (0.18) (-6.26) (-1.88) (-0.34) (-4.13) (-0.19) (2.34) (-5.44) (-3.11) (-2.21) (-5.68)
Age Group
50-55 0.0196** 0.0273** 0.0220* -0.0154* 0.0079 0.0080
(1.90) (2.08) (1.75) (-1.64) (0.51) (0.61)
55-60 0.0260* 0.0361* 0.0180 -0.0415** -0.0368 -0.0265
(1.60) (1.65) (0.89) (-2.46) (-1.45) (-1.22)
60-65 0.1318** 0.1322** 0.0926* -0.0224 -0.0446 -0.0792
(2.77) (2.63) (1.79) (-0.47) (-0.77) (-1.41)
>65 0.0830 0.0482 -0.0331 -0.0156 -0.0086 -0.1117
(1.31) (0.58) (-0.49) (-0.21) (-0.07) (-1.30)
Winner*Age
50-55 -0.0043 -0.0016 0.0366 0.0194 0.0166 0.0726
(-0.15) (-0.04) (0.93) (0.65) (0.33) (1.80)
55-60 -0.0169 0.0027 -0.0085 0.0393 0.0719 0.0762
(-0.36) (0.05) (-0.17) (0.87) (1.24) (1.39)
60-65 0.1042 0.1603 0.1016 0.1145 0.1656 0.1196
(0.91) (1.27) (0.86) (0.88) (1.00) (0.78)
>65 (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
Loser*Age 50-55 -0.0359** -0.0517*** -0.0480*** -0.0008 -0.0197 -0.0155
(-2.82) (-3.02) (-3.06) (-0.09) (-1.25) (-1.11)
55-60 -0.0342* -0.0555** -0.0352* -0.0069 0.0004 0.0079
(-1.83) (-2.23) (-1.55) (-0.53) (0.02) (0.42)
60-65 -0.1051** -0.1151** -0.0895 -0.0399 -0.0437 0.0162
(-2.18) (-2.09) (-1.46) (-0.98) (-0.83) (0.24)
>65 -0.1408** -0.1456 -0.1161 -0.1480** -0.1741 -0.1321**
(-2.42) (-1.47) (-1.58) (-2.72) (-1.53) (-2.16)
Tenure 0.0114*** 0.0177*** 0.0066*** 0.0210*** 0.0322*** 0.0164***
(5.35) (6.80) (2.85) (8.36) (9.18) (5.44)
Tenure2 -0.0001 -0.0003** 0.0000 -0.0008*** -0.0010*** -0.0007***
(-0.62) (-2.35) (0.26) (-5.18) (-5.24) (-4.15)
N 11913 11953 11967 11863 11903 11917 11913 11953 11967 11863 11903 11917
Groups 2375 2379 2380 2356 2360 2361 2375 2379 2380 2356 2360 2361
R-Squared 13.58 8.31 10.35 19.94 12.4 12.43 13.56 8.24 10.35 15.70 8.41 8.08
1. T-stats in parenthesises based on standard errors clustered around groups and robust to heteroscedasticity
2. Dependent Variables and Sales in logarithms.
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which they require compensation (Topel, 1991; Harris and Helfat, 1997) in addition to the
physical costs of relocation (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1995).
Consistent with Conyon (1997), the combined Chairman-CEO role is generally not asso-
ciated with higher levels of remuneration compared to other CEOs. Although the sample
is restricted to FTSE 350 companies, it is possible that this is picking up a size effect
as smaller companies are more likely to have a combined Chairman-CEO role17. How-
ever, controlling for company size in the form of logged sales, together with other control
variables and firm and individual fixed effects, a 10% combined Chairman-CEO salary
premium is reported but there is no statistically significant premium in terms of emolu-
ments or total remuneration. The Chairman-CEO salary premium is replicated in terms
of the pay slice but combined Chairman-CEOs do not receive a greater proportion of
boardroom emoluments or total remuneration.
Older internal promotees to CEO receive a greater remuneration and a greater slice of
boardroom pay than younger promotees consistent with a tournament compensation struc-
ture. CEOs with large equity holdings do not appear use their control rights associated
with equity to secure larger remuneration packages for themselves. If anything, equity
appears to be a substitute for remuneration.
In order to maintain incentives, the tournament model predicts that the prize is increasing
in the number of players. In terms of the pay slice, an increase in executive directors does
increase the prize both in the OLS and the fixed effects regressions. However, in terms
of remuneration levels, CEO salary, emoluments and total remuneration are not found to
be increasing in the number of executive directors. However, as discussed above, due to
the unknown number of external candidates, the true number of players may not be well
defined by the number of executive directors.
Executive Directors
Table 5.12 examines the relative pay slice to all executive directors and table 5.11 the
levels of remuneration. Prior to controlling for fixed effects and other control variables,
directors who have been passed over for CEO do appear to earn more than other executive
directors. However, after controlling for fixed effects and other control variables only
the coefficient for salary is positive and only marginally significant. In terms of the pay
slice, losers generally appear to earn less not more than other executive directors. As such
17Even within the FTSE350 there is significant variation in company size.
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Table 5.9: Remuneration of Chief Executives
OLS Fixed Effects
Sal Emol Rem Sal Emol Rem Sal Emol Rem Sal Emol Rem
Chair & CEO -0.0751 -0.1242 -0.1249 0.0678 0.0488 0.0756 0.0537 -0.0869 -0.0131 0.0990* -0.0181 0.0755
(-1.25) (-1.49) (-1.46) (1.38) (0.63) (0.97) (1.18) (-0.78) (-0.13) (1.85) (-0.13) (0.66)
Internal 0.0775 0.0075 0.0165 -0.0132 -0.1332** -0.0822 0.0522 -0.4317* -0.2395 -0.0999 -0.6260** -0.4327**
(1.26) (0.10) (0.20) (-0.28) (-2.07) (-1.20) (0.30) (-1.76) (-1.27) (-0.94) (-2.61) (-2.31)
Age Group
50-55 0.2443*** 0.2272*** 0.2102*** 0.1146*** 0.0574 0.0558 0.0234 0.0064 0.0194 0.0228 0.0146 0.0160
(7.02) (4.73) (4.34) (3.72) (1.23) (1.24) (1.09) (0.14) (0.48) (0.87) (0.26) (0.37)
55-60 0.2962*** 0.2869*** 0.2082*** 0.1020** 0.0232 -0.0387 -0.0209 -0.0246 -0.0557 0.0027 0.0092 -0.0343
(7.29) (4.99) (3.62) (2.81) (0.41) (-0.71) (-0.73) (-0.41) (-1.04) (0.08) (0.13) (-0.60)
60-65 0.1517** 0.0273 -0.0377 0.0822 -0.0609 -0.1066 -0.0865 -0.1164* -0.1728** -0.0450 -0.0371 -0.1758**
(2.03) (0.26) (-0.38) (1.31) (-0.58) (-1.08) (-1.95) (-1.38) (-2.36) (-0.92) (-0.35) (-2.20)
>65 0.1789 0.3283 0.2819 -0.0163 0.0774 0.1156 -0.1893 -0.0897 -0.2288 -0.2802** -0.2698 -0.4441*
(1.05) (1.15) (1.06) (-0.13) (0.39) (0.64) (-1.22) (-0.27) (-0.81) (-2.04) (-0.82) (-1.59)
Winner*Age
50-55 -0.0420 0.0501 0.0846 -0.0910 -0.0206 -0.0131 0.0020 0.0881 0.0702 0.0333 0.1004 0.1034
(-0.53) (0.49) (0.75) (-1.52) (-0.25) (-0.15) (0.04) (1.08) (1.25) (0.56) (1.26) (1.79)
55-60 -0.0861 -0.0057 0.0044 -0.0674 0.0472 0.0490 0.0833 0.1980* 0.1896** 0.0958 0.1956* 0.1860**
(-0.90) (-0.05) (0.03) (-0.95) (0.47) (0.47) (1.36) (1.84) (2.33) (1.43) (1.83) (2.14)
60-65 0.1973 0.4186* 0.3188 0.0816 0.3326* 0.2145 0.1004 0.3996** 0.2969*** 0.1123 0.3864** 0.2657**
(1.28) (1.93) (1.46) (0.63) (1.80) (1.14) (1.23) (2.34) (2.92) (1.29) (2.01) (2.41)
>65 (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
Tenure -0.0060 0.0056 -0.0109 0.1587 0.5652 0.4564**
(-1.13) (0.71) (-1.35) (1.10) (1.36) (1.94)
Tenure2 0.0003** 0.0000 0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0003
(1.97) (-0.06) (1.40) (-0.30) (-0.31) (1.19)
CEO Equity
0-3% -0.1190*** -0.0914** -0.1110*** -0.0076 -0.0318 -0.0032
(-6.04) (-2.76) (-3.69) (-0.53) (-0.78) (-0.14)
3-15% 0.0039 -0.0188 -0.0111 0.0104 0.0087 0.0048
(0.40) (-1.24) (-0.75) (1.39) (0.65) (0.49)
>15% 0.0047 0.0112** 0.0118** -0.0012 -0.0008 -0.0008
(1.28) (2.14) (2.20) (-0.45) (-0.23) (-0.16)
Large Non-CEO Owner
0-5% 0.0116 0.0106 0.0073 -0.0009 -0.0048 -0.0108*
(1.45) (0.95) (0.66) (-0.34) (-0.60) (-1.83)
5%-25% -0.0066** -0.0062 -0.0040 -0.0016 -0.0002 0.0027
(-2.59) (-1.56) (-1.02) (-1.57) (-0.06) (1.17)
>25% -0.0016 -0.0065* -0.0083** 0.0018 0.0019 0.0010
(-0.66) (-1.95) (-2.65) (1.13) (0.51) (0.30)
No. EDs 0.0288*** 0.0131 0.0209* 0.0019 -0.0190* -0.0043
(3.37) (1.09) (1.79) (0.41) (-1.77) (-0.49)
No. NEDs 0.1044*** 0.1551*** 0.1638*** 0.0051 0.0086 0.0177*
(16.60) (14.44) (14.39) (1.05) (0.70) (1.80)
% Independent NEDs 0.1999*** 0.1461** 0.1384** -0.0008 0.0522 0.0173
(4.29) (2.18) (2.18) (-0.03) (0.91) (0.42)
Sales 0.0399*** 0.0406*** 0.0442*** 0.0756*** 0.0743*** 0.0839***
(9.38) (6.69) (7.33) (4.71) (2.85) (3.48)
TSR 0.0187 0.2348*** 0.1139*** 0.0089 0.1367*** 0.0714***
(1.10) (6.98) (4.17) (1.01) (4.72) (3.17)
N 4374 4397 4407 3171 3186 3188 4374 4397 4407 3171 3186 3188
Groups 1086 1094 1097 877 880 880 1086 1094 1097 877 880 880
R-Squared 11.62 12.07 13.84 42.12 34.68 40.23 49.86 27.99 31.10 50.14 27.09 34.20
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Table 5.10: Pay Slice to Chief Executives
OLS Fixed Effects
Sal Emol Rem Sal Emol Rem Sal Emol Rem Sal Emol Rem
Chair & CEO -0.0129 -0.0692 -0.0451 -0.0211 -0.0730* -0.0442 0.0730 -0.0246 -0.0442 0.1524** 0.0458 0.0376
(-0.38) (-1.57) (-1.07) (-0.59) (-1.63) (-1.07) (1.31) (-0.22) (-0.49) (2.24) (0.33) (0.33)
Internal -0.0227 -0.0384 -0.0527* -0.0469* -0.0808** -0.0738** -0.2632 -0.3700** -0.3647** -0.2504 -0.5380** -0.3545*
(-0.96) (-1.30) (-1.80) (-1.91) (-2.40) (-2.35) (-1.57) (-2.39) (-2.27) (-1.06) (-2.59) (-1.63)
Age Group
50-55 0.0706*** 0.0760*** 0.0713*** 0.0532** 0.0494* 0.0515** 0.0153 0.0349 0.0318 0.0108 0.0087 0.0071
(3.99) (3.30) (3.44) (2.61) (1.70) (2.11) (0.71) (1.08) (1.06) (0.43) (0.20) (0.21)
55-60 0.1065*** 0.1126*** 0.0585** 0.0574** 0.0555* 0.0100 -0.0160 0.0159 -0.0101 -0.0186 -0.0113 -0.0211
(5.37) (4.44) (2.50) (2.72) (1.87) (0.40) (-0.53) (0.34) (-0.24) (-0.58) (-0.19) (-0.45)
60-65 0.0853** 0.0721 -0.0008 0.0056 -0.0058 -0.0725 -0.0762 -0.0739 -0.1239** -0.0274 -0.0473 -0.1271*
(1.99) (1.36) (-0.02) (0.13) (-0.10) (-1.29) (-1.49) (-1.00) (-1.96) (-0.51) (-0.52) (-1.80)
>65 0.0167 0.0739 0.0092 -0.0698 -0.0152 -0.0536 -0.3360** -0.3399* -0.4591** -0.1557* -0.1846 -0.3992***
(0.20) (0.76) (0.09) (-1.04) (-0.17) (-0.50) (-1.98) (-1.68) (-2.50) (-1.76) (-1.02) (-3.27)
Winner*Age
50-55 -0.0492 -0.0433 -0.0130 -0.0567* -0.0415 -0.0316 0.0129 -0.0301 0.0384 0.0079 0.0365 0.0535
(-1.46) (-0.89) (-0.30) (-1.64) (-0.82) (-0.71) (0.30) (-0.35) (0.83) (0.18) (0.48) (1.08)
55-60 -0.0578 -0.0270 -0.0182 -0.1005** -0.0591 -0.0522 0.0873 0.0965 0.1393** 0.0673 0.1465 0.1211*
(-1.26) (-0.50) (-0.37) (-2.52) (-1.10) (-1.08) (1.44) (0.89) (1.97) (1.09) (1.46) (1.67)
60-65 0.1949* 0.2743** 0.2220* 0.1736 0.2550* 0.1881 0.1298 0.2512 0.2210** 0.1177 0.2989* 0.1778*
(1.65) (2.10) (1.89) (1.31) (1.73) (1.42) (1.22) (1.49) (2.31) (1.33) (1.68) (1.68)
>65 (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
Tenure -0.0009 0.0040 -0.0068 0.0439 0.0092 -0.1065
(-0.30) (0.74) (-1.26) (0.34) (0.05) (-0.73)
Tenure2 0.0002** 0.0001 0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0002
(1.99) (0.32) (1.40) (-1.16) (-0.49) (0.73)
CEO Equity
0-3% -0.0287** -0.0397** -0.0246 -0.0236 -0.0594*** -0.0382**
(-2.01) (-2.03) (-1.37) (-1.42) (-2.89) (-2.21)
3-15% 0.0019 -0.0029 -0.0034 0.0115* 0.0133 0.0185**
(0.31) (-0.40) (-0.44) (1.64) (1.46) (2.40)
>15% -0.0049** -0.0037 -0.0024 -0.0047** -0.0045 -0.0097***
(-2.08) (-1.18) (-0.62) (-2.58) (-1.41) (-2.84)
Largest Non-CEO Owner
0-5% 0.0055 0.0061 0.0087 0.0005 -0.0031 -0.0028
(1.23) (0.92) (1.51) (0.15) (-0.50) (-0.62)
5%-25% -0.0007 -0.0010 -0.0013 -0.0002 -0.0005 0.0014
(-0.48) (-0.47) (-0.67) (-0.15) (-0.24) (0.70)
>25% 0.0006 0.0000 -0.0015 0.0009 0.0030 -0.0011
(0.48) (-0.01) (-0.74) (0.45) (1.15) (-0.28)
No. EDs 0.0460*** 0.0440*** 0.0456*** 0.0397*** 0.0500*** 0.0469***
(8.48) (6.86) (7.86) (6.36) (5.00) (5.85)
No. NEDs 0.0050 0.0109* 0.0124** -0.0128** -0.0124 -0.0090
(1.23) (1.77) (2.38) (-2.26) (-0.95) (-1.08)
% Independent NEDs 0.0497 0.0457 0.0076 -0.0352 0.0498 -0.0193
(1.55) (1.11) (0.21) (-1.13) (0.81) (-0.48)
Sales 0.0067*** 0.0063** 0.0035 -0.0019 0.0246 0.0016
(3.00) (2.09) (1.30) (-0.14) (1.10) (0.09)
TSR 0.0125 0.0211 0.0267* 0.0115 0.0088 0.0230*
(1.05) (1.22) (1.92) (1.17) (0.42) (1.61)
N 4374 4397 4407 3171 3186 3188 4374 4397 4407 3171 3186 3188
Groups 1086 1094 1097 877 880 880 1086 1094 1097 877 880 880
R-Squared 4.55 2.59 2.08 14.03 7.27 8.32 5.61 3.03 2.67 7.37 4.04 4.54
1. T-stats in parenthesises based on standard errors clustered around groups and robust to heteroscedasticity
2. Dependent Variables and Sales in logarithms.
3. Year Dummies
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the results appear to broadly favour the premise that reduced employment opportunities
dominant the loser compensation effect.
5.3.3 Duration Analysis
The results in section 5.3.1 do not find categorical support for the loser compensation
hypothesis. However, if social or other reasons prohibit the increased compensation of
directors purely for being passed over for the top job, it may be more acceptable for
all parties if the director leaves the company. Such an outcome remains consistent with
the tournament model as the losing director, who previously accepted a remuneration
package worth less than their marginal product in order to participate in the promotions
tournament, will have a strong incentive to leave. Alternatively, if the loss of the CEO
succession competition reduces the external employment opportunities, it may be that no
compensation is necessary to retain the director, in which case the director has no financial
incentive to leave.
This section will explore the director’s likelihood of exit with particular regard to the
effect of a CEO succession defeat. Consistent with the methodology of chapter 3, a semi-
parametric duration analysis framework is employed to determine the likelihood of exit
which will vary throughout the directors’ tenure. Specifically, it will be interesting to
understand how an executive director’s hazard rate reacts to the succession of a rival. For
the purposes of constructing the hazard, the failure event is considered to be the end of the
executive directors’ tenure as an executive director. As in chapter 3, directors who remain
on the board at the end of 2005 are right censored. A promotion to CEO or change in the
director’s position does not constitute a failure event, provided the director continues as a
full time executive at the same company.
Further to the descriptive statistics presented in section 5.2, figure 5.6 shows the hazard
to any exit state for CEOs and executive directors in our sample. CEOs have a lower haz-
ard throughout, reflecting their longer median tenures. The movement of the underlying
likelihood of exit over the directors tenure is strikingly similar for CEOs and executive
directors. Both groups experience a low initial hazard, identified as a the monitoring pe-
riod in chapter 3, which rises until the 5th year and then levels off (declines for the CEO)
before rising rapidly due to the increased frequency of retirements. The leveling off (or
decline) in hazard after the fifth year of tenure was the subject of investigation in chapter
3 where two possible explanations for the observed phenomenon were offered. Firstly,
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Table 5.11: Remuneration of Executive Directors
OLS Fixed Effects
Sal Emol Rem Sal Emol Rem Sal Emol Rem Sal Emol Rem
loser 0.0975*** 0.0701*** 0.0557** 0.0477 -0.0356 -0.0347 0.0226*** -0.0125 0.0201 -0.0193 -0.1046** -0.0693**
(5.45) (2.84) (2.21) (1.34) (-0.70) (-0.69) (3.16) (-0.82) (1.50) (-1.20) (-2.66) (-1.99)
Age Group
50-55 0.1591*** 0.1875*** 0.1547*** 0.0704*** 0.0713*** 0.0651** -0.0131 -0.0179 0.0134 -0.0029 0.0005 0.0019
(9.04) (7.97) (6.50) (4.25) (2.92) (2.68) (-1.42) (-0.87) (0.74) (-0.27) (0.02) (0.10)
55-60 0.2569*** 0.2704*** 0.2146*** 0.0983*** 0.0530 0.0281 -0.0434*** -0.0719** -0.0178 -0.0236 -0.0552 -0.0376
(10.46) (8.29) (6.43) (4.42) (1.58) (0.84) (-2.84) (-2.16) (-0.62) (-1.47) (-1.47) (-1.21)
60-65 0.2781*** 0.2343*** 0.1551*** 0.1381*** 0.0519 0.0255 -0.1387*** -0.230***5 -0.1743*** -0.0800** -0.1814*** -0.1932***
(6.84) (4.31) (2.93) (3.29) (0.89) (0.45) (-4.24) (-4.40) (-3.70) (-2.37) (-2.91) (-3.45)
>65 0.1696* 0.0117 -0.0877 -0.0022 -0.1278 -0.1998* -0.2824*** -0.4518*** -0.3662*** -0.1740*** -0.3253*** -0.3479***
(1.90) (0.11) (-0.83) (-0.03) (-1.04) (-1.84) (-4.80) (-5.14) (-5.18) (-2.90) (-3.07) (-4.33)
Loser*Age
50-55 -0.0521* -0.0898** -0.0735* -0.0513** -0.1094*** -0.0900** -0.0452*** -0.0503** -0.0634*** -0.0351*** -0.0275 -0.0193
(-1.90) (-2.39) (-1.89) (-2.17) (-3.08) (-2.51) (-4.62) (-2.30) (-3.23) (-3.29) (-1.08) (-0.91)
55-60 -0.0350 -0.0554 -0.0517 -0.0398 -0.0665 -0.0542 -0.0489*** -0.0424 -0.0517** -0.0359** 0.0017 -0.0075
(-0.95) (-1.10) (-1.02) (-1.31) (-1.52) (-1.24) (-3.51) (-1.48) (-1.99) (-2.47) (0.05) (-0.25)
60-65 -0.1012 -0.0468 -0.0825 -0.1078* -0.0631 -0.0912 -0.0227 0.0058 -0.0206 -0.0191 0.0208 0.0477
(-1.43) (-0.51) (-0.89) (-1.83) (-0.80) (-1.12) (-0.78) (0.12) (-0.40) (-0.69) (0.38) (0.77)
>65 -0.0698 -0.0524 -0.0844 -0.1466 -0.1396 -0.1533 -0.1843*** -0.2814** -0.2865*** -0.0843* -0.1718 -0.1345*
(-0.49) (-0.29) (-0.46) (-1.26) (-0.86) (-1.04) (-3.02) (-2.40) (-3.87) (-1.72) (-1.16) (-1.88)
Chair 0.2540*** 0.2021*** 0.2270*** 0.2185** 0.3268** 0.4761***
(6.69) (3.94) (4.36) (2.19) (2.39) (3.54)
FD 0.0335** -0.0038 0.0134 0.0383 0.0919 0.1039**
(2.31) (-0.18) (0.64) (1.01) (1.51) (1.97)
Tenure 0.0082** 0.0277*** 0.0066 0.2417** 0.5550*** 0.3412**
(2.01) (5.16) (1.32) (2.49) (3.41) (2.63)
Tenure2 -0.0001 -0.0007*** -0.0002 -0.0007*** -0.0013*** -0.0008***
(-0.81) (-2.98) (-0.77) (-4.87) (-4.94) (-3.93)
CEO Equity 0-3% -0.0954*** -0.0771*** -0.1182*** 0.0087 0.0329* 0.0218*
(-8.65) (-4.30) (-7.07) (1.45) (1.84) (1.84)
3-15% 0.0083* -0.0058 0.0009 -0.0028 -0.0086 -0.0128**
(1.81) (-0.77) (0.13) (-0.93) (-1.14) (-2.20)
>15% 0.0081*** 0.0142*** 0.0150*** 0.0030** 0.0049* 0.0078***
(3.26) (4.51) (4.73) (2.16) (1.69) (3.07)
Largest Non-CEO Owner 0-5% 0.0054 0.0059 0.0017 0.0010 0.0007 -0.0042
(1.56) (1.19) (0.36) (0.67) (0.22) (-1.61)
5%-25% -0.0049*** -0.0057** -0.0032 -0.0008 -0.0023* 0.0009
(-3.52) (-2.74) (-1.56) (-1.34) (-1.60) (0.83)
>25% -0.0068*** -0.0077*** -0.0084*** -0.0005 0.0003 0.0012
(-5.07) (-3.98) (-4.42) (-0.92) (0.21) (0.93)
No. EDs 0.0087** 0.0120** 0.0181*** -0.0002 -0.0174*** -0.0048
(2.43) (2.40) (3.61) (-0.09) (-3.38) (-1.08)
No. NEDs 0.0994*** 0.1323*** 0.1387*** 0.0060** 0.0050 0.0023
(30.79) (27.52) (28.50) (2.63) (0.87) (0.46)
% Independent NEDs 0.1787*** 0.0538 0.0906** -0.0348** -0.0186 -0.0125
(6.65) (1.31) (2.27) (-2.28) (-0.59) (-0.49)
Ind NEDs*Loser -0.0029 0.0802 0.0802 0.0392** 0.1078** 0.0869**
(-0.07) (1.28) (1.29) (2.00) (2.13) (2.07)
Sales 0.0358*** 0.0339*** 0.0379*** 0.0379*** 0.0599*** 0.0569***
(16.77) (11.66) (12.78) (5.30) (2.97) (2.89)
TSR -0.0280*** 0.1795*** 0.0847*** -0.0011 0.1400*** 0.0683***
(-3.15) (9.87) (5.31) (-0.23) (8.79) (5.54)
N 16724 16805 16827 12500 12548 12554 16724 16805 16827 12500 12548 12554
Groups 4258 4276 4282 3514 3523 3524 4258 4276 4282 3514 3523 3524
R-Squared 9.63 10.52 12.54 37.70 29.38 34.45 43.25 26.29 28.5 47.38 27.56 31.18
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Table 5.12: Pay Slice to Executives
OLS Fixed Effects
Sal Emol Rem Sal Emol Rem Sal Emol Rem Sal Emol Rem
Loser 0.0048 0.0236** -0.0215** -0.0020 0.0190 -0.0276 -0.0021 -0.0028 -0.0310*** -0.0196 -0.0233 -0.0629**
(0.70) (2.19) (-2.28) (-0.10) (0.61) (-0.95) (-0.35) (-0.27) (-3.47) (-1.41) (-0.81) (-2.46)
Age Group
50-55 0.0565*** 0.0828*** 0.0558*** 0.0220** 0.0501*** 0.0319** -0.0051 0.0171 0.0155 -0.0088 0.0189 0.0110
(6.64) (6.72) (4.82) (2.51) (3.49) (2.39) (-0.61) (1.16) (1.30) (-1.02) (1.05) (0.79)
55-60 0.0723*** 0.0972*** 0.0448*** -0.0055 0.0253 -0.0144 -0.0349** -0.0069 -0.0135 -0.0280** 0.0108 -0.0143
(6.19) (5.95) (2.93) (-0.44) (1.38) (-0.84) (-2.58) (-0.29) (-0.73) (-2.16) (0.40) (-0.70)
60-65 0.1427*** 0.1383*** 0.0676** 0.0121 0.0048 -0.0339 -0.0634** -0.0340 -0.0481 -0.0216 -0.0081 -0.0583
(5.14) (4.38) (2.37) (0.42) (0.14) (-1.05) (-1.96) (-0.77) (-1.34) (-0.94) (-0.19) (-1.35)
>65 0.0505 -0.0076 -0.0676 -0.1894*** -0.2124*** -0.2640*** -0.1403** -0.1418* -0.1649** -0.0676 -0.0847 -0.1628**
(0.92) (-0.14) (-1.26) (-3.60) (-3.31) (-5.04) (-2.65) (-1.82) (-2.83) (-1.26) (-0.93) (-2.49)
Loser*Age
50-55 -0.0551*** -0.0852*** -0.0711*** -0.0444*** -0.0867*** -0.0676*** -0.0119 -0.0302* -0.0227* -0.0049 -0.0117 -0.0055
(-4.54) (-4.88) (-4.51) (-3.71) (-4.30) (-3.70) (-1.39) (-1.92) (-1.67) (-0.53) (-0.61) (-0.34)
55-60 -0.0368** -0.0657*** -0.0332 -0.0160 -0.0556** -0.0148 -0.0183 -0.0307 -0.0048 -0.0104 -0.0054 0.0160
(-2.06) (-2.86) (-1.57) (-0.96) (-2.21) (-0.64) (-1.51) (-1.45) (-0.27) (-0.85) (-0.22) (0.76)
60-65 -0.0578 -0.0609 -0.0206 -0.0435 -0.0474 -0.0012 -0.0347 -0.0694 -0.0142 -0.0079 -0.0265 0.0594
(-1.43) (-1.25) (-0.38) (-1.07) (-1.00) (-0.02) (-1.01) (-1.47) (-0.24) (-0.38) (-0.62) (0.85)
65 0.0171 0.0156 0.0130 -0.0189 -0.0264 -0.0227 -0.1646*** -0.1794* -0.1301** -0.0609 -0.0749 -0.0221
(0.22) (0.15) (0.15) (-0.26) (-0.24) (-0.27) (-3.59) (-1.90) (-2.28) (-1.50) (-0.53) (-0.33)
Chair 0.2538*** 0.1830*** 0.2099*** 0.1447* 0.2775** 0.3041***
(9.40) (4.04) (4.53) (1.70) (2.19) (2.96)
FD -0.0071 -0.0275** -0.0180** -0.0196 -0.0331 0.0053
(-1.01) (-2.83) (-2.02) (-0.82) (-1.10) (0.20)
Tenure 0.0097*** 0.0184*** 0.0062** 0.0000 -0.0268 -0.0002
(3.62) (5.77) (2.23) (0.00) (-0.22) (0.00)
Tenure2 -0.0001 -0.0003** 0.0000 -0.0007*** -0.0010*** -0.0005***
(-0.84) (-2.30) (-0.30) (-7.33) (-5.03) (-3.57)
CEO Equity
0-3% -0.0025 -0.0013 -0.0042 0.0007 0.0075 0.0147*
(-0.40) (-0.12) (-0.49) (0.16) (0.73) (1.86)
3%-15% 0.0012 0.0042 0.0036 -0.0006 0.0012 -0.0020
(0.44) (1.03) (1.01) (-0.26) (0.23) (-0.57)
>15% 0.0004 0.0000 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0009
(0.22) (0.01) (0.14) (-0.21) (0.09) (0.46)
Largest Non-CEO Owner
0-5% 0.0005 -0.0003 0.0003 0.0010 0.0025 0.0013
(0.27) (-0.10) (0.10) (0.84) (1.00) (0.75)
5-25% -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0002
(-0.82) (-0.37) (-0.74) (-0.45) (-0.97) (-0.28)
>25% 0.0000 0.0006 0.0005 -0.0009 0.0000 0.0004
(0.03) (0.32) (0.26) (-1.56) (-0.04) (0.45)
No. EDs 0.0087*** 0.0082* 0.0109** 0.0082*** 0.0086** 0.0095***
(4.24) (1.92) (2.61) (4.69) (2.53) (3.35)
No. NEDs 0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0018 -0.0030* -0.0024 -0.0051
(0.19) (-0.12) (-0.62) (-1.63) (-0.59) (-1.57)
% Independent NEDs -0.0237 -0.0105 -0.0188 -0.0251** -0.0210 -0.0408**
(-1.54) (-0.41) (-0.77) (-2.06) (-0.96) (-2.30)
Ind NEDs * Loser -0.0046 -0.0077 0.0100 0.0093 -0.0016 0.0298
(-0.19) (-0.19) (0.26) (0.55) (-0.04) (0.92)
Sales -0.0018 -0.0013 -0.0007 -0.0208*** -0.0139 -0.0214***
(-1.47) (-0.76) (-0.45) (-4.14) (-1.55) (-2.90)
TSR -0.0089 -0.0129 -0.0068 -0.0102*** -0.0160 -0.0071
(-1.55) (-1.36) (-0.81) (-2.62) (-1.56) (-0.98)
N 16724 16805 16827 12500 12548 12554 16724 16805 16827 12500 12548 12554
Groups 4258 4276 4282 3514 3523 3524 4258 4276 4282 3514 3523 3524
R-Squared 2.46 1.55 1.25 13.73 6.51 5.51 2.48 1.63 0.96 4.5 3.03 2.16
1. T-stats in parenthesises based on standard errors clustered around groups and robust to heteroscedasticity
2. Dependent Variables and Sales in logarithms.
3. Year Dummies Included.
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Figure 5.6: Hazard to Any Exit
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by year five, shareholders have acquired sufficient information as to the competence of
the CEO to be willing to stick with them even if performance is mediocre. Secondly, a
reduction in the hazard after year five may be the end result of actions taken by the CEO
designed to entrench themselves in their position. The results of chapter 3, albeit not
entirely conclusive, favoured the entrenchment hypothesis. The evidence presented here,
that the CEO’s hazard declines but the executive director’s hazard does not, may also be
suggestive of CEO entrenchment. The CEO is better positioned to capture the nomina-
tions process than executive directors, whereas one would presume that a performance
revelation effect would apply to CEOs and executive directors alike.
Figure 5.7 shows the impact of winning or losing a CEO succession competition18. Un-
surprisingly winning a succession competition reduces the hazard of exit. However, being
passed over for promotion is associated with a dramatic increase in the hazard, particu-
larly if the defeat occurs during the early years of their tenure. Such a pattern is consistent
with the ‘up or out’ employment model. Upon experiencing a succession defeat, it ap-
pears a significant number of directors are either persuaded to leave or are unwilling to
wait around for the next succession competition and immediately seek employment else-
18An executive director is identified as a winner or loser once the succession is announced. Prior to this
or if no succession competition took place then both loser and winner variables will equal zero.
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Figure 5.7: Hazard to Any Exit
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where. If the loss occurs after the fifth year of the director’s tenure, then the effect reduces.
It is possible that directors who have had a longer wait and then are passed over send a
stronger signal about their suitability for a top job. In which case, these directors may
have less external promotion opportunities and are consequently more willing to stay on
as executive directors. It is also possible that these directors have built up more equity
incentives with vesting conditions during their tenure and are therefore less inclined to
leave until they have satisfied their vesting conditions and realised their equity.
Table 5.13 describes the results of a Cox (1972) regression for all executive directors. It
shows the significance of the executive’s position in the determination of the likelihood
of exit. Against the base of the executive director, CEOs, chairmen and finance directors
all experience lower hazards. Combined Chairman & CEOs experience the lowest hazard
rates, less than half the likelihood of exit than executive directors. Older directors gen-
erally experience larger hazard rates than younger directors, albeit directors over 65 do
not have higher hazards than directors 60-65. In addition, directors of smaller companies
within the FTSE 350 and better performing companies are shown to have lower hazard
rates.
The blockholder variable marginally increases the hazard at levels of blockholder equity
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between 5% and 25%. Nevertheless, the monitoring effect measured by this variable
is not as strong as expected. A stronger effect might be captured if the identity of the
blockholder was able to be determined as different types of owners might well use their
control rights in very different ways (E.g. a venture capitalist may be a more vigilant
monitor than a trust fund controlled by the CEOs family). Unfortunately, this information
is not available without considerable further research.
Directors with a small number of rivals, as measured by the number of executive directors
serving on the board, have significantly lower hazard rates. The number of non-executive
directors marginally increases the hazard. However, the independence of non-executive
directors is largely inconsequential which, again, is surprising given the importance at-
tributed to the independence of directors both in the academic literature (Bebchuk and
Fried, 2004) and the reform of best practice (Combined Code, 2003).
Although the difference in quartiles is not as large as in chapter 3, the hazard responds
to relative performance as measured by annual FTSE 350 TSR quartiles. Here, the move
out of the bottom quartile causes the most significant reduction in the hazard but there
is no reduction in hazard from moving from the second to the top quartile. The weaker
effect can be attributed to the hazard comprising all exit states, some of which would
become more likely following good performance (e.g. headhunted). It is also possible
that a CEO, being the agent most responsible for delivering shareholder value, is judged
on TSR performance to a greater extent than his executive subordinates, who are more
likely assessed on operating or divisional performance.
Impact of CEO Succession
In order to explore the impact of CEO succession competitions on the likelihood of exit,
tables 5.14 and 5.15 split the sample into executive directors (including finance directors
and chairman) and CEOs. For the purposes of constructing the failure event for executive
directors any director promoted to CEO is considered to be right censored, otherwise the
failure event occurs when they are no longer serving on the board.
Table 5.14 confirms the graphical analysis of figure 5.7 that when a rival is promoted to
the position of CEO a dramatic increase in the likelihood of exit occurs. The interaction
with age and the loser variable are interesting. It appears that older losers are less at risk
of exit than younger losers. If age was a good proxy for the probability that the CEO
would be around for the next succession round we would expect older directors to be
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Table 5.13: Hazard to Any Exit - All Positions
1 2
Position
Chairman & CEO 0.510*** (-4.93) 0.499*** (-4.68)
CEO 0.647*** (-9.01) 0.604*** (-9.06)
Chairman 0.693*** (-5.10) 0.642*** (-5.29)
Finance Director 0.778*** (-7.25) 0.667*** (-7.80)
Age Group
50-55 1.061 (1.37) 1.044 (0.93)
55-60 1.547*** (10.20) 1.509*** (8.67)
60-65 2.369*** (13.63) 2.364*** (11.82)
>65 1.801*** (4.96) 1.890*** (4.44)
Largest Non-CEO Owner
0%-5% 0.992 (-0.65)
5%-25% 1.006* (1.66)
>25% 1.001 (0.25)
No. EDs 0.840*** (-14.48)
No. NEDs 1.022** (2.06)
% Independent NEDs 1.015 (0.19)
lnsales 1.125*** (20.98)
Total Shareholder Return
LQ-Median 0.769*** (-5.78)
Median-UQ 0.656*** (-8.77)
UQ 0.675*** (-8.00)
N 21451 15950
No Directors 4945 4068
No. Failures 3676 2969
Wald χ2 476.2 1087.9
1. T-statistics reported in the parentheses.
2. *** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%.
3. Year dummies included.
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more likely to move on if, as suggest by the results in section 5.3.1, they are not being
compensated. Instead the reverse effect is found; older losers are less likely to exit. This
suggests that the reduction in external employment opportunities associated with both age
and being passed over for the top job dominate the need to be compensated for previously
sacrificing compensation in order to participate in a CEO promotion competition. The
remaining variables are broadly consistent with the results presented in table 5.13.
For completeness, we measure the impact of our main variables on the CEO’s hazard rate
in table 5.15. Internally promoted CEOs have a marginally higher hazard than external
hires, albeit the estimated coefficients are short of significance. There is an interaction
effect between internally promoted CEOs (winners) and directors aged 60-65, suggesting
these CEOs are at particularly high risk, beyond that which arises naturally from being
old and internally promoted. One factor that might contribute to this is the practice of
appointing an experienced director on a short-term basis when the company is in a period
of transition or crisis. An increase in CEO equity at low levels is important in reducing
the hazard for the CEO, whereas an increase in equity above 3% appears inconsequential.
In addition, our blockholder variable is stronger for the CEOs than for the executive direc-
tors. The effect is to reduce the hazard at low levels of blockholder equity but to increase
it at levels beyond 5%, albeit beyond 5% the effect is only marginally significant.
As suggested above, there is a greater response in the hazard to TSR performance for
CEOs than for executive directors. The effect of increasing the number of executive di-
rectors is broadly similar to that for executive directors, with more executive director being
associated with lower hazards. However, for CEOs, an increase in non-executive direc-
tors also reduces the hazard, whereas for executive directors the hazard was increased.
This, together with the finding that the independence of the directors appears relatively
unimportant, implies that the process of reform which has seen boards comprise a greater
proportion of independent non-executive directors has put CEOs under greater risk. How-
ever, again it should be stressed that these findings should be considered with the fact that
the hazard is for all exit states, not just the hazard of forced departure. Indeed, in chapter 3
evidence was presented that an increase in independent non-executive directors did result
in a higher hazard of forced departure for CEOs.
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Table 5.14: Hazard to Any Exit - Executive Directors
1 2
Loser 7.3908*** (2.92) 4.2278* (1.86)
Age Group
50-55 1.1018 (1.48) 1.0365 (0.48)
55-60 1.7343*** (8.52) 1.6530*** (6.64)
60-65 2.9836*** (12.35) 2.7050*** (9.27)
>65 1.8910*** (4.61) 1.9262*** (4.12)
Loser*Age
50-55 0.9396 (-0.68) 0.9440 (-0.58)
55-60 0.8366** (-1.95) 0.7984** (-2.22)
60-65 0.5715*** (-4.05) 0.6511** (-2.84)
>65 0.9165 (-0.37) 0.9601 (-0.13)
Chair 0.6675*** (-4.58)
FD 0.6570*** (-8.07)
CEO Equity
0-3% 0.9239* (-1.63)
3-15% 1.0061 (0.29)
>15% 1.0021 (0.17)
Largest Non-CEO Equity
0-5% 1.0021 (0.16)
5-25% 1.0058 (1.41)
>25% 1.0005 (0.12)
No. EDs 0.8537*** (-12.25)
No. NEDs 1.0318** (2.76)
% Independent NEDs 0.8522 (-1.42)
Ind NEDs * Loser 1.2685 (1.47)
Sales 1.1074*** (16.50)
Total Shareholder Return
LQ-Median 0.8326*** (-3.72)
Median-UQ 0.6964*** (-6.82)
UQ 0.7900*** (-4.44)
N 16961 12685
No. Directors 4280 3532
No. Failures 3038 2458
Wald 630.0 1120.9
1. T-statistics reported in the parentheses.
2. *** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%.
3. Year dummies included.
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Table 5.15: Hazard to Any Exit - CEOs
1 2
Winner 1.108 (0.88) 1.179 (1.28)
Chairman & CEO 0.991 (-0.06) 1.077 (0.50)
Age Group
50-55 1.030 (0.28) 0.982 (-0.16)
55-60 1.595*** (4.69) 1.502*** (3.72)
60-65 2.299*** (5.88) 2.327*** (5.54)
>65 1.592 (1.22) 1.852 (1.54)
Winner*Age
50-55 1.079 (0.42) 1.387 (1.13)
55-60 0.668** (-2.32) 0.959 (-0.16)
60-65 0.713 (-1.26) 1.920** (2.25)
>65
CEO Equity
0-3% 0.731** (-2.76)
3-15% 1.045 (1.04)
>15% 0.992 (-0.36)
Largest Non-CEO Holdings
0-5% 0.946** (-2.03)
5-25% 1.013* (1.65)
>25% 1.001 (0.10)
No. EDs 0.852*** (-5.46)
No. NEDs 0.955* (-1.73)
% Independent NEDs 0.894 (-0.61)
Ln Sales 1.129*** (9.94)
Total Shareholder Return
LQ-Median 0.648*** (-4.49)
Median-UQ 0.594*** (-5.07)
UQ 0.512*** (-6.18)
N 4490 3265
No.Directors 1111 893
No. Failures 770 623
Wald 101.5 341.7
1. T-statistics reported in the parentheses.
2. *** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%.
3. Year dummies included.
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5.4 Conclusions
This chapter has sought to provide an overview of remuneration arrangements of, not just
the CEO, but all executive directors. This has allowed an exploration of certain topics
beyond the scope of pay studies that limit their investigation to the CEO. In particular,
this chapter has presented data on the levels of remuneration associated with each execu-
tive position together with the distribution of pay within the executive management team.
Furthermore, this chapter has approached tournament theory from a new perspective by
investigating the effects of CEO succession events on the remuneration and likelihood of
exit of executive directors.
If, as posited under tournament theory, CEO competitions are self financing with directors
accepting smaller remuneration packages relative to their marginal product in exchange
for the prospect of winning the prize, then it might follow that on losing the competition
pay will increase to compensate the director for the absence of a future promotion oppor-
tunity. Further, one might expect that this compensation effect to be particularly important
to older CEOs as younger CEOs may still be able to participate in the next CEO compe-
tition. However, after controlling for fixed effects and standard wage control variables
executive directors do not appear to receive additional remuneration when somebody else
is appointed to the position of CEO. Moreover, the compensation effect is not stronger for
older directors. As such, the findings of this chapter do not support the loser compensation
hypothesis.
There may be a number of factors at play resisting a loser compensation effect. It could
simply be socially unacceptable for directors to receive additional compensation for losing
a promotions competition. The author knows of no anecdotal evidence where a company
has admitted to undertaking a remuneration review just because a CEO succession has
occurred. It is unlikely that such a review would be welcomed by shareholders. Remu-
neration reviews are often undertaken following a change in strategy, which may involve
a change in CEO, but the justification for the review is typically based around the new
strategy rather than the change in personnel. If it is just a social convention that prevents
the compensation of losers then a succession defeat should generate a strong financial
incentive for the director to leave the company for greater reward elsewhere.
Alternatively, it is possible that the reduced employment opportunities associated with
being passed over for the top job counteract the loser compensation effect. If being passed
over for the top job reveals some adverse information regarding the director’s suitability
207
for a CEO position, then the director may experience a contraction in external employment
opportunities. Consequently, compensation to retain the CEO would not be necessary in
which case a succession defeat would not result in a higher likelihood of exit. Indeed,
older directors who experience a succession defeat receive less compensation than other
directors which could suggest that the negative signal is magnified for older directors.
In order to distinguish between these competing explanations of the absence of a loser
compensation effect, the impact of succession defeat on the likelihood of exit was ex-
plored. The promotion of a rival to CEO dramatically increases the directors exit likeli-
hood. This is consistent with the idea that lack of compensation for being passed over,
prompts directors to seek employment elsewhere. However, older directors who expe-
rience a succession defeat experience a lower likelihood of exit than younger directors
who experience a succession defeat. This suggests that the financial incentive to leave to
organisation is reduced for these older losers. This is consistent with the negative signal
effect which is presumed to be more significant for older directors as the signal is stronger
for these directors.
The analysis of compensation upon exit likelihood is worthy of further exploration. An
obvious, albeit labour intensive extension, would be to distinguish between the exit types
and adopt a competing risks framework as in chapter 3. This would allow a more precise
estimate of the impact of the variables of interest upon different exit states. The adoption
of a parametric form, in addition to the semi-parametric method employed here would
also be an interesting accompaniment to the results presented in this chapter. Moreover,
the implementation of a frailty model in order to control for unobserved individual het-
erogeneity would also be a worthwhile extension.
Like the majority of published work on executive remuneration, a shortcoming of this
investigation is the absence of data concerning directors’ pensions. Executive directors
of public companies typically enjoy company pension contributions or belong to a de-
fined benefit scheme with accrual rates of up to 1
30
th
of final salary per annum. These
pension benefits are not insignificant. Lord Browne, left BP plc with a pension pot worth
approximately £20M. Further, anecdotal evidence suggests that losers of CEO promotion
competitions are compensated in the form of additional pension benefits. Unfortunately,
for the majority of our sample years, UK public companies were not required to disclose
information on the executive directors’ pensions. However, since the introduction of the
Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations (2002) companies are obligated to disclose
pension contribution to directors and valuations of define benefit schemes. Therefore,
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there is certainly scope for further research in establishing whether losers of CEO promo-
tion competitions receive additional pension benefits. Such a study would provide a more
complete picture of the compensation to executive directors, following the promotion of
a rival to the position of CEO.
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Appendix
5.A Hay Group
Hay Group performs job evaluations for both publicly traded and privately owned compa-
nies. Each job is assigned a reference level on the basis of the job’s size, complexity and
importance. The reference level is determined prior to considering the performance of
individual employees. The reference levels have been used in discrimination court cases
to determine equal pay for equal worth. A CEO of a large international organisation will
have a reference level towards the top end of the scale. A CEO of a smaller organisation
and a senior executive of a larger organisation could have the same reference level. A
lower level executive of a smaller company will be towards the beginning of the scale.
Within a firm, a typical promotion is considered to be approximately 2 reference levels.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion
‘There is widespread concern that inappropriate remuneration schemes, par-
ticularly but not exclusively in the areas of investment banking and trading,
may have contributed to the present market crisis.’
Financial Services Authority ‘Remuneration Policies’ 13 October 2008.
6.1 Overview
This thesis has sought to contribute to the body of applied microeconomic research that
has investigated the extent to which existing remuneration and governance arrangements
facilitate the delivery of shareholder value. This fundamental question remains the moti-
vation behind much of the current research in corporate governance. In pursuit of an an-
swer, the existing theoretical and empirical literatures have explored several topics. These
include questions over the alignment of managerial incentives with shareholder interests
(Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck, 2004); (for instance provided
by stock options (Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon, 2005; Hall and Liebman, 1998; Hall and
Murphy, 2003)); the, perhaps undue, influence that CEOs are able to exercise of the pay-
setting process (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004) and their own likelihood of exit (Hermalin and
Weisbach, 2003; Weisbach, 1988); the importance of shareholder rights (Gompers, Ishii,
and Metrick, 2003) and the extent to which monitoring by active shareholders reduces
agency problems (Karpoff, 2001; Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi, 2008) but potentially
reduces firm-specific investment by the executives themselves (Burkart, Gromb, and Pa-
nunzi, 1997); the influence of shareholder voting (Kerr Christoffersen, Geczy, Reed, and
Musto, 2007); and the extent to which competition for promotion to CEO elicits effort
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from board members (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Bognanno, 2001).
This thesis has focused upon the contemporary academic debates surrounding the inde-
pendence of the pay setting process; the extent to which the turnover of CEOs responds to
firm performance; the impact of shareholder activism; and the remuneration of executive
directors. Data from Manifest Information Services Ltd on FTSE 350 companies 1995-
2005 was used to conduct four empirical investigations into corporate governance and
executive remuneration. This research was, perhaps, better positioned than the extant em-
pirical literature to explore these issues as our sample contains important details missing
from prior studies. Manifest’s database was designed in 1995 and took advantage of the
regulation introduced at the time (Greenbury, 1995) which vastly improved the disclosure
of executive remuneration, particularly in respect of bonus arrangements, executive stock
option schemes and long term incentive plans. Manifest’s database records detailed infor-
mation on all aspects of executive remuneration on an individual basis. Each director’s
service dates are recorded and an assessment of every non-executive director’s indepen-
dence from their firm and the executive management team is undertaken. In addition,
Manifest logs every resolution proposed for shareholder approval at company meetings
and, where disclosed by the company, the poll results associated with each resolution. In
structuring the research project, consideration was given how to maximise the potential
of the dataset and optimise the resulting contribution to the literature. For this reason,
the thesis was structured around four quite separate empirical investigations, albeit on the
related themes of governance and managerial incentives.
This chapter will provide a summary of the research objectives of this doctoral project,
reiterating why they are relevant to the contemporary academic debates and why they are
useful for practitioners. Further, this chapter will assess the extent to which these objec-
tives have been satisfied during this project. The contribution of the project predominately
lies within the empirical testing of important existing theories associated with executive
remuneration and corporate governance. Common to all the theories examined in this
thesis is how far the observed arrangements serve to add shareholder value and therefore
the extent to which the underlying processes that generate the observed arrangements are
operating efficiently.
This research has also explored new areas and has taken advantage of econometric tech-
niques that have, hitherto, not been exploited in the existing literature. This has resulted in
a number of exciting preliminary findings that warrant further examination. Each chapter
also identifies the shortcomings and limitations of the investigations, together with areas
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which require further exploration. This chapter will collate these opportunities for fu-
ture research and make further suggestions as to worthwhile areas for related projects to
explore. Final thoughts are presented in section 6.4.
6.2 Research Objectives and Principal Findings
This research has sought to make a contribution to knowledge in the field of applied mi-
croeconomics by engaging existing theories associated with executive remuneration and
corporate governance with evidence. By applying sophisticated econometric techniques
to previously unexamined data it was envisaged that significant and meaningful insights
into competing theories being advanced in the literature could be made. While the com-
peting theories are not entirely incompatible with each other there are certain aspects
of theories which are mutually exclusive. The resolution of these incompatible explana-
tions of remuneration and governance arrangements was the first objective of this research
project.
However, this research also had other objectives. Our sample permitted the application of
certain econometric methods that had not been fully exploited in the existing literature.
Certain insights have been made into the topics that would have been difficult to achieve
with standard methods. Furthermore, following the exploratory work in this thesis it
is hoped that future research might be guided along new lines of inquiry. Finally, this
thesis was designed to be a useful resource for practitioners and policy makers in the
governance and remuneration industries. Consequently, an overview of UK remuneration
and governance arrangements was provided in the introduction and each chapter presented
summary information and descriptive statistics where appropriate1.
6.2.1 Academic Contribution
Chapter 2 sought to assess two competing theories concerning the determination of chief
executive remuneration; ‘optimal contracting’ and ‘rent extraction’. If remuneration con-
tracts are determined optimally, the structure and composition of the remuneration com-
mittee responsible for creating, observing and reviewing those pay arrangements should
also be the optimal arrangement for the firm. Consequently, the proportion of indepen-
1Following completion of this thesis, the author intends to present the findings to organisations in the
corporate governance industry.
213
dent directors serving on the board or the remuneration committee would be the optimal
arrangement for the firm. Therefore we would not expect any difference between those
companies with lots of independent directors and those with none. However, if unresolved
agency problems are embedded in the operation of public companies, as posited by the
rent extraction theory, CEOs can be expected to capture the pay setting committee and in-
flate their own remuneration. Under such circumstances, independent directors should be
more resilient to capture and therefore an increase in independent directors on the board or
the remuneration committee might be correlated with an reduction in CEO remuneration.
The empirical testing of the above propositions is not as straight forward as might appear
at first glance. Chapter 2 demonstrated that there were numerous issues related with
accurate data measurement and correct econometric specification. The chapter conducted
a thorough examination of how the results were sensitive to each methodological choice.
Such an exercise is well suited to a chapter of a thesis which is not restricted by the same
space requirements imposed on journal articles. Indeed, while the final preferred estimator
of chapter 2 tended to favour the optimal contracting view of pay setting arrangements,
perhaps the more important contribution of chapter 2 was the demonstration of which
econometric specifications are likely to produce the most robust tests of the propositions.
Following on from chapter 2, we were keen to explore CEO turnover along similar lines.
Again, two competing theories were examined, this time concerning the extent to which
the threat of CEO dismissal is an effective discipline or whether unresolved agency prob-
lems allow CEOs to capture the process and entrench themselves in their organisations.
Again, the extent to which the directors were independent was examined in order to help
judge between these hypothesises.
While independence of the directors appears relatively unimportant in the capture of re-
muneration, chapter 3 did find some evidence for the entrenchment of CEOs and some
success of independent directors in reducing this entrenchment. However, once again an
important contribution of the chapter lies within the application of an econometric method
not previously applied to CEO turnover. By using duration analysis to analyse the time
to different exit states a clear narrative emerged concerning the movement of the hazard
over the course of the CEO’s tenure. It is unlikely that we would have been able to ex-
plore the concepts of entrenchment and performance revelation by using standard binary
regression models. In addition, it is hoped that the application of this technique will guide
future research to new areas2.
2Some possibilities are discussed in the section below.
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Chapter 4 undertook a different approach. Here, the objective was to contribute to the
debate regarding shareholder activism and its importance in the creation of shareholder
value. Much of the existing literature suspects that direct intervention by shareholders is
at best inconsequential and their interference could even be damaging. Therefore, in addi-
tion to measuring the impact on returns, we were interested to ascertain whether activism
influenced any other aspect of corporate governance, particularly, given the subject matter
of the earlier chapters, the remuneration and turnover processes. For the first time, data on
the votes cast at shareholder meetings were used as a proxy for activism. Consistent with
the extant literature, shareholder voting did not appear to influence future shareholder re-
turns, rather shareholder voting appeared to reflect prior unresolved under-performance.
Shareholder voting on remuneration arrangements and the election of CEOs also reflected
performance and also governance best practice in terms of the composition and inde-
pendence of board committees. However, despite anecdotal evidence to the contrary, no
evidence of a relationship between dissent at shareholder meetings and future remuner-
ation arrangements was found, nor was any relationship uncovered between shareholder
voting and the likelihood of forced departure. It appears that voting against violations of
best practice does not translate into the adoption of best practice or removal of the CEO.
In light of this finding it was important to consider the incentives for shareholder ac-
tivism. Much has been made in literature of the lack of adequate incentives to activism,
as activism constitutes a public good with the associated free-rider problems. Moreover,
given the absence of any relationship with voting, it is possible that the influence of ac-
tivism occurs prior to the meeting takes place, in which case dissent through voting would
only capture the unresolved matters of shareholder concern. However, in the same way
that there is pressure to vote with management in order to preserve the reputation of the
company, shareholder efforts to discipline managerial behaviour are only credible if in-
centives for doing so are consistent with improving shareholder returns. Furthermore, the
measurement of activism is itself difficult, as many instances of shareholder engagement
are outside of the public domain. While we can not observe the shareholder engagements
themselves we can observe the actions that they achieve. Therefore an analysis of the
market’s reaction to the most significant governance event - the dismissal of the CEO -
provided an insight into the influence that shareholders are able exercise over the compa-
nies that they own. While the market reacts negatively on the day of the announcement of
the CEO’s dismissal, the action does appear to significantly improve the fortunes of the
company, suggesting that shareholders do potentially possess a credible threat with which
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to discipline managerial behaviour. The extent to which the forced departure is the result
of direct shareholder engagements requires further investigation.
Chapter 5 was designed to provide an overview of all executive directors’ remuneration,
together with an insight into the distribution of pay between board members. This led
naturally to an analysis of tournament theory; that is the extent to which large pay differ-
entials between the CEO and the other executive directors are used to motivate executive
directors to compete for the CEO’s job in the next promotion tournament. Empirically
testing tournament theory is difficult as large pay differentials are compatible with other
theories of executive remuneration. In light of this, chapter 5 focused on the compensation
for executive directors who are in office when somebody else is promoted to the position
of CEO. One possible implication of a self-financing tournament is that directors who are
passed over for the position of CEO might require compensation to adjust for the loss of
promotion incentives, otherwise they face a financial incentive to leave.
Again the importance of econometric method was reinforced, as at first glance there ap-
peared to be a large compensation effect for the losers of CEO tournaments. Yet, after
controlling for individual fixed effects and other control variables the impact on remuner-
ation was statistically insignificant. To test whether the absence of a compensation effect
increased the likelihood of exit (as expected if remuneration is structured in a manner con-
sistent with tournament theory), the duration analysis framework undertaken in chapter 3
was exploited again. If no increase in exit likelihood occurred then the absence of a loser
compensation effect could be the result of a loss in external employment opportunities
arising from being passed over. However, a significant increase in the likelihood of exit
was found when executive directors were passed over for promotion, consistent with the
tournament model.
6.2.2 Contribution to Practice
This research has the potential to serve as a resource for practitioners and policy makers of
best practice and may serve to inform future decisions made in the corporate governance
and executive remuneration industries. For example, discerning between the optimal con-
tracting and the rents capture model of executive pay determination is very relevant to the
ongoing debate regarding the reform of UK corporate governance. Conventional wisdom
has it that more independent directors achieve a better alignment of CEO pay packets
and with the interests of shareholders. However, if no relationship between pay and the
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independence of the directors is found then no matter how independent your directors,
the efficiency of the CEO’s remuneration contract will be unaffected. As such, reforming
efforts might be best directed elsewhere.
Likewise, the extent to which CEOs face a threat of dismissal has direct implications for
policy makers of best practice. The majority of reform efforts have sought to improve
disclosure and transparency in the audit, internal control and pay-setting processes. Yet
relatively little attention has been given to the threat of dismissal and its potential to dis-
cipline the behaviour of the CEO. If agency problems can be sufficiently mitigated via
the threat of dismissal, then policy makers may be prompted to focus their efforts less on
remuneration and more on CEO turnover. Indeed, the findings of this research tentatively
suggest that there is more entrenchment in the dismissals process than there is capture of
the pay-setting process.
The call for greater shareholder activism has also been a prominent characteristic of the re-
form era. Over our sample, a number of organisations have emerged, including Manifest,
that offer shareholders proxy voting and related services for institutional shareholders.
Policymakers have sought to encourage institutions to vote their shares in an attempt to
raise overall governance standards. While voting levels have increased, chapter 4 was
unable to identify any causal link between voting and any aspect of governance or perfor-
mance. In contrast, the dismissal of the CEO under pressure from shareholders did have
a major impact on the future direction of the company. Consequently, shareholder insti-
tutions and policymakers might be better off focusing their attention on how to maximise
the return of direct engagements, rather than increased voting levels.
Further knowledge of the distribution of pay within the board should empower practi-
tioners and policy makers with a greater understanding of the key issues when setting
remuneration policies. The investigation of chapter 5 into tournament theory might be
particularly useful for policymakers. Tournament theory provides a justification for the
large pay differentials observed between employees at different levels within a company’s
hierarchy. Viewing the CEO’s remuneration as a prize, internal competition for this prize
helps to elicit effort from the executive directors.
Yet UK policymakers are either unaware or have chosen to ignore the potential of pro-
motion incentives. The combined code (2006) makes no reference to tournament theory,
limiting the role of remuneration to ‘attract, motivate and retain’ only the director who
is being remunerated3. Therefore, the main incentive device proposed by institutional
3Perhaps it is difficult for companies to convince their shareholders that CEOs get paid ‘more than they
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guidance is performance-related pay through long term equity incentives. However, these
incentives are costly as large grants are necessary to motivate risk averse agents. How-
ever, if incentives can be provided by having the CEO’s remuneration constitute a prize
then the need for costly equity incentives might be reduced. It may be cheaper and more
efficient to re-balance the CEO’s remuneration in the direction of non-variable elements
if its function is to act as a prize for the other directors.
6.3 Suggestions for Future Research
As stated in the conclusion to each chapter, there is scope within each empirical investiga-
tion for further exploration. This section will briefly highlight these suggestions for future
related research but will also suggest more general new avenues for research in executive
remuneration and corporate governance.
While the evidence presented in chapter 2 does not generally support a rents capture
model, it would be wrong to dismiss the model outright. Accusations of capture are often
directed at the specific details of pay arrangements, such as annual bonus arrangements
or the nature of the performance conditions associated with the vesting of equity incen-
tives. While this study examined impact of independence on total remuneration, it remains
possible that an independent pay-setting committee may be important in the design and
monitoring of these incentive schemes. In the context of the present financial crisis, it
would be worth exploring how governance factors influence the extent to which incentive
schemes reward luck rather than genuine performance. One possibility is a comparison
of the incentive schemes that pay-out against peer group performance against those that
reward against absolute earnings. Also, given that the strongest variable that determined
current pay was prior period pay, it may be worth exploring the factors that cause pay
from prior periods to persist into current remuneration arrangements. If a faster rate of
adjustment is associated with a more efficient pay-setting process more independence in
the pay-setting process might be associated with faster adjustment rates.
Chapter 3 applied a semi-parametric method as nothing was known about the underlying
distribution of the hazard. It would be worth exploring the potential in adopting a full
parametric form which assumes a distribution for the baseline hazard. This would result
in more efficient estimates, provided the assumed distribution is a fair representation of
deserve’, i.e. more than their marginal contribution to productivity.
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the underlying hazard. Further, while adjustments for unobserved individual effects were
made to the standard errors used for inference on the hazard ratios it might be worth
modeling these effects directly applying a ‘frailty’ model. Together, these adjustments
would provide an interesting comparison to the results presented in that chapter.
An extension of the work in chapter 3 that explored the impact of governance reforms
would also be of interest. Ideally, to identify the precise impact of the reforms one would
desire two groups of similar companies, except that one group was not subject to the re-
forms. This would enable the application of difference-in-difference methods in order to
distinguish between the impact of the reforms and the changes that occurred due to other
factors. The collection of this sample would be difficult as the reforms apply to all large
UK listed companies. However, some companies listed on the Alternative Investment
Market (AIM) are broadly similar to the smaller companies listed on the FTSE All Share.
AIM companies are exempt from the combined code and the directors’ remuneration re-
port regulations and therefore might constitute an appropriate control group.
Chapter 4 might be extended by attempting to capture the effect of behind the scenes ne-
gotiations with management. Obviously, given the hidden nature of these engagements
acquiring sufficient data to perform a quantitative experiment might prove difficult. How-
ever, as Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2008) have shown, access to data is not impos-
sible. If a casual link between the engagements of shareholders and shareholder returns
could be established it would have wide ranging implications for the operation of corpo-
rate governance and the direction of future research.
An obvious but important extension to chapter 5 is the collection of data on the executive
directors’ mode of exit. Chapter 3 showed that different modes of exit for the CEO should
be modelled differently. Therefore, the adoption of the competing risks framework for
executive directors would provide more accurate results as to the impact of a CEO suc-
cession event upon the existing executive director’s likelihood of exit. In addition, to the
acquisition of pensions data, which is now publicly disclosed in public companies’ annual
report and accounts, would aid the calculation of total executive remuneration.
Whilst it certainly appears that a CEO succession event has implications for the other
executive directors, further theoretical work would also increase our understanding of ex-
actly what to expect. This would provide a more complete framework for future empirical
work. For example, it would be interesting to understand how existing remuneration lev-
els might moderate the extent to which the likelihood of exit increases when a rival is
promoted. It would also be useful to have a better understanding of how the prospect
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of the CEO being hired externally might disrupt tournament incentives for the existing
directors.
During the implementation of this research, a number of issues have been left unresolved
due to the complexity of the processes underlying the observed arrangements. As such this
research project might be complemented by a qualitative investigation on broadly similar
themes. For example, a shortcoming of chapter 2 is that it is difficult to know whether
directors who satisfy the criteria of independence are indeed independent in character and
judgement. While Manifest’s assessment is the best available large sample information on
the matter, if one was able to actually sit in remuneration committee meetings it might be
possible to determine whether the criteria for independence, as laid out in the Combined
Code (2003), actually translate into real independence of character and judgement. Gain-
ing access to remuneration committee meetings would be difficult to negotiate in practice
but it is not beyond the realms of possibility. Roberts, McNulty, and Stiles (2005) un-
dertook interviews with 40 directors as part of the Higgs (2003) review into the role and
effectiveness of the non-executive director. Their research was able to identify ways in
which non-executive directors have the potential to perform duties outside of their moni-
toring role envisaged by agency theory by, for instance, making contributions to strategy.
6.4 Final Conclusions
Popular interest in executive remuneration and corporate governance appears universal
and robust to the prevailing economic climate. During years of economic growth, the
business press highlights the remarkable levels of pay earned by top executives whereas
in less plentiful years accusations of rewards for failure and a lack of accountability are
restated. Since the onset of the present financial crisis commentators are calling for an
overhaul of regulation in the financial services industry. Remuneration arrangements, in
particular, annual bonuses have once again have been criticised (FSA, 2008)4. Subse-
quent attempts by policymakers to reform the existing framework will, no doubt, provide
opportunities for further related research.
However, academic research in executive remuneration and corporate governance should
not just respond to the latest headlines. Corporate governance and executive remuneration
4Note that uncapped bonuses for investment companies had been highlighted as issues for shareholder
concern by institutional guidance (ABI, 2003) and companies such as Manifest long before the present
financial crisis. Bruce, Skovoroda, Fattorusso, and Buck (2007) also examined the issue of bonuses and
firm performance.
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have evolved to become mainstream disciplines for academic inquiry. Murphy (1999)
identified the explosion of academic work published in executive remuneration from the
1980’s to 1990’s. Since the turn of the millennium, this trend has continued, or even
gathered pace, with voluminous material being produced on the subjects. Undoubtedly,
the wide interest in the subjects has stimulated the academic inquiry but it is more the
resolution of outstanding academic questions that is central. We are far from a complete
understanding of governance and pay arrangements. Incompatible theories of governance
and remuneration continue to be advanced by different parties which demand resolution
through empirical testing.
The emergence of new major economic territories such as China and India provides an ex-
citing new avenue of research for all applied microeconomists but particularly for scholars
interested in executive remuneration and corporate governance. Incumbent companies in
such territories have their own governance tradition, about which little is known5. The im-
plications of Chinese or Indian style governance regimes for delivering shareholder value,
operational performance or efficient remuneration contracts are undocumented. The lack
of access to data in such territories, remains a significant obstacle to effective research in
this area but given these territories are becoming more open to investment from outside it
may not be long before a meaningful attempt at an empirical study into such countries is
possible. Outside investors bring with them their own standards and expectations of good
governance which may bring them into conflict with the status quo in those countries.
Corporate governance agencies, such as Manifest, already provide coverage of stocks on
a global basis.
In summary, academics interested in executive remuneration and corporate governance
have never been better placed to conduct research. Given the level of popular interest,
together with the development of the topics into credible subject matter for research and
improving availability of data it should not difficult to win funding for research and pub-
lish the output. Many of the theoretical debates remain unresolved and prior empirical
studies require further development. Research that results in a greater understanding of
how to design and operate efficient corporate governance arrangements should assist the
creation of shareholder value, which is the stated objective of every public company in
the UK.
5Even the extent to which the government retains influence over these companies is unclear.
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